[rof120]

Originally Posted by FalkeEins

indeed....

Yves, in the English-speaking world at least, and this is a point Lionel Persyn makes well in his huge Curtiss H-75 tome (Lela Presse), the H-75, Ms 406, Bloch and, yes, the D.520, ( "..c'est la barbe , ces avions inexpérimentés.."), are inextricably associated with defeat as opposed to the Hurricane, the machine of victory....(..and a long and successful career after France in many theaters).

You over-estimated the Bloch 'score' a little as well..(it appears you've edited your 'several hundreds..'.)..59 Bloch pilots were KIA for +/- 155 German machines shot down (Drix gives the Blochs 188 vics including 50+ Bf 109s). The average squadron pilot apparently regarded the Bloch favourably enough as outlined by André Deniau (GC II / 6):

"..Nous savions que le Bloch 152 était surclassé par le Bf 109 (…) :..we knew that the Me 109 outclassed the Bloch -with its overall superior performance, higher top speed, superior rate of climb and maneuverability the enemy enjoyed a considerable advantage. Our adversary could take the initiative, joining or breaking off combat at will. However in the Bloch the pilot enjoyed good visibility, the airframe was strong and sturdy and the armament relatively powerful.."

- I think nobody considers the Hurricane a superlative fighter. It was not a poor one either, far from it. It was a sound design and, during the Battle of Britain, about 2/3 of Fighter Command were equipped with Hurricanes (about 60-66 %), 1/3 with Spitfires, not taking "Defiants" and "Blenheim" fighters into account for they hardly played any part. Recently I heard in a "historical" TV program that Hurricanes won 80 % of all British fighter victories in the Battle of Britain. We can't rely on TV programs for History but 80 % could be true. Douglas Bader wrote: "I always considered the Hurricane the better gun-platform." (Book "Fight for the Sky", by Sir Douglas Bader, 1973.)

Your remarks are true but now (nowadays) I am not dealing with people's feelings all over the world, be it 1940, 1942, 1945 or later including today. I am dealing with facts, real events and real losses and victories (German, British and French). If you believe British publications, or at least almost 100 % of them, the French Air Force played virtually no part at all 1940, it was "wiped out" by the Luftwaffe on May 10, 1940 (this is nonsense of a rare intensity and quality), and only the glorious RAF fought the Nazi Huns and "saved civilisation" (and the whole world). The RAF was glorious, yes, RAF aircrew (not only the fighter boys) were brave and glorious but the French, too, played a significant part in the 1940 fighting. The French Army was thoroughly defeated roughly in 3 days not 15 or 46 but the French AF never was. It fought until the very last day and was stronger, and much better equipped, at the end of June than at the beginning of May.

Please think of this: the Luftwaffe lost almost exactly the same number of aircraft in the French Campaign (46 days, of which only 38 days saw a significant air activity, the rest of 8 days being almost idle, not quite) and in the actual Battle of Britain (10 July-30 September - 83 days). So over mainly France the Germans lost aircraft at more than twice the rate achieved in the Battle of Britain. (c) - (copyright) The only really important difference between both campaigns, or battles, is the presence or the absence of the French air force. (c), the end) I am not forgetting the significant contribution of Dutch forces, who not only destroyed about 180 Ju 52s (a few were destroyed by Allied forces, mainly British fighters including Blenheims and possibly Defiants): they destroyed also quite a number of other German aircraft including quite a few Ju 88s (see TBOFTN by Peter Cornwell) shot down by Dutch AAA and by Dutch fighters. Too bad their government panicked after the Rotterdam bombing (the Germans claim, ever since, that this was an error and a misunderstanding caused by poor or non-existing radio links) and surrendered after only 5 days, for otherwise they would have given the Luftwaffe a few more headaches. The Dutch were bl… good.

Without the Dutch contribution of approximately 200 the Luftwaffe lost about 1,270 AC over France etc. in roughly 38 days and 1,430 more in 83 days over Britain. For a same duration of 30 days this is 1,003 over France and Benelux countries as compared to 517 over England so German losses per month (on average) were roughly twice as high over France etc. than over England. The RAF contributed to this result but the main factor was the Armée de l'Air, which is simply normal, by the way, for the French were fighting over their own country and, according to a British-French agreement on airpower, had got about 800 single-engined fighters in first-line units (groupes de chasse) as compared to the RAF's 600, of which about 100 were deployed in France (I already gave explanations on this and on reinforcements).

I am not criticizing or denigrating the RAF in any way, which would be wrong (not true) and stupid. I am only establishing some facts. It would be all too easy to counterattack today's RAF armchair heroes (including many Frenchmen) like this:

"France engaged 800 fighters for 46 days, England engaged 100 fighters for 12 days (see book Twelve Days in May by Brian Cull). The French contribution was 800 x 46 = 36,800, the British contribution was 100 x 12 = 1,200 so the French fighter contribution was 36,800 : 1,200 = 30.7 times bigger. Even if ("IF") allowing 170 German losses to AA, as a whole the French shot down 1,065 German aircraft, the RAF got 135 (by the way, my real estimation is about 200...).

Obviously the above paragraph is nonsense and oversimplistic… just like virtually all British (and other) explanations of this kind. I know the above reasoning has many flaws and contains errors. I just feel it is useful to remind certain people of a few facts, of reality. The French did not fight the Luftwaffe alone, neither did the RAF, very far from it. Jingoistic nonsense can't change historical facts.

Here are the figures published by two excellent French historians in their book "l'aviation de chasse française 1918-1940" (French fighters), by Raymond Danel and Jean Cuny, page 182. This book is absolutely remarkable and (together with some others) a must for anybody who likes to be informed on this matter. I think these particular figures were establishd by Raymond Danel (not "Daniel", as Engl.-speaking people always write):

On May 10, 1940 French combat units (deployed in such a way that they were able to take part in the fighting but a few were not in the battle area yet) had the following numbers of fighters, not including reserve AC etc.:

Morane 406*: 412 - Curtiss H 75: 126 - Bloch 151**: 47 - Bloch 152: 150 - Dewoitine 520: 57 - Potez 630 (twin-engined, twin-fin, cannon-armed): 18 - Potez 631 (same remarks): 102 - Grand total 912 fighters,
Rof120 is adding the following: 912, of which 792 (almost 800) were single-engined fighters. These numbers were rising every day thanks to rising production in factories, in particular for Bloch 152s and D.520s.

GC I/3 joined the fighting on 13 May with 34 D.520s, GC II/3 on 15 May with 34 too, G C I/6 on 17 May with 26 Morane 406s, GC II/9 on 19 May with 26 Bloch 152s (a reinforcement by exactly 100 modern fighters even though MS 406s were obsolescent but not worthless. I assume these 100 fighters are included in the above total of 912. Morane 406s (1,085 were produced, of which about 60 were exported to various countries) were 52 % of the 792 French single-engined fighters. This percentage sank very rapidly because headquarters wanted to phase out the type as quickly as possible. It was replaced mainly with Bloch 152s (generally new AC, not worn-out like many 406s), D.520s (one groupe de chasse - GC II/7 - around June 1st and two more around mid-June) and Curtiss H-75s (one GC - GC III/2) about June 1. On June 24 (end of this campaign) only 5 GCs equipped with Morane 406s were left so that 5 other GCs had been reequipped with other fighter types: 1 with D.520s, 1 with Curtiss H-75s, 3 with Bloch 152s. One month later - if only the Army generals had held their positions - most French fighter units would have been equipped with the superlative D.520. The Bloch 152 was being replaced by the much-improved Bloch 155 (this had just started).

* The French naval aviation received about 30 MS 406s, not counted here. ** The Bloch 151 was considered "not combat worthy" but some units of the Armée de l'Air and of the Naval Aviaton received a few dozen until the much better Bloch 152 could be delivered.

On May 10 the total existing numbers, not only in first-line units (without Naval Aviation), were: Morane 406: 950 - Curtiss H-75: 181 - Bloch 151: 114 - Bloch 152: 360 - D.520: 79 - Potez 630: 84 - Potez 631: 174 plus a few odd types. Grand total: 2,002. The Numbers of Bloch 152s and Dewoitine 520s were rising very rapidly, literally every day.
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Large Numbers (especially Morane 406s) were being used in flying schools etc., others in research centers or undergoing repairs, etc.

The top performance of a fighter is not everything. They did not fight at their top speed all the time. The Me 109 E was clearly better than all other designs except Spitfire and D.520 (I understand the D.520 was better in actual combat). The 109's superiority did not make Morane 406s, Bloch 152s and Curtiss H-75s useless and worthless, not combat-worthy. Believing this is nonsense (again). These three "inferior" types shot down hundreds and hundreds of German aircraft including dozens and dozens of Me 109s and 110s. They were all better than the 109 on particular points: manoeuverability, armament, turn radius etc., even pilot protection. Most people don't understand basic physics and they don't care. This is a serious fault. In particular, all French-made fighters and bombers were cannon-armed, giving them in all cases a far better firepower than the 109's. A 109 had two 20 mm cannon but their MG FF was a very poor weapon whereas the French HS 404 was a superlative 20 mm cannon, so much so that the proud RAF adopted it and used it very intensively from 1941 on (under the name of "Hispano") and the RAF was so satisfied with this French cannon that this continued well after WW II. The USA (Air Force and Navy) used that same French cannon too, with slight modifications and, of course, a purely American type designation making it unidentifiable (as if HS 404 wouldn't suffice). Just like the RAF during the BoB the French air force endeavoured to use their fighters with lesser performance, as far as possible, only against bombers and recce AC, Curtisses and D.520s flying top cover. All French fighter types won numerous victories (not least because of the good pilots, too), the penalty for types with lower performance being higher losses in air battles.

The Bloch 152's armament - two light machine-guns and two superlative HS 404 cannon - was not only "relatively" powerful even if a 152-pilot said so, but very powerful for the time (1940) and according to Len Deighton these cannon devastated the AC they hit (a few Spitfires were armed with 2 such cannon during the BoB but alas with terrible teething trouble because the RAF didn't mount properly into the wings at first. According to some private information I got German fighter pilots avoided combat with a Bloch 152 if possible, in particular if the numbers were one to one. They probably had received orders to this end, probably something like "Do not risk to lose your fighter and possibly your life just for the fun of having a dogfight with a Frenchie ("Franzmann") armed with such a deadly cannon, or two". They certainly feared French pilot proficiency but also, to a large extent, the 152's terrible cannon.