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Old 9th February 2012, 20:30
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Re: Which Units clashed with US. 4th FG in April 8. 1944?

Quote:
Originally Posted by Erick88 View Post
Drgondog, at what point in the air war between the US 8th FC and Luftwaffe is it safe to conclude that the 8th FC gained numerical superiority against the LW fighters units tasked with intercepting the former?
Thanks in advance.
That is a tricky question.

If the LW was tasked to intercept 8th AF over Lowlands and France - then the LuftFlotte 3 was inferior numerically in Sept/Oct 1943 as all of 8th FC was capable of going to German border. In October 1943 the 4th, 56th, 78th, 352nd and 355th were operational - all P-47C/D's.

If the LuftFlotte Reich was the primary axis of dayfighter strength over Germany - and they delayed engaging until the P-47s were turning back from Dummer Lake to Frankfurt, then 8th FC reached 10-11 Long Range escort operational Groups by Ovtober 1944 - enabling approximately 500-550 long range escorts to be dispatched to deep targets.

If the question is Local superiority in which the LW could concentrate 200-250 s/e fighters on one or two bomb wings (like November 26 - Misburg) then only 40-100 USAAF fighers would be in position to defend, then I would say December/January marked the end of consistent ability to achieve local superiority anywhere in Germany.

After Bodenplatte and approximately mid January, 1945 the LW moved many squadrons to a line from Steinhuder Lake to Schweinfurt/Lechfeld.
That would be the point in time when nearly every mission, with the help of target area recon by the three Scout forces enabled concentrations of 3 or more long range fighter groups to bear anywhere along the bomber stream quickly. It is in this timeframe that the LW lost even local superiority.

The dominant factor in the crucial losses to USAAF in December 1943 through May 1944 (IMO) was the stupid directive from Goering to Not fight the US Escorts - go strictly for the bombers. The US fighter pilot became very accustomed to being the Aggressor which encouraged even smal formations of US fighters to attack - no matter the odds. The very tough and talented LW was by and large emasculated by that directive... then as losses skyrocketed in January through May - the replacement training was inadequate and the LW could not convert many bomber pilots to fighters because of Hitler.

Game of attrition over by April/May, 1944.
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