Quote:
Originally Posted by Delmenhorst
I have with great interest read our report and there are some interesting points.
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Delmenhorst, thank you for your words of praise! It is very pleasing that my work is of interest to people like you. I have responded to your points below and have also sent you a private message regarding a couple of specific points in your message.
Personelle and materielle Einsatzbereitschaft
I should hope that a few people have had access to this source, since it is so important. The privilege that I was referring to involved seeing the colour originals, rather than the microfiche copies of the files. The originals are in a tender state, though by no means as tender as a few of the documents from past centuries that I had a chance to view at the British National Archives. The benefit of seeing the originals is that the textual notes regarding the state of various Luftwaffe units can be read easily. I should clarify that I only saw a small selection of the volumes in the series and access to the rest is dependent on their physical state. I did not have the time to find out how many files in the series are accessible.
Western Front
This was one of several generalisations that I had to make to save space in my work and to avoid excessive detail for what was a non-specialist audience. You are correct, the Western front is shorthand for operations in Western Europe and over Germany.
Aircraft, crews and fuel
You are right that it is best to analyse these three in combination, but I found absolutely no data concerning the allocation of fuel between operational theatres and very little data concerning aircrew. If you know where to look for this, I would be very glad to find out!
Aircraft in reserve
I mean all aircraft not subordinated to an active command, so units resting, re-equipping or transferring from one theatre to another. I relied on the written comments in the Einsatzbereitschaft series to make this determination.
Fall in aircraft strength in the East in November-December 1941
This was caused by the withdrawal of some units for rest, due to German over-confidence, and by the transfer of other units to the Mediterranean. Losses were not as significant an influence, because German losses had declined precipitously from the peak in June-July 1941, as the Soviet air force had been largely destroyed, for the time being. Logistical and weather issues played a part too, but the core point is that the Wehrmacht was making a maximum effort to capture Moscow and defeat the USSR, so there was no operational pause during which the Luftwaffe could make the choice of reducing its activity, as there was in late spring 1943 before the battle of Kursk.
The Stalingrad airlift
It is likely that the airlift would have failed in any case, because the Germans had put themselves in an untenable position. However, it is not possible to argue that a doubling of Luftwaffe transport strength would not have changed the situation. Even if the Stalingrad pocket could not be maintained by an air lift, which is probable, the improvement in German logistics could have facilitated a successful relief of the pocket and the withdrawal of at least part of the 6 Army. Even if this were not to be the case, the general crisis along the entire southern sector of the German front would have been reduced, as units moving up to the front could have been supplied more easily. On the subsidiary point regarding the effectiveness of Soviet AA fire, I think it is clear that Allied fighters and long-range bombing attacks on airfields, the dominant dangers in the Mediterranean, posed a much more serious threat. Flights into the Stalingrad pocket were vulnerable to AA fire, but the Soviet forces could only rarely attack transport aircraft bases or formations of aircraft in the air.
Scandinavia
This is shorthand, and you have again understood it correctly. I used Scandinavia to avoid having to discuss the precise nature of the deployment of Luftflotte 5, for which I did not have space.
Stirlings and four-engine bombers in general
I was not aware of the full details of the shoot down of Pingel, but the point still stands. It was far more difficult to attack heavy bombers, even weaker-armed RAF types, than other aircraft types. RAF Blenheims and Soviet Il-4s could not survive without fighter escort in the very literal sense, that is entire formations were shot down. In the case of four-engine bombers, the destruction of entire formations was rare and required great exertions from the Luftwaffe.
Rockets
Rockets represent a resource cost, this is the main point. If rocket fighters had not been needed, the time and effort spent on this activity could have been redirected to address the requirements of the Eastern front. I am aware of the deficiencies of the 210 mm rocket, but it had an explosive charge far larger than any other cannon or rocket system used in air combat during the war. Thus, it is an excellent illustration of the lengths to which the Luftwaffe had to go to attack USAAF bomber formations. Indeed, the 210 mm rocket did make a significant contribution to the heavy losses suffered by the USAAF in autumn 1943, in spite of all the problems with this weapon. The case of the R4M only reinforces the point that the Luftwaffe had to develop a weapon of extraordinary complexity, the Me 262 jet fighter with rocket armament, to finally solve the problem of attacking bomber formations, and it took until the final weeks of the war to do this. The resources expended on this effort could have been allocated to producing more machine-guns and cannon to equip the standard types on the Eastern front.
Marine flak and IADS (Integrated Air Defence System)
I am aware of the existence of naval flak units of course. I could not locate data on the distribution of these units. Are you in a position to help? To use modern USAF terminology, an IADS consists of a multitude of components, from the surface and aerial defences to the variety of communications and command units that coordinate the air defence system. I would be very interested in writing about all this, but again the difficulty is finding data.
Gun-laying radar
This is excellent news! I am looking forward to going back to Freiburg to look at this information. I am not surprised that most gun laying radar were in the West, but it is good to have independent confirmation from you.
Kind regards,
Dan