[Simon Trew]

Thanks for the replies.

Leon,

I'm afraid that what I have included in my post is the full extent of my summary of each monitored conversation transcript. As you probably know, some of the transcripts are very short - a few sentences only. Others are very long (five or six single line-spaced pages, several thousand words). If I tried to be more detailed in my summary, the project would probably never get finished.

The stuff I cut and paste into my post comes from Appendix C to Chapter Nine of my bibliography. Appendix C includes not only summaries of Normandy-related material, but also a rather longer list of monitoring reports relating to Operation Steinbock. Altogether, Appendix C currently runs at 31 pages of A4 (around 14000 words).

Appendix B to the same chapter summarises DEFE 3 signals for June, July and August 1944 that deal with the Luftwaffe in Normandy. These are one-line summaries - again, something more detailed would take many months to produce. That appendix currently runs at 89 pages (51500 words). Here is the introduction and the first few entries (note, the remark about Bold and italicised entries is meaningless as the formatting on this posting doesn't seem to reproduce what exists in the original document):

Appendix B: DEFE 3 signals about Luftwaffe operations

This section of the bibliography describes the principal content of about 4000 signals that were sent to Allied field commands by British intelligence services during the Normandy campaign, and which are preserved in the DEFE 3 and HW 5 series in the UK National Archives. The appendix focuses on material that casts light on the Luftwaffe’s activities in the West during summer 1944, with particular reference to operations by flying units and flak formations. There are also many references to logistical matters, airfield serviceability and other subjects.

In the table below, signals are listed in their numerical-chronological sequence, rather than according to any other criterion. Coverage starts on 5 June 1944 and continues to the end of August. Generally speaking, priority is given to describing signals that are concerned primarily with aspects of the Normandy campaign. Attention is also given to operations by units based in the south of France (from 2. Fliegerdivision), some of which participated in anti-shipping operations off the Normandy coast. However, some material relating to operations in the French interior, and over the western Mediterranean, is omitted, since it seems peripheral to the contents of this bibliography.

A conscientious attempt was made to examine every one of the 12,000+ signals sent during the Normandy campaign, but it is likely that a few relevant items escaped my attention. Also, because I have sought to describe the principal content of each signal in a very limited space, my descriptions may be neither as detailed nor as helpful as some readers would wish. I hope nevertheless that enough information is provided to make this appendix of value to its intended users.

(For additional information about the origins and contents of DEFE 3 and HW 5 intelligence records, see Chapter 9, sections 2.1.1. and 2.1.2. See also sections 5.1.1. and 8.1.1. of the same chapter for information about related Luftwaffe material held in the UK National Archives.)

N.B. In the left-hand column of the table below, each signal is presented using either italics or bold characters as a form of emphasis. This is intended to indicate to readers whether or not the signal is referenced in F. H. (‘Harry’) Hinsley’s British Intelligence in the Second World War, Its Influence on Strategy and Operations: Volume Three, Part II (H.M.S.O., London 1988, chapters 46-48, chapter 51 and appendices 17 and 18), which is the most important published source that previously made use of the material summarised here. In cases where italics are used, the signal in question was described in the book and a footnote was used by the authors to indicate this fact. In cases where bold characters are used, however, it was not. Judging by the information presented below, it seems reasonable to assume that readers of Hinsley’s book may be unfamiliar with the contents of a very large proportion of the signals summarised in this appendix. For students of the Normandy campaign, this indicates that despite the great value of the work carried out by Hinsley and his team, close examination of the contents of the DEFE 3 series is still likely to reveal a considerable amount of interesting new material.

File and signal number Time and date signal sent to Allied field command Summary of signal’s principal contents

DEFE 3/166

KV 6561 0412 hrs 6 June Air operations Brittany 5 June
KV 6579 0704 hrs 6 June Rennes airfield unserviceable for night landing
KV 6606 1259 hrs 6 June X. Fliegerkorps aircraft & crew strength 4 June
KV 6619 1433 hrs 6 June 2.(F)/122 recce report evening 5 June
KV 6624 1404 hrs 6 June (F)/123 and NAG 13 recce tasks a.m. 6 June
KV 6627 1630 hrs 6 June Some flak details 27 May – 1 June
KV 6629 1642 hrs 6 June III./SG 4 arriving Laval 6 June
KV 6632 1651 hrs 6 June III Flak Corps to protect Evreux airfield 6 June
KV 6637 1854 hrs 6 June III./JG 3 aircraft & crew strength 5 June
KV 6638 1925 hrs 6 June X. Fliegerkorps intentions for evening 6 June
KV 6639 1853 hrs 6 June NAG 13 at Dinard on 6 June
KV 6642 1747 hrs 6 June IX. Fliegerkorps intentions for night 6-7 June
KV 6647 2041 hrs 6 June Luftflotte 3’s D-Day response (JG 1 & JG 3)
KV 6653 2109 hrs 6 June French airfield serviceability on 6 June
KV 6655 2118 hrs 6 June Plan to evacuate Carpiquet (Caen) airfield
KV 6662 2203 hrs 6 June Location of II./JG 53 on 28 May
KV 6667 2232 hrs 6 June Fighter control arrangements at Dreux 2 June
KV 6668 2236 hrs 6 June II./JG 2 joins JG 1 on 5 June
KV 6670 2325 hrs 6 June Arrangements for use of NAG 13 from 6 June
KV 6671 2344 hrs 6 June IX. Fliegerkorps intentions for night 6-7 June
KV 6673 2347 hrs 6 June OKL aviation fuel conservation orders 5 June

As for Chapter 9 (primary and secondary sources relating to the Luftwaffe in Normandy and also pre-invasion operations from January to 5 June 1944), that is fairly complete, but I'm hoping for some advice about missing items from people who are more expert on Luftwaffe operations than I am (my main area of expertise, if I dare to call it that, lies in land warfare). Once the gaps are filled, it will probably be publishable. Currently, it runs at 127 pages (around 60,000 words) - operations by Luftwaffe ground forces in Normandy are dealt with in a separate chapter and Chapter 9 is only about the activities of flying and flak units.

Appendix A is the one I am yet to write. That deals with TNA HW 5 sources. But I still need to look at some of those files and then collate the material.

Anyway, thanks for your interest and hopefully this clarifies issues a bit further.

Best,

Simon