[drgondog]

Kutscha - thanks for reproducing this chart - I had lost 'memory' of source.

The LuftFlotte/Reich Losses for the period in contrast to the other Western Losses is precisely the foundation for my thesis re: the impact or importance of the Mustang at a critical juncture in Daylight Strategic bombing by 8th and 12th and early 12thAF Ops. The Mustang and to a lesser extent were the sole fighter assets engaging LuftFlotee Reich in this timeframe.

Many historians point to Big Week, and I think for the wrong reasons. The right reasons are that USAAF decided to once again go deep, in force, day after day after the pounding it took in Aug-Oct, 1943. It was the determination and the emergence of the long range escort in increasing numbers that make the Big Week the beginning of the end from my POV.

It is easy to point out that the Luftwaffe, particularly LF Reich continued to inflict 10%+ casualties on the bomber force in January, February, March and April - with the crescendo in April - then only once after April 29. When you look at Kutscha's referenced Reich losses in Jan-May 1944 in contrast to prior and post periods it seems intuitive that this is the period of greatest loss of experienced pilots and leaders with severe consequences on effectiveness after that.

Ruy/Franek - while I hold a separate opinion about the period in which the Luftwaffe was broken, my thesis surrounding the term 'broken' is the point at which the Luftwaffe could no longer inflict the kind of losses that threatened the execution of Daylight Strategic Bombing - there are of course many other valid deinitions and I will not argue against yours.

Regards to all
,
Bill