[Bruce Dennis]

SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.320/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

A GERMAN RADAR STATION AT DOUVRES.
1. The information contained in this report was obtained from
selected P/W of the 8th Kompanie of Ln. Regiment 53, who were
captured on 17th June 1944 at a Radar station which they were
manning 2 km. to the East of Douvres. The site consisted of
two Würzburg Riese and two Freyas without the A.N. attachment;
one of these Freyas was of the mobile type, and was not
operational pending its being changed for one of the fixed
type.
2. The operators as a whole were not particularly
knowledgeable, but were able to give some interesting
information on the way in which Allied air attacks affected
operational efficiency of the station. One member of the
station, an officer, was more knowledgeable than the others
and added some odd scraps of information on other Radar
equipment, which are summarised in this report.

DAMAGE BY ALLIED AIR ATTACK.
3. The beginning of May saw the opening of almost daily air
attacks on the Radar station at Douvres; from this time until
D-Day the site was subjected to bombing, machine-gun and
rocket projectile attack from Thunderbolts, Typhoons and
Spitfires.
4. Surprisingly little resulted from those attacks; eight men
had been killed and one barrack building had been burnt out,
but the Radar installations themselves, protected as they were
by heavy brick work, were practically undamaged. Apart from
short intervals of a few hours for repairing cables and
aerials severed by M.G. fire, the installations were,
according to P/W, continuously in operation.
5. It was stated R.P. attack was particularly ineffective,
but that machine gun fire into the cabins of Radar
installations was both feared and effective. During air
attacks, therefore most of the personnel of the station,
including crews from the Würzburg and Freya cabins, went to
the "Bunker" shelters.
6. On the night of 6th/7th June, the Kompanie had been busily
employed in plotting Allied shipping and at 0100 hours on that
night the Würzburg had plotted same 100 ships, which
information was passed through to Jafü 5. At 0300 hours a
large number of bombs fell in the neighbourhood and all the
personnel left their posts to take to the shelters, leaving
the apparatus unattended.
7. From D-Day onwards the Würzburgs and Freyas were kept
operating even with the added weight of artillery and tank
attack and the equipment was, in fact, operational until a few
hours before the site fell to the Invasion Forces. It is,
therefore, clear that in an operational sense the site
survived nearly five weeks of constant attack.
8. When capture became imminent, however, all technical
apparatus on the site was destroyed by explosive charges. The
personnel put up a good defence, and it was not until the
Allied tanks broke through the protective minefield that the
station finally surrendered.

PLOTTING ROOM.
9. The plotting room on this site, which correlated data
received from the Freya and Würzburg, was housed on the top
floor of a two-storey "Bunker" - a box like building partly
sunk in the ground and constructed of concrete two metres
thick. It had originally been intended that, in addition to
handling normal Würzburg and Freya searches, the plotting room
should also be employed for control of night fighters, but
since there were no night fighters operating in this area, this
latter function had never emerged; in any case the Seeburg
Tisch had not been installed, although provision for it had
already been made.
10. At the time of the Invasion, the plotting equipment
consisted of a ground-glass screen, measuring some 8 x 12 ft.
let into a wall, the glass bearing a map on which the plots
were drawn. In addition to this a small-scale map of Northern
France, overlaid with tracing paper, was laid flat on a table
but this latter had never been put into use, having been
forestalled by the Invasion.
11. In operation, plots from the Würzburgs and Freya were made
in pencil, no distinction being made on the ground-glass
screen between friendly and enemy plots.
12. The plotters, who wore earphones, received their
information direct from the operators of the Freya or
Würzburg, and transferred their plots to the ground-glass
screen. A man called an "Ableser" then read off the plot from
the ground-glass screen and telephoned it to Jafü 5 at Bernay,
and latterly in the Western suburbs of Paris.
13. At one end of the room there was a platform on which sat a
supervisor, who was responsible for the accuracy of the
plotted information. He kept his eye on all plotting whilst
listening to information as it came from the Radar equipment.
He had a small telephone at his side through which he could
plug in to any line from Würzburg or Freya.

SOME NOTES ON RADAR EQUIPMENT.
General Remarks.
14. The only knowledgeable P/W, an officer, gave as his
opinion that British and American Radar technique are slightly
ahead of their German counterpart. In German Signals circles,
he said, it is openly admitted that any piece of Allied radar
equipment is seized upon and studiously copied.
15. One major difference, he believed, was that Allied Radar
equipment was always smaller and more compact in construction
than similar German apparatus.
Hand written comment: but the German Rotterdam weighs about
half H2S - its British original!
16. Some few details on current German Radar Geräte were given
by the above source. These are summarised below.
Würzburg.
17. The Würzburg Riese on the station at Douvres were of the
usual type, and had a search range of 30/40 kilometres.
The frequency of both Würzburg Riese was stated by P/W to be
600 mc/s.
"Window".
18. Some operators of the Würzburg and Freyas, although
agreeing that they experienced interference from "window",
interference which showed itself in a series of specks and
lines on the presentation screen, maintain that because
"window" travels more slowly than an aircraft, an experienced
operator can distinguish the flight of the aircraft against
the tracks of the "window".
19. The officer P/W, however, is sceptical about all anti—
window devices, and believes that the German Radar authorities
are seriously perturbed by it.
20. Some few weeks ago Goering, it is alleged, offered a cash
prize of 300,000 Reichmarks to any Signals personnel who could
invent an apparatus to outwit "window".
Nürnberg Gerät.
21. According to P/W, the Nürnberg Gerät is fitted to Würzburg
in order to eliminate the effects of "window". This apparatus
has not been entirely successful, although it makes the
operator's job slightly easier.
"Würzburg Laus".
22. The "Würzburg Laus" is said to be an apparatus replacing
the Nürnberg Gerät as a counter measure for "window". The
apparatus in contained in a box 18 x 9 x 9 inches, which is
attached to the Würzburg.
23. The "Laus" is a much more recent development, and is said
to be somewhat more successful than the Nürnberg Gerät.
Flanderzaun.
24. This is the colloquial name given to highly characteristic
interference pattern on the screen of the Würzburg and Freya.
The word is apparently associated with the barbed wire
entanglements of Flanders in the last war, and this gives some
indication of the picture which the interference makes.
25. P/W believed that this interference is a transmission
apparently on the frequency on which Würzburg and Freya are
operating, and same P/W have the idea that it emanates from
the Isle of Wight vicinity.
Köthen Gerät.
26. The "Köthen Gerät" is, according to P/W, not an apparatus
but a frequency of the Freya. For example, particular
frequencies on Freya are designated A, B, C and D, and Köthen
is merely another frequency deriving its name from an
experimental station at Köthen.
27. The A, B, C and D frequencies, P/W thinks, were produced
by civil firms, and the Köthen name implies that this
frequency is a development of the Luftwaffe's own experimental
station at Köthen.

"Limbach".
28. Amongst documents found at the Radar station at Douvres
was a paper headed "Limbach"; this piece of apparatus was
stated to be attached to the V.H.F. transmitter/receiver in
the aircraft and to operate in conjunction with the Freya on
the ground.
29. The paper stated that the procedure employed with this
apparatus was similar to that of the Gemse - Erstlings
procedure, but strangely enough was used in conjunction with
the FuGe 7.
30. According to this P/W, the Limbach was superseded by the
Gemse - Erstling (FuGe.25).
31. The document in question has been forwarded to A.D.I.(Sc).

Rammstoss Gerät.
32. This is stated to be an instrument carried in German
bombers, its purpose being to show the position of other
aircraft and prevent collisions in tight formation.
Rotterdam Gerät and Panorama Gerät.
33. It is stated that both these instruments, Allied in
origin, are now being used by G.A.F. aircraft, but all P/W had
heard was that the Panorama Gerät had a wide focus, whilst the
Rotterdam Gerät was designed to show a small area.

Diana.
34. At long last, after a lapse of 21/2 years, confirmation of
"Diana" has come to light through documents. The first
mention was from a notebook of a P/W of I/K.G.30 in August
1941 (A.D.I.(K) 420/1941), which stated that Diana was to be
similar in principle to Elektra, but working on a short-wave
band and within a frequency range of 3,000/6,000 kc/s.
35. The present document notes that "Diana" is similar to
Elektra but operates on short waves. This P/W stated that
"Diana" had not been operational.

ORDER OF BATTLE - LN. REGIMENT 53.
36. The 53rd Ln. Regiment, to which the 8th Kompanie at
Douvres belonged, consists of a number of Kompanien ranging
from 1 to 26; The Kompanien are not necessarily numbered
consecutively, so that the total in the 53rd Ln. Regiment may
therefore be less than 26. All the Kompanien had code names.
37. The 53rd Ln. Regiment was responsible for an area bounded
on one side by the coast, and on the other sides by a line
running from the tip of the Cherbourg peninsula to the South
of Paris and northwards to Dieppe. Its Kompanien lie all along
the coast and towards the interior at a distance of 30/40 km.
apart; each Kompanie's area overlaps so that the entire
territory is completely covered.
38. The H.Q. of the 53rd Regiment is in Paris and is under the
command of Oberstleutnant FLECH, with Major HOFFMANN as
Deputy.

25th Kompanie.
39. The 25th Kompanie is the H.Q. Kompanie and has a strength
of 20/25 men, who were engaged in visiting Freya and Würzburg
sites of the Regiment and doing minor repairs. It was stated
that these men were by no means skilled engineers, and knew
nothing of the internal workings of the Freyas and Würzburgs.
8th Kompanie.
40. The 8th Kompanie at Douvres had a total strength of 160
men, who were divided as follows:-
Kompanie Stab............ Administrative Staff.
Zug 1 )
Zug 2 ) ................. Personnel manning the Freya
and Würzburg on six-hour
shifts day and night.
Flak Zug................. Personnel manning and
guarding Flak position
round the Kompanie’s site.
41. Another Kompanie of this Regiment, the number of which was
unknown to these present P/W, was said to be manning a site at
St. Valery-en-Caux.

MORALE.
42. Generally speaking, the morale of the 8th Kompanie during
the pre-Invasion raids was high, and their resistance during
the final attack on the station was certainly not suggestive
of low morale. It is noteworthy, however, that since capture
and the absence of the excitement of action, these P/W are
heartily glad to be out of the war. The majority are convinced
that Germany has already lost the war.
SEE APPENDIX OVERLEAF.

A.D.I.(K). S.D. Felkin,
30 June 1944 Wing Commander

1. The Deputy Commander of the 8th Kompanie at Douvres
an Oberleutnant - was good enough to bring his paybook with
him, and his career is therefore set out below as a matter of
interest.
Oct. 1937 – March 1938... Was with Ln. Abteilung R.L.M.,
2nd. Komp. at Potsdam (This was,
supposed to be one of the very
elite schools for Signals in
Germany before the war).
March 1938 – April 1938.. Was with Ln. Abt. R.L.M. 2nd. Komp.
in Vienna, and took part in the
Anschluss.
April 1938 - Aug. 1938... Back to the R.L.M. 2nd. Komp. at
Potsdam.
Aug. 1938 - Sept. 1939... Acted as Funker to Ln. Regt. 4,
7th Komp. in Vienna.
Sept. 1939 - Feb. 1940... Became a Horchfunker with Ln. Regt.
4, 7th Komp. At Cracow.
Feb. 1940 - March 1940... Was posted to the Ln. Officers'
Training School at Halle.
April 1940 - Aug. 1940... Joined Ln. Regt. 4, Abt. III as
Staff Officer. Here he was
in command of a Hörstelle.
Aug. 1940 - April 1941... Became O.C. of Horchstelle (W.24)
at Breslau. (P/W explained that all
these Hörstellen are described in
passon and paybook as Wetter
Funkempfangstelle which is in fact
only a cover name for Horchdienst).
April 1941 – March 1942.. Was at the depot of Horchstelle (W.3) which is at Athens. Here his job was to listen in to English ground telegraphic messages which were coded and decoded.
March 1942 - April 1942.. Posted to Nikolaiew in Russia as Staff Officer to III Abteilung Ln. Regt. 4.
April 1942 - May 1943.... Served in Ln. Regt. 130, who were
there in the South Russian sector in support of a Flak division.
May 1943 - May 1944...... Became O.C. of the 11th Komp. Of
Ln. Regt. 57 and later O.C. of the 7th Komp. Of the same Regiment then
near Orleans.
2. In May 1944 he was posted to his present unit (Ln.53, 8th
Komp.) as Second-in-Command to Hauptman EGLE. He says that it
was intended that he should take over this Company in a very
few weeks' time.
Decorations:
Erinnerungsmedaille for Austria.
Erinnerungsmedaille for Sudetenland.
K.V.K. Second Class with Swords.
Rumanian Cross given to those who fought against
Communism.
Krimm Shield, which commemorates the battles of
the Crimea, including Sebastopol and Kersch and
last:-
E.K.II.