[Nick Beale]

So, to sum up ...

France by May 1940 had a numerically strong airforce which was being re-equipped, too late as it turned out, with a range of modern types which (we will never know for sure) may have proved superior in combat to those serving with other nations had they been available in time and experienced none of the teething troubles that tend to plague newly introduced military aircraft. When Germany attacked, the French armed forces (which, I believe, outnumbered the Germans?) were deployed in a manner which was unequal to the task of defeating the invader.

French air power was more effective than has generally been understood but could not change the outcome. Despite these successes the French Prime Minister was pleading with Britain to deploy more squadrons of Hurricanes to France, squadrons Grozibou implies were not actually needed.

By contrast the British air defence system in 1940, with all its imperfections, did the job it was built to do. France was put out of the war and partially occupied, Britain wasn't.

And by the way, I still think "The Most Dangerous Enemy" was excellent. (1) It wasn't about the Battle of France and (2) the remarks Grozibou quotes are probably a very good summation of what the British then believed had happened in the Battle of France. And it was what they thought that affected what they did.