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Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
Me again. My strong impression, after viewing many files and drinking many cups of tea staring into the distance, is that the only way to see what influenced US decision making processes during that period is to start with the US facility for tracking U-boats (pre OP20-G). Although not as sophisticated as the UK Submarine Tracking Room, it was the only place the US authorities had where the whole story was available to view. It incorporated current and hstorical information into the assesments produced and, as such, became an intelligence source in it's own right. This is would have been the paramount source for policy-makers to study trends.
A single conversation with an OP20-G member a few years ago settled it in my mind. He was surprised that I would even ask: as far as he was concerned, the natural suspicion of code-breaking and SIGINT in general by many senior staff was overcome by the 'matter-of-fact' reports coming out of this source, and the doubters seemed able to ignore the SIGINT background.
As you no doubt appreciate, FDR had been moving mountains behind the scenes to prepare the USA for war, and he found a great partner in Churchill, but the British transfer of scientific equipment and intelligence information during 1940 began before Winston took control.
Bruce
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