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Old 5th August 2009, 02:00
tcolvin tcolvin is offline
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Re: VIIIUSAAF and BC failures at the Wesel bridges.

From the following excerpts from the official report on Veritable, it seems that with regard to Wesel, the mediums and heavies got two tasks;
1) Preventing reinforcements from assembling to cross bridges and ferries. This was given to BC, the area bombing experts, and to 2 Group RAF (in 2TAF).
2) Bringing down the road and railway bridges. This was given to the precision-bombing experts, VIII USAAF. They brought down one span of the road bridge. I assume this was patched in some way, because the road bridge remained a target.
When VIIIUSAAF failed, 2 Group RAF had a go on March 3 and 5, being controlled by MRCP (see the thread on the failure at the Roer dams for an expression of my surprise that MRCP was not used in that instance as well). 2 Group RAF also failed.

REPORT ON OPERATION “VERITABLE", 8 February - 10 March 1945 by G(Ops) Records, HQ British Army of the Rhine, October 1945
(Excerpts dealing with Air Support by mediums and heavies.)
SECTION 11 AIR
56. The whole resources of Second TAF were available in addition to "heavies” of US IX Bombardment Div and Bomber Command. The operation would NOT be delayed, however, in the event of bad weather preventing the air forces from operating.
57. In outline, the air support plan was as follows :
(a) Prior to D-Day. Operations against railways, bridges and ferries serving the battle area, care being taken not to give any indication of the point of attack.
(b) On the night D minus 1/D, "heavies" would try to obliterate EMMERICH, CLEVE and GOCH, cratering being accepted.
(c) On D-Day, priority was given to fighter-bombers on the German gun areas, with an FCP and CABRANK available all day. It was also hoped to use American "heavies" on NUTTERDEN and MATERBORN, using anti-personnel and proximity fuse bombs. Consideration was given to the possibilities of dropping liquid fire bombs or canisters to burn out certain areas or concrete pill-boxes. These plans had to be rejected as low altitude flying would be necessary and the probable losses were unacceptable. In addition, all roads leading to the battle area and the RHINE crossings were to be covered by armed recce and Tactical Recce.
d) On night D/D plus 1, approaches and railway centres would be treated to prevent the arrival of enemy reserves.

AIR PHASE I
87. Medium and heavy bombing attacks prior to D-Day consisted of the following ;
1 Feb, 113 aircraft of VIII USAAF dropped 281 tons of HE on the road bridge at WESEL without success, and 26 aircraft put 59 tons on the rail bridge, but observation of results was not possible.
2 Feb, 56 aircraft of 2 Group RAF dropped 81 tons of HE on an oil mill, actively in production, at HEIDEN E 9260, with good results.
6 Feb, 30 aircraft of 2 Group RAF attacked a POL dump and depot of 27 oil storage tanks at EMMERICH and 48 tons of bombs were seen to fall in the CENTRE of the target area.
Night 7/8 Feb, 287 aircraft of RAF Bomber Command dropped 1,384 tons of HE on CLEVE and 153 aircraft put down 467 tons on GOCH, in both cases to deny the main routes into the battle area. Results were excellent. In addition, 95 aircraft of 38 Group dropped 1,670 x 500 lb bombs on the road centres and billeting areas of WEEZE, UDEM and CALCAR.
88. During Phase 1 of the operations bad weather seriously interfered with the medium and heavy bombing programmes. In spite of this, however, flying was attempted on every day except 12 Feb, and a number of targets were engaged. The weight of attack in most cases had to be curtailed and the results obtained were usually impossible to observe. For example, the following instances can be cited. On D-Day 8 Feb, 198 aircraft were scheduled to bomb the NUTTERDEN feature but owing to the weather and proximity of our own tps, the attack had to be called off, many aircraft jettisoning their bombs on CLEVE. On the same day, 144 aircraft were detailed on MATERBORN but only 16 attacked, and 64 aircraft were directed on KRANENBURG by radar but no results could be observed. GELDERN and RHEINBERG A 2128 were attacked on 9 Feb; XANTEN the next day; SONSBECK and KEVELAER by instruments on the 11th, and WEEZE, UDEM, XANTEN and KEVELAER again on 13 Feb.

AIR PHASE 2
95. Medium and Heavy bombing programnmes during this phase included the following targets. On 14 Feb, when visibility was the best so far in this operation, 2 Group RAF attacked WEEZE, UDEM, STRAELEN and NIEUKERK with a total of 122 aircraft. VIII USAAF dropped 98 tons of HE on the WESEL road bridge and destroyed one of its spans. IX USAAF put over 166 aircraft to attack GELDERN, KEVELAER, XANTEN and GOCH.
The15th was to all intents and purposes a non-flying day.
On the next day UDEM and WEEZE were attacked by 61 arcraft of 2 Group RAF, 418 tons of HE from 95 aircraft of RAF Bomber Command fell on WESEL and 63 aircraft of VIII USAAF also attacked the same town.
17 Feb was another blank day for the Mediums and Heavies.

AIR PHASE 3
103. This period was again marked by bad weather and close support was only possible on a very limited scale until 21 Feb. The Medium and Heavy bombers carried out a number of attacks chiefly bombing by instruments.
On 18 Feb 155 LANCASTERS of RAF Bomber Comrnmand dropped 691 tons of HE on WESEL.
On the 19th 166 aircraft of RAF Bomber Command attacked WESEL again, dropping 716 tons, and 68 aircraft of VIII USAAF put 164 tons of HE on the WESEL railway bridge.
The 20th was a blank day and the effort on 21 Feb was on a small scale. 30 aircraft from 2 Group RAF attacked each UDEM and WEEZE, and IX USAAF put over 73 aircraft at XANTEN and 58 at GELDERN. The 22nd was a good flying day but all the Allied effort was concentrated deep into GERMANY.

AIR PHASE 4
113. No flying was possible on 23 Feb.
On the next day Medium and Heavy bombers of 2 Group RAF, with 43 aircraft, bombed RHEINBERG and with 45 aircraft REES. VIII USAAF sent 70 aircraft to try once again to destroy the WESEL railway bridge, but without success.
The 25th was a day of small effort. 2 Group RAF attacked UDEM and XANTEN.
Visibility remained poor on 26 Feb and the effort was again small. 2 Group RAF sent 30 aircraft to attack gun positions and 10 aircraft of 38 Group RAF attacked the ammunition dump at XANTEN once again.

AIR PHASE 5
122. Weather was again a limiting factor during this phase.
On 27 Feb, 62 aircraft of 2 Group RAF bombed MARIENBAUM and SONSBECK.
On the 28th GELDERN, by 2 Group RAF, and RHEINBERG by IX USAAF, were attacked. KEVELAER, and once again XANTEN, were engaged by 61 aircraft of 2 Group RAF-when 96 tons of bombs were dropped on 1 Mar.
The effort remained small on the next day with a few aircraft of 2 Group RAF attacking GELDERN, KEVELAER and RHEINBERG.
On 3 Mar the road and rail bridges at WESEL were once more attacked by some 70 aircraft of 2 Group RAF but remained standing after the raid.

AIR PHASE 6
136. During this period the weather again most seriously interfered with our air effort. The Medium and Heavy bombers were only able to operate on 5, 6 and the very early morning of 7 Mar. Close support was restricted to 5 Mar only. The enemy may consider himself fortunate that the weather intervened to protect his constantly diminishing bridgehead on the LEFT bank of the R RHINE opposite WESEL. Little less than complete destruction of his forces might have been achieved had the weather been kinder.
137. On 5 Mar, 41 aircraft of 2 Group RAF dropped 164 x 1,000 lb. bombs on the WESEL bridge, and 48 aircraft put down 183 x 1,000 lb bombs on the road bridge, both MRCP controlled. Hits were claimed but the bridges still remained up. On the next day 39 MOSQUITOES of RAF Bomber Command attacked tp concentrations in WESEL putting down 41 tons of HE. This attack was followed by two further ones. The first the same evening and the second early on the morning of 7 Mar. 82 Heavies dropped some 463 tons of HE. During the intervening hrs between these two attacks, 46 single MOSQUITOES kept the pot boiling.

SECTION 27 AIR SUPPORT MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBERS (Summary)
182. The pIan for medium and heavy bombers involved the attack before D-Day of POL dumps and installations within tactical distance from the battle-field, and the two bridges over the R RHINE at WESEL. On the night D minus 1/D-Day, heavy attacks were carried out on communication centres and defence strong points, behind the main enemy defence line.
On D-Day, a series of attacks by medium bombers was planned to neutralize the main enemy defensive areas in the path of the attack, but achieved only limited success, owing to weather conditions. Thereafter, attacks were mainly directed
against communication centres and billeting areas, though an ammunition dump and the bridges at WESEL took on a very important aspect later on in the operation.

Tony
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