Quote:
Originally Posted by Nick Beale
1) Yes.
2) Maybe but I've not tried to compile the stats. Lots of people died in accidents in all air forces but I don't have comparative data. Flying in the 1940s was far more hazardous than now and in wartime aircraft were often overloaded, operated from less than ideal fields etc. Runway and hazard lighting was kept to a minimum in the general blackout. Loading bombs and fuel could result in fire and explosions. Luftwaffe pilot quality deteriorated as training was curtailed. Delivery flights to North Africa were over water, those to Italy over mountains. Aircraft construction suffered from materials shortfalls, bombardment, dispersed production in sheds, tunnels forests. Germany was using slaves to produce aircraft. All of this is likely to have affected the quality of the final product.
3) I've never made any attempt to calculate total losses in the MTO or elsewhere, only for given units at particular times or for individual actions, so I can't really help. At a tactical level, an aircraft is lost when the user requires a replacement for it; where that replacement comes from is not too important (provided refurbished machines really are "good as new" and not obsolete marks, of course). At a strategic level however, the more severely damaged planes you can put back into action alongside new production, the better.
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Nick, thank you again for your thoughts. Point 1 makes me think that Ted Hooton's figure may well be a very rough reflection of reality, since it's quite difficult to know which of the Bestandliste (correct term?) to include in any calculation.
In point 2 you suggest a few reasons for why the Luftwaffe in particular may have been badly affected by non-combat losses. I think its possible, particularly in view of the many comments made by men at the time and later historians, that the Luftwaffe maintenance and repair organisation was particularly bad in comparison to the RAF, for example. That would potentially mean that during crisis periods, such as the withdrawals late 1942, the Luftwaffe would be largely incapacitated by its own technical problems, rather than Allied air supremacy. Do you get that sense from your study of the Mediterranean air war? I have the impression that in Tunisia especially, the Luftwaffe had significant technical means and the men to use them, but failed to achieve much because of awful maintenance problems.
I understand that you haven't been collating total losses, but do Ted Hooton's figures seem qualitatively correct? By that I mean do the loss figures match the relative intensity of combat across the time periods in question? I was surprised that the beginning of 1944 was as quiet as the beginning of 1943, in spite of the air battles around Anzio.
Do you think that the Germans had much harder a time getting badly damaged aircraft repaired than the RAF or USAAF?