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Old 11th March 2005, 18:07
Christer Bergström Christer Bergström is offline
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Quote:
Maj. Gen. I.S.O. Playfair et al book The Mediterranean and Middle East vol IV (London 1966) p. 355 26.2. - 30.3.43 losses were Allied 156
Very interesting! Due to that other British public wartime source which I mentioned (the one which said that the Allies lost 151 aircraft in air combat in Tunisia in January 1943), the Allies lost 104 aircraft in air combat in Tunisia in March 1943.

Also, in the period 26 February - 30 March 1943, the German fighters in the area reported at least 212 victories against at least 62* own aircraft shot down and destroyed in air combat or crashed due to unknown causes (with another four shot down and destroyed by ground fire).

* I don’t have the exact aircraft loss figures for JG 27, so I used the figure of the number of pilots killed, MIA, PIW or wounded pilots. This figure on average is about nine-tenths or so of total aircraft combat losses. Hence the reservation “at least 62 own aircraft shot down”.

So we can see a quite dramatic drop in the victory-to-loss relation for the German fighter units in this area - from between 8 and 9 victories for every loss in air combat (269 - 32) in January 1943 to less than half that relation only two months later, between 3 and 4 for every loss in air combat. Clearly an effect of a mounting numerical inferiority. The combined Allied air forces in the area expanded from 600 in late 1942 to 1,500 in mid-March 1943. Of course that will be reflected in the German losses, just like could be expected if the number of Allied antiaircraft guns would have increased by 2.5 times.

Quote:
in his Eagle in Flames but on page 224 he gives LW losses in Med. 1.11.42 - 30.4.43 as 2.422 a/c.
Yes, those were crippling losses. But again, here we are dealing with “losses” which include a large number of aircraft which sustained damage from 10% damage degree and above, many of which thus were repaired and returned to service. Plus that those figures include aircraft damaged even in accidents. It is probable that in the figure above we can find the same aircraft appearing two, three or even more times - each time sustaining moderate damage and being repaired. Compare those figures with the similar figures given by Williamson Murray - who we have seen gives only figures for both damaged and destroyed, and to all causes, non combat included - on p. 230 in his “Luftwaffe”.

But it is absolutely clear that the Axis sustained absolutely crippling losses due to the overwhelming Allied numerical superiority in the air in North Africa.

Quote:
clearly the Axis had suffered a blood letting to which they hardly could afford at that stage of war.
Indeed - as I wrote previously:

Quote:
Please consider these figures for Tunisia, April 1943:

I./JG 53 lost 47 Bf 109s (including 15 to enemy action) and received only 21 Bf 109s as replacement, and had only 13 Bf 109s on 1 May 1943. (During the same period, it achieved 32 victories.)

II./JG 53 lost 51 Bf 109s (including 18 to enemy action, 14 of which were destroyed in bombing attacks against II./JG 53’s air base) and received only 38 Bf 109s as replacements. (During the same period, it achieved 24 victories.)

II./JG 77 lost 28 Bf 109s (including 9 to enemy action) and received 26 Bf 109s as replacements. (During the same period, it achieved 34 victories.)

In total, the combined strength of these three Jagdgruppen went down from 103 Bf 109s on 1 April 1943 to 66 on 1 May 1943, a drop of 35 % in just one month.

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This is clear proof of the fact that the Allied ability to not only replace their losses, but even increase their number of aircraft, was the single most important factor to the fact that the Allies finally managed to achieve air supremacy in Tunisia. Despite sustaining higher losses than the Axis, the Allies managed to increase their aircraft strength in Tunisia - from 600 in late 1942 to 4,900 (including 2,100 fighters) in late May 1943.

As we have seen, not even the Luftwaffe’s superiority regarding pilot experience will suffice against such a numerical superiority - or, as Juha expressed it from the other side of the coin, even inexperienced USAAF units can prevail against a more experienced enemy when they reach such a vast numerical superiority.
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Christer Bergström

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