[drgondog]

Thanks for the 332nd operational statistics Paul. The July statistics do reflect the single group (A) policies that existed at that time (with exceptions for occasional A and B with perhaps 28-30 apiece). In the fall of 1944 in both 8th and 15th AF the two force Group had enough pilots and aircraft in the TO&E to fly them frequently. You might look at the 332nd mission numbers for comparison.

It does strike me as 'odd' that with approximately 100-120 (and approx. 120 pilots) Mustangs in the July timeframe (estimated based on standard squadron TO&E at that time), that only a typical strength mission based on three squadrons would be flown.

The only documents that might provide insight would be the squadron Engineering daily status logs recasting availability based on inventory, battle damage, engine changes, etc. One other thought is that the 332nd may have flown a non-typical 12 Mustang squadron in three flights rather than four flights of four. Perhaps the policy of maintaining 100% Black American pilots placed a 'supply' problem for replacement pilots.. more likely, and less likely is a maintenance issue in which a lot of a/c were grounded for lack of crews.

Yes the task of copying USAF 85 line by line was arduous - and done before USAF populated database at USAFHRC at Maxwell AFB. Equally challenging was pinpointing change of equipment (i.e from P-47 to P-51) to perform the distribution analysis of victory credits.

As to the P-38 being able to perform adequate escort for 8th AF? I agree, given a priority of stripping PTO to replace P-47s in ETO that the escort population would have enabled the 8th AF to continue deep raids after March 1944 when the supply of P-38J-15s arrived with 110 gallons in LE of wing and improved intercooler. The J-25s arrived after D-Day so the dive flaps and boosted ailerons would not be present to extend the P-38 performance envelope.

IMO, since the P-38 was a marginal performer air to air (~2:1 over LW with barely parity through D-Day) the P-38/P-47 combination would have resulted in 500+ more LW pilots and many more fighters available for Invasion Front on June 7.. The AAF/RAF would still have major numerical superiority but a lot more LW bomber and fighter bomber sorties would have been successful against shipping.