Je vous dis qu'il faut cesser le combat
Maybe he was right in the summer of 1940, especially without the benefit of hindsight.
No Frenchman was keen nor gallant 1940
Fortunately those are your words, not Townsends and anyone on this forum.
You misquote and take out of context, odd for someone who's good in languages as yourself - perhaps Freudian
In half the time!
It isn't about time Yves, it is about
sorties flown. How many sorties did the Luftwaffe fly during the Battle of France compared to the Battle of Britain? Again I'd be surprised if you really didn't know the difference.
"L'Invicibles Vainqueurs"
So they did their share of the job, the RAF finished the job and did the 2nd, remaining half. It had become easier for all the well-known reasons (radar, own soil etc.) but also because the French (including AA in many cases) had destroyed a large part of the German aircraft (German production was very insufficient at the time) AND of the German aircrew, almost exclusively perfectly-trained, combat-hardened men including many a German fighter ace who didn't survive. These AC and these aircrew would have done a lot of harm in the English sky and possibly would have tipped the balance. Townsend ought to have been very grateful to the French instead of spitting at their graves!
Your standard Britain should be very greatful, since it was France who practically won the Battle for Britain before it started. Yet there are no numbers. How many aces did the Jagdwaffe loose? What is the exact number of aircrew
lost over France, air crew that didn't return like Mölders did. Did this really influence the balance? The Luftwaffe had to lick its wounds (rest its crews and replace lost a/c and men after two months of campaigning), but is there any proof that they were planning a size increase before the attack on Britain? Did the Luftwaffe enter the Battle of Britain with a significantly weaker force? Judging by the 1941 forces that engaged the Soviet Union, I'd be tempted to say (without checking my sources) that such an expansion was not really part of the plan. Would larger reserves have helped during the Battle of Britain campaign, sure, but they would not have tipped the balance. Lets not even start on
almost exclusively perfectly-trained, combat-hardened men, that is a gross exaggeration.
Last but not least : the French should not have surrendered? What about the Dutch, who surrendered already on 15 May, a bit hastily I think (I am aware of the Rotterdam fire)
Fight fire with fire right? Indeed the dutch could have fought on, for what, two days longer and achieve what? The main towns in ruins and no strategic gains. You do not understand the dutch situation, Fortress Holland, although valuable in the days before the aeroplane, had become worthless in WW2. Fortress Holland also contains all the "big" cities concentrated in a rough triangle Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Utrecht. Sure the dutch could have lasted a couple of days extra - only the army, since the AF had fought itself to oblivion.
Fighting on for more ruins and dead civilians.
Je vous dis qu'il faut cesser le combat
The problem with modern states is that there is a difference between the time they've been beaten and the time they accept they have lost. The dutch being good tradesmen, know when a cause is lost, they than start looking at cutting their losses and the next hopefully more profitable deal.
In this case the next deal happended to be the continued fight from Britain.
Unlike France the dutch had a poor bargaining position.
what about Belgium, which surrendered on 28 May, leaving the French army "in the air", in a very awkward (and deadly) position.
Don't you mean
Anglo-French armies?
what about the British, who started their evacuation planning very early indeed, namely on 20 May (!) and possibly in September 1939, and let down their ally exactly in the middle of the fighting.
It is not at all strange that they started planning the evacuation at the earliest date. It is called a contingency, to be ready in the case of ... defeat. If the British General Staff was worth its red stripe they'd would have had the outline of an evacuation plan not long after they had a plan to put forces on the continent - the two plans should go together. Deployment + Evacuation.
I believe there were still British units on the continent after Dunkirk (Highlanders?) but I am too lazy to check any sources. That the British army
let their ally down in the middle of fighting was not really a matter of their choosing, now was it? Or have you suddenly forgotten the military reality in the North?
But this is (yes here it comes) a better example of your double standard, because if a Britton had used similar words to describe the french effort, you'd be incensed. Remember how Britain was let down by France when did not continue the fight. In the end, we must assume this to be little more than a
tit for tat game.
Now more on topic, why didn't the British pour in their AF more aggressively when they had the opportunity (right from the beginning). The Battle of Britain is always used as the excuse to proof the decision right, but at the time it was too cautious an act. The RAF employed wholesale (with a less large reserve at home, including Bomber Command) could have had a significant impact on the course of the Western campaign.
The British Army did all it could, but the RAF was not fully committed, and most histories try to explain this fact "away" in terms of home defense and the coming Battle of Britain. Of course those RAF men that were deployed fought to their best ability, but RAF High Command did not. They were fighting a safe war with strong reserves at home and strong adherence to doctrine. Now the debate will undoubtingly enter the numbers game - what RAF FC considered to be the minimal number of squadrons needed to defend the Realm.
Just consider that during the actual Battle of Britain the RAF was still able at all time to maintain a number of Groups that were practically reserve groups and even No.12 group wasn't a real front line group until the bombing of London.
The RAF might have been too cautious and rigidly doctrinal in their 1939/40 campaign on the continent.
what about the USA, which didn't even take part in this war although they knew perfectly well that eventually they would have to but waited until they were forced to do it by Japanese aggression at Pearl Harbor, the US forces being terribly ill-prepared even in December 1941
That is democracy for you. The US population was isolationist in 1940, why should their sons be killed (again) in a european squabble? Can't really say that I blame them for that. In their view 17/18 hadn't solved the european issue, why bother a second time?
Of course the politicians were smarter. Sell weapons against dollars or gold, let those dumb Europeans buy themselves into financial dependency (Clive Ponting 1940 - Myth and Reality).
France bought, Britain bought and kept buying and finally loaning. If at one stage your now dependent countries are near to losing the war, you can always back them up militarily (to ensure final payment of debts after the war has been won - the cynic would add).
The Battle of Britain was more a Battle for Washington...
but not a less important battle to win!!
The Arsenal of Democracy was a
very profitable business before the Japanese forced the issue and started the global war
Off topic, but that's what this tread is all about, right?
Most of this is opinion