[RCheung]

Wu was still on active service in 1958 when the action took place, so he would have had access to the "internal documents" back then.

Ye was in overall command of the (joint) operations - by definition, he would have had access to the PLAAF and PLANAF after action reports.

It is curious that even though Lin, Hu mentioned the actions "around" the Quemoy Crisis, the actually actions "during" the Crisis were largely absent. Probably still a sore point after all these years?

The bamboo curtain had not been completely opaque in recent years - things have leaked out (on blogs by PLAAF veterans) that showed more losses during the Korean War actions and the odd snippets about the Quemoy actions. A PLANAF mechanic had emigrated and felt free enough to reveal some very interesting details from the ground at Lu Qiao PLANAF base. That is, of course, the base from which the PLANAF sent the two "Da Dui" (Esk.) aloft to engage the Sidewinder-armed F-86F of the ROCAF 2nd TFW. The guy provided details of the MiG-15bis that was downed - Mike Chien's missile impacted between the wing fences, tearing off the right wing in that position. During the subsequent dogfight, 50 cal bullets rained on Lu Qiao, wounding a number of base personnel. (Probably happened when Lt. H.Y. Sung chased one of the PLANAF MiG-17 right over Lu Qiao).

The PLANAF Regimental C.O. was so incensed by the drubbing that he ordered bombs loaded on the MiG-15bis for the dawn strike on airbases in Taiwan. Luckily, he was ordered to stand-down. Quite apart from the heavy losses that the MiG's would have suffered - the strike could have provoked a nuclear response from the Matador cruise missiles the U.S. had deployed to Taiwan in anticipation of an invasion attempt ... That move was telegraphed to the ChiCom High Command and the message clearly got through!