Quote:
Originally Posted by Oberst
Explain their defeat? You don't know? They were hammered into submission by the USAAF, combined with idiotic decessions from Goring/Hitler. Simple I would think.
As far as documents.. well, I do not know where Mr. Murawski got the information for his books, other then First Hand accounts from Luftwaffe fighter pilots, Second hand accounts, Units diaries and so forth.
Recent coversation with a good friend of mine:
"So where are we? only talking about p-51? I don't think so, more then a P-51 threat in the skies of Germany. More then just Allied fighters. Its the whole. And pilots think.. what to do? Engage escorts, engage heavies? Sometime you make the decission, sometimes the USAAF makes the decission. Either way I thought, this might be my last day. Either way, you can't make the right decission. Either way you just fight to live."
He went on about 2:1, 5:1, 10:1 ( including bombers ). But I think I missed the point of numbers. I just remember the sacrifice. My mistake and appologies for bring it up, carry on.  |
Including bombers, the LW was outnumbered always by the 8th AF. The distinction is that the LW could engage or not - based on the conditions. When escort fighters entered the equation, the decisions much more complex - whether the numerical advantage was favorable or not.
One thing I will NEVER question is the courage or the skills of the German fighter pilot.
Having said that I see a lot of comments that denigrate the skill and courage of the US fighter pilot - particularly in the early days of long range escorts when they were not only fighting as 'underdogs' in context of numbers of fighters - but also flying 5 to 7 hour missions in lousy weather and tempermental airplanes - then dropping to the deck to attack heavily defended airfields.
The latter was twice as deadly to Mustangs as the 109/190 combined. Virtually 90% of the US Fighter Aces lost in combat were to German 20mm flak.
Very little credit is given concerning skill in taking off in low visibility, assembling in an organized way, achieving rendezvous, flying through bad weather and landing in bad weather and poor visibity - particularly when the training was largely in clear skies in the US.
As to achieving surprise or tactical advantage - only when sweeping ahead and catching LW assembling or taking off, or when landing - due to the extraordinary loiter time. Otherwise the LW controllers knew when the bombers were taking off, had a good feel for the fighters timetables and the fighters were always tethered to 0-5K altitude from the bombers and German fighters could normally assemble and climb an intercept course and time to be 2000-7000 feet above the American escorts and choose to fight - or not.