Hello Ed,
Thank you for your response. I have to say that your comment is rather confused, because you did not select a clear main theme for your critique. I will reply to what is the central point of your argument:
Quote:
Originally Posted by edwest2
Your comment at the end of the article ignores many other issues.
A bullet by bullet, engine by engine comparison is too narrow.
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My comment is a reflection on a small-scale case study, but it casts a useful light on the larger issues involved. Wars are won by allocating and employing resources of equipment and manpower in a manner which is superior to that of the enemy. This is what Nazi Germany did in 1939 and 1940, until the Battle of Britain, and again in 1941 during the first stages of Operation Barbarossa. Thereafter, as Nazi strategy and operations increasingly lost focus and became incoherent, Germany began to suffer one defeat after another. The eventual collapse of Nazi Germany was caused by the Allies' ability to allocate and deploy resources in a far superior manner.
In the case of this Ju 188 loss, Germany developed a relatively advanced aircraft very late in the war and deployed it in a way which rendered it vulnerable to much less complicated Soviet aircraft. It is clear that this was an example of resource misallocation and one which reflected very broad trends within the German war effort. Instead of addressing the problem presented here, that Germany was producing the wrong aircraft for the wrong reasons and thereby weakening its own air force, you have suggested that the point I make is too narrowly drawn. I cannot agree. The Ju 188 is a small but useful illustration of the fact that the Nazi leadership did not adequately manage Germany's small resource base, which hastened German defeat.
Regards,
Dan