[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

You are welcome, Bill. Do I understand that the A and B Groups would have about 36 aircraft each, for a total of 72, and a possible C Group with 12 more? Following a more detailed look at Mahoney, I can report that the 46 Mustangs on 17 July was at the very bottom of the range of sorties for the 332nd. The highest number of aircraft put up by the 332nd FG in 1944 appears to have been 64 Mustangs on 23 October.

Without having access to 332nd FG squadron histories that cite the order of battle, I would guess that the 46 Mustang effort was three squadrons and the 64 Mustang effort was all four squadrons with any early returns filled by spares. There was method in AAF doctrine in MTO and ETO for 16 a/c squadrons. Typically two flights in a section could cover each other 'a la Thatch Weave' while essing to maintain pace with the bombers.

The sortie numbers listed by Mahoney for the 332nd FG in 1944 range from 39 to 64, with the average at about 52 aircraft. In short, its strength was very similar to that of the other Mustang groups, notwithstanding the presence of the fourth squadron.

For the reason suggested above, I suspect three squadron mission composition for any documented strength in '48' range

Both Mahoney and the 332nd Osprey profile mention the problem of a lack of replacement pilots, so that was most likely the primary problem. I haven’t read either book fully, as yet, so I will be able to say more once I have done so. The losses suffered by the group were fairly low and there is little mention of maintenance problems, so technical issues were less important.

To safely arrive at either conclusion the Group history of Battle Damage, Accidents and MACR's would be needed - a depth that Osprey typically finds onerous with respect to research. Category B damage would typically take an a/c out for several days, and engine change at least a day-often two. Does Osprey mention the Service Group support attachment to 332nd location - or shared with one or more other groups. That would be needed for something as major as a wing change, for example. If 'off-site' add a couple of days for pick up and transport.

How helpful of the USAF to do the database so many years after the war. I wonder if part of the reason for that is that were no concerns about unit effectiveness, as there were during and after the Vietnam war. On the subject of equipment changes, did any of the Fighter Groups ever fly two different aircraft types in combat at the same time? My impression is that this would have been very rare, but various combinations of sub-types of the same aircraft were flown regularly, depending on supplies of new aircraft.

USAFHRC did so as a service improvement to cut down on the labor and time to respond to individual record requests. USAF 85 was by itself a component of an ambitious study to see what, if any, individual characteristics (age, second child or son, athletic record, IQ, academic record, etc) formed a predictable profile for pilot selection.. The first task was to parse the data from all the theatres, scrub duplicates, scrub ground scores, match against Victory Credit Board documents as available and punch into IBM type record cards for processing and sorting by computer.

Yes to flying two types of equipment at the same time operationally. The war continued and new equipment didn't instantaneously appear and pilots had the schedule flight time for training with few new ships available. Specifically the 352nd, 355th, 358th, 359th, 361st, 479th (P-47 to P-51) and 20th, 55th, 364th and 479th (P-38 to P-51) are examples of two type a/c composition battle groups during the transition - usually for aonly a couple of days from time of full compliment available for each squadron.

I certainly agree that the increased range and performance of the J-15 was important, but I was making a broader point, returning to the idea that deep raids were not essential. Even with a hundreds more pilots and aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not seriously challenge Operation Overlord, because the overall standard of German equipment and training was very low compared to the Allies. They would have needed, at a minimum, hundreds of new aircraft with the two-stage supercharged Jumo 213E/F and turbocharged BMW 801J. They barely achieved this in the case of fighters in 1945 and never came close in the case of strike aircraft. Given that this was the case, any D-Day strike would have confronted large numbers of Allied fighters with superior altitude performance, which could engage the Luftwaffe at will. It is possible to imagine higher Allied casualties in the air and on the ground, but I would say no serious disruption to the landings was possible, even in 1943.

Regards,

Paul

We would disagree on the last point Paul. The standard of the German pilot skill top to bottom by June 6 was relatively low to February 1944 because of the attrition caused by escort fighters over central and deep Reich, primarily caused by the Mustang. During Q1 and Q2 four P-38 FG's in the ETO destroyed only 178 LW fighters by the end of June, approximately 130, by D-Day as contrast to 1361 by Mustangs in the same period with fewer sorties

If one surmises that Double the actual P-38 Victory credits in the medium range to long range missions (as contrast to P-47 short to medium range Penetration/Withdrawal escort), one could speculate that at least twice the experienced LW pilots that weren't killed by Mustangs would have been available.. and the tempo of attrition should have given LW training command some relief to develop better replacement pilots.

Second point to tactical advantages, somewhat nullified by Beachy Head and Type 16 Control for direction, is the weather and cloud cover favored the LW with respect to putting scattered but strong penetrations of fighter bombers and fighters at low altitude where the P-38, P-51 and P-47 were less effective in performance advantage over FW 190 and BF 109. The Spit and Tempest and Typhoon would have been just as effective.

I am not offering a victory to Germany but I am suggesting that it was dicey at Omaha, dicey in consolidation of beach head, fronts dicey 'enough' in ability to stop Panzer reinforcements from Calais area via strong airpower - if 2x experienced LW fighter pilots had been available to disrupt logistics at the Beach or destroy Mulberry or give the Panzer more time to travel at night.

I am saying "I just don't know " how to calculate the impact of what the Joint Chiefs and Allied Command feared most - namely a LW that was not reduced successfully as a result of POINTBLANK.