Tony, listened to whom? Do you mean Fürbringer? He had nothing to do with U-boat development and as I wrote earlier the idea for the Elektroboote didn't exist until January 1943. The only decision the SKL made in 1940 was to continue to built the conventional submersibles and not divert too much resources to the experimental boats designed by Walter - a correct one in view of an expected short war and the justified reservations about the practical useage of the Walter propulsion.
It is true that Allied incompetence was the reason why the conventional boats lasted longer than expected, but the lack of support of the RAF in maritime matters was only one of the factors. The U-boats had already practically lost the convoy battles in late 1941, but then the US entered the war and their ignorance presented the U-boats a lot of easy targets off the US East Coast, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean for the first half of 1942. The introduction of the M4 enigma in February 1942 left Bletchley Park blind for the rest of the year and this led to some renewed successes against North Atlantic convoys in late 1942, but even then the most of the sinkings happened in distant and less defended areas like off South Africa. This is why I wrote that more available VLR aircraft over the North Atlantic in 1942 would not have made much difference, the most successes were achieved elsewhere.
Dönitz explicit mentions the use of radar, long-range aircraft AND escort carriers as main reasons for the crisis in May 1943 after the failed convoy battles against HX-238 (escorted by HMS Fencer), SC-130 (strong VLR presence), ON-184 (escorted by USS Bogue) and HX-239 (escorted by HMS Archer).
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It is rather too easy to blame bombing when Doenitz turned U-boat manufacturing upside down in 1943, and surely it is not surprising that in the end he got next to nothing as a result.
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According to the K-Amt, a conventional building program for the type XXI would have completed the first U-boat not earlier than November 1944 and these were expected to reach operational status in late 1945 or early 1946. Dönitz knew that he could not wait so long and made the right decision to switch the manufacturing method that managed to built 120 type XXI U-boats before the war ended - keep in mind that the production figure would have been at least a third higher without the Allied bombing. The conventional building program would have completed no more than 30 type XXI U-boats until May 1945 if everything went as planned...