[Jim Oxley]

It'll be interesting to see what approach the author takes to explain the poor battle preparation of the Allied ships.

Samuel Eliot Morison lay the initial blame on the lack of communication from a Royal Australian Air Force Lockheed Hudson aircraft A16-218 of 32 Squadron (Sgt W.J. Stutt) operating out of the Fall River Base, Milne Bay in New Guinea to the sighting of the enemy force at 1026/8 August. And that those ‘unfortunate circumstances’ led to the debacle, along with failures in ship identification and communications.

That lack of communication by the Hudson crew has been picked up by other other writers over the years who also lay the blame against the lack of reporting from the Australian Hudson plane as the first mistake in a battle of many errors and therefore the main contributing reason for the Savo Island battle disaster.

Yet that is not true.

Captain Emile L. Bonnot USNR (Ret) in 1988 presented a paper stating that Stutt’s radio message from the Hudson plane had been received by the following:
* USS Vincennes in that Captain Reifkohl the Commanding Officer made mention of it in his orders on the afternoon on 8 August

* USS Astoria as Lt.Cmdr. Walter B. Davidson said he had a report in the morning

* USS Enterprise by Lieut and Assistant Gunnery Officer Elias B. Mott saying the report was placed on their Status Board in the early afternoon

* HMAS Canberra with Cmdr. E.J. Wright, control officer of the after 8” guns, stating that they had the report when he came off watch at sunset

* MacArthur’s SW Pacific Area Headquarters Station Report No. 350 1817/8 repeated over Bells radio and read by Rear Admiral V.A.C. Crutchley at 1839/8, repeated over Fox radio and read by Rear Admiral R.A. Turner at 1845/8.