[rof120]

Hello again dear, faithful readers,

If you know any details on the famous French-German air battle on November 6, 1939 (see below), I would be very grateful if you could share these details with me or with everybody (right here in this thread).

By the way, your comments are always welcome even, or rather in particular, if you dare disagree with me. Either you're right and I am grateful for having learned something thanks to you, or you're wrong and I can help you perfect your knowledge.
(Who - I'm asking you - knew that the Germans lost slightly more aircraft during the French Campaign (only 38 days of real fighting) than in the Battle of Britain (83 days), so that the German loss rate was about twice as high in May-June 1940 as in July-September (BoB)?)

Today I was in the hands of the dentist again. I hope I have all your sympathy for my suffering and bravery. But most of you certainly are similar victims and martyrs. In order to console everybody I’ll give you a first example of what I consider one of the great differences between French victory claims (I did not write « fighter pilots’ claims » - on purpose) and victory claims filed in other air forces.

There is a great difference and I feel I was not clear enough in my preceding posts so I have to apologise. As far as air victories are concerned the French system for claim filing, screening and official confirmation was entirely different from what the corresponding procedures, IF ANY, were in other air forces. The German system is well-known: one man only for one victory. The RAF procedure is not quite clear in the minds of many persons because it changed strongly in the course of the war and eventually even included the film footage shot at the same time as the firing of guns (1940 the French had nothing of this kind and it was not widespread in other air forces).

I am discussing only 1940 French victories here, nothing else like 1942 or 1943-45 or the Free French aircrew - which is an entirely different story - because almost everybody in the world believes that 1940 there were only a few French victories or none at all – which is the contrary of reality – and that French fighters were very few and far between – but actually 1940 there were more French fighters in first-line units than within the RAF and ON AVERAGE their quality and effectiveness in combat were about even in both countries. Some misguided fanatics even believe that French aircrew would not fight – I need not comment on such stupidity. In May-June 1940 (French Campaign) the Luftwaffe lost combat aircraft (Ju 52s being eliminated from this calculation) at roughly double the rate of the Battle of Britain (per week or per month on average), of course with significant Dutch, Belgian and British contributions as well as AA successes. As I already remarked this does not mean that the RAF was not really good in the BoB for the combat conditions and goals were entirely different: the main British goal was not to destroy as many E/A as possible but to remain « in being » with a strong fighter force to reckon with, which made a German invasion impossible (assuming it would have been possible at all, which is doubtful).

The following is what everybody who is interested in the 1940 air war – including the BoB - has to grasp and be aware of:

The 1940 French victory figures are NOT the victory claims made by fighter pilots. They are what unit COs (escadrille leaders leading about 15 pilots and mainly their direct superior officers the commandants de groupes leading about 30-36), claims filed as what these units (the groupes de chasse or GCs) thought was their victories of the day after screening and assessing what the pilots or their CO claimed, knowing in advance that victory claims would be scrutinized very exactly so it didn’t make any sense to file any unserious claims. There was some overclaiming (by very far not as hair-raising as within Luftwaffe and RAF), yes, but underclaiming too. These reports were forwarded to French Air HQ for processing and for official confirmation too. Most victories were never confirmed because the Germans were so unfair and occupied French airfields, barracks, HQs and… farms, where they « freed » good food and good wine. From about 700-900 actual victories (depending on sources) it seems that HQ had the time to confirm only 245 before the whole paperwork broke down and vanished. Obviously this does NOT prove that French fighters won only 245 victories; exactly the same problem was encountered by GERMAN fighter pilots at the end of WW II: thousands (?) of real German victories were never « bestätigt » (confirmed).

Now an example – an air battle, well-known or even famous, at least in France. On November 6, 1939, nine Curtiss H-75 fighters of GC II/5 led by lieutenant Houzé met “27” Me 109s at an altitude of about 6,000-7,000 meters. There was a terrific, long dogfight. After landing the French pilots reported having shot down ten (10) Me 109s, of which 2 crashed in Germany. Eventually 4 (four) “victoires sûres” were credited to them as well as 6 “victoires probables”. You can see that the alleged “French overclaiming” had very strong limitations.

It seems that the German pilots identified Lt Houzé's fighter as the French leader's aircraft and he had to fight half a dozen 109s. Eventually he escaped and made a belly-landing with his badly shot-up fighter. Ten to one for the French, it seemed! But 2 more Curtisses had to make forced landings (one because of fuel starvation), so that we can (today) say: 8 to 3 for the French. Not one single French fighter was destroyed, all were intact or repairable. The whole Allied press (in the UK too) reported this story as a fascinating event and evidence of French superiority in air combat. This air battle is well-known in France as “le combat des neuf (9) contre vingt-sept (27)”, which means 3 German fighters against every French opponent. At the time the French reported “about 20” Me 109s flying at about the same altitude as they did, plus 7 (counted by Houzé, it seems) flying higher. I doubt that these figures were, and are, accurate, for the Germans flew in pairs (Rotte), in double pairs (Schwarm) and in multiples of these except, of course, if some aircraft had engine trouble or similar problems and had to turn back. The first formation of 20 is quite possible but 7 is not very likely: it probably was rather 8 (2 Schwärme), except in the case of engine trouble etc. Experience shows that pilots very often saw more enemy aircraft than actually were there so these 27 could have been anything from 12 + 8 (20) to 16 + 8 (24) or even 28. Precise data from the German side would be most welcome.

The French pilots claimed 10 victories if I remember correctly. Eventually four (4) “victoires sûres” and 6 (six) “victoires probables” were credited to them. In Peter Cornwell’s big book TBOFTN (page 112) we can find 5 Me 109s destroyed and 3 damaged. Only one victim of sgt Legrand is mentioned but even long after the war he reported two shot down in his book “Chasseurs en vue, on attaque!” and I have a strong tendency to believe him. We have no evidence that German documents mention all the losses suffered in this air battle. I can’t remember J. Prien’s version: anybody?

This air battle was a disaster for the Luftwaffe and this event reached the nazi political level for Göring was not only the LW’s supreme commander but also the nazi regime’s N° 2 after Hitler. He summoned the unit’s CO, Hauptmann (captain) Johannes Gentzen, to report in Berlin. This unit, JGr. 102, was disbanded and its pilots were incorporated into a new “Zerstörergruppe”, in theory flying Me 110s but at this time many of the “Zerstörer” AC were still Me 109 Cs or Ds. According to various Internet-sources Gentzen was the only German "ace" of the Polish Campaign with 7 confirmed victories, but the Luftwaffe did not use the Allied word (coined during WW I) nor the notion of "ace". Later the best German fighter pilots (having won at least several dozen victories) were called "Experten". Gentzen won an 8th victory on November 8 (a Morane 406) and a 9th on April 9, 1940 (a Curtiss - for revenge), and he was killed on May 26, 1940, in an accident when taking off in an emergency in his Me 110 C, his airfield being attacked by British bombers. Interestingly I found some Internet-articles discussing Gentzen and his career, or JGr. 102, but… none of these even mentions the air battle on November 6, a German disaster. This is very typical: in one single encounter French fighters destroyed at least 5 out of about 28 (?) German fighters and damaged at least 3 but nobody knows about it nor mentions it. It's not fashionable even to mention actual French successes (in this case a triumph which became known worldwide - see P. Cornwell's book, page 112). No wonder most people know nothing on French fighters or only the usual libelling and insults ("refused to fight" etc.).

The German losses included two “Staffelkapitäne” (Oberleutnants) killed as well as one more Lt captured unhurt by the French. These three pilots can hardly have been beginners, and the death of two Staffelkapitäne (corresponding each a RAF Sqn Leader as far as numbers are concerned) within a few minutes was a very hard blow. One more German pilot was wounded and another one was taken prisoner by the French. Pilot losses, at least provisionally: 5. I don't know if the Gruppenkommander of JGr. 102 - Hauptmann Johannes Gentzen - took part in this air battle, and I would like to know. I consider it very likely. P. Cornwell mentions Me 109s from Stab and 1., 2. and 3./JGr.102 so that it seems that the whole Gruppe (3 Staffeln and the Gruppenstab) took part in this air battle. One Luftwaffe-fighter Gruppe had a complement of 40 fighters including the Stabsschwarm (4 AC), of which about 70 % (28 fighters) were serviceable. Evidence of French and German origins match fine.

We have to remember that on this day JGr. 102 was flying obsolescent Me 109 Ds, which were being replaced, from September through December 1939, by the much-improved Me 109 E. It was much better mainly because of a much stronger engine with fuel injection (DB 601 a) made by Daimler-Benz. Before the 109 Es arrived French fighters Curtiss H-75 (4 Groupes de chasse) and Morane-Saulnier MS 406 (7 groupes) (and British Hurricanes) clearly had the edge over Me 109s, MS 406s not least thanks to their very effective cannon HS 9 or HS 404 (with almost doubled rate of fire: 600-700 rounds/minute). With the Me 109 Es this edge was reversed (provisionally). You can’t win all the time. It seems that by December 1939 at the latest all Me 109 Ds had been replaced by Es in first-line units.

This thread has been viewed more than 3,000 times already. It could rise to 4,000 or even 5,000 and more, given time. 3,000 in less than 2 months is very satisfactory because this subject (1940 French victories) is one of the worst-known of the entire WW II and also one of those which were the victims of the worst authors (many being British, but mainly French authors) and the worst research and publications except in a few magazine issues like "avions", in particular 2 special issues on 1939-1940 French aces - "Les As français 1939-1940" (83 pilots IIRC). Let us hope that this gap in the knowledge of WW II will be closed.

Remember please: the German air force lost as many combat aircraft in the French Campaign (virtually in 38 days) as in the Battle of Britain (83 days) which followed, but in half the time, over France and Benelux, as compared to the duration of the BoB.