[kirche]

P.S:
The usual daily summary during the preparation for the offensive of one of the tank brigades was: "The brigade area was bombed three times in groups of up to 20-27 enemy aircraft - losses: 2 people were killed and 6 people were wounded" (mainly in the motorized infantry battalion).
In the peri-active period of the offensive and the breakthrough of the front line of the same brigade: enemy aviation prevailed in the air - as a result, the infantry could not accompany the tanks and opened the flank. The enemy's artillery (self-propelled and ATA) from the flank disrupted (stopped) 50% of the tanks in the attacking battalions. The retreating infantry allowed to approach the tanks of enemy soldiers who attacked the damaged tanks with bottles of combustible mixture and anti-tank grenades. Result: 2 tanks are irretrievably lost! Attempts to introduce reserves into the battle were also violated by aviation - as a result of the disrupted order of the offensive and retreat of the infantry of escort, the enemy's anti-tank artillery disarmed tanks (infantry without tanks did not go).

Here is the typical tactic of German aviation against the Soviet tank brigades on the defensive - and no "Rudel" (tank-fighters) were needed here.
A similar tactic was also used by Soviet stormtroopers-the disruption of communications and the transfer of troops in the rear, the suppression of infantry and artillery on the front lines, and the damage to aircraft at aerodromes. And the destruction (or often capture) of equipment was carried out by infantry and artillery in the seizure of positions.
Both those and other "battlefield planes" did their job. And in every case there were heroes.
The rest is for high-ranking staff officers who easily rewarded only themselves, as well as their adjutants, staff radio operators, cooks and personal drivers. Those who now like to discuss the plausibility of the claims of that terrible war at the level "I believe / do not believe" remind me those staff officers.