Hi Thor,
thanks again for your comprehensive reply.
Here are some initial comments/thoughts:
1. With the Forms Z prepared by the Groups, the Group HQ collated the details of the losses going down as provided by the squadrons and I believe that in some cases they 'averaged' out the positions as provided in the individual squadron Forms Y, before re-transmitting the data in the Form Z. The BC HQ, and specifically the BC ORS, upon reciept of the Forms Z from the Groups, plotted all the sightings of aircraft going down and then had to assess the general area and cause of loss in relation to the known number of missing aircraft. This was a hap-hazard affair. Even at this stage of the war, about the most reliable aspect of the reports from the bomber crews was the time logged. Reported positions were much less reliable because they solely reflected where a crew thought they were, which could differ considerably from where they actually were (the difference between reported and actual positions could be substantial, especially on nights when winds scattered the bomber streams). The result was that when the BC ORS plotted the sightings, the plots created an effect like the spread of shot gun pellets on the map, and the ORS had to basically assess and guess where individual losses occurred. When there was a tight and distinct group of sightings at the same time, this wasn't a problem, but when the sightings were geographically scattered is became a problem.
With the individual log entries that you mention, while the reported times should be solid, there is no guarantee that the positions are entirely accurate. Again, this is where the information in the missing 1 Group Form Z would be beneficial because then all the sightings could be plotted in the same manner as done by the BC ORS, with the added benefit of actually knowing the crash locations.
Because original data is missing, the only ORS information to go on is the end assessment made by the BC ORS and published in the Interception Tactics report. Here are the assessed crash locations for the Zeitz stream as determined by the BC ORS after reviewing the Forms Z:
"Zeitz: Fighters 6 (near Schweinfurt, Coburg and Weimar outward and Paderborn, Hengelo and Zwolle homeward); flak 2 (1 at Frankfurt, 1 at target); unknown 1." (note - no determination was made for LM742)
As you'll be aware, a total of 10 aircraft were lost from the Zeitz raid and 1 from the Brux raid. Now, to look at these losses in relation to the ORS assessment, in combination with the data from the surviving Forms Z:
12 Sqdn NN712 - shot down by a fighter according to post-war BC ORS assessment. Sightings indicate that an aircraft was shot down in the general area at 2113-2115 hrs, reported variously as a single-engined a/c and a 4-engined shot down after air-to-air tracer seen. I would presume that some of the 1 Group sightings thought the cause was Flak because this appears to be the Frankfurt Flak loss as mentioned above.
405 Sqdn PB402 & 434 Sqdn KB850 - both crashed in close proximity and the BC ORS was unable to make a post-war assessment of the cause of loss. Sightings were made in the area of aircraft crashing between 2121-2145 hrs, with one of these stating that air-to-air tracer was seen. Although it is generally held that the two aircraft collided (according to local witnesses), no collision was reported by crews of 5, 6, or 6 Groups. Instead the ORS assessed a loss to a fighter near Schweinfurt in the Interception Tactics Report.
The ORS assessed another loss to a fighter near Coburg in the Interception Tactics but none of the Zeitz force crashed in the area. LM742, however, did. Times of sighting in surviving Forms Z that could relate to this are between 2155-2206 hrs, none of which give a cause of loss, so it has to be assumed that the sightings of an aircraft shot down by a fighter in this area were made by 1 Group.
153 Sqdn NG335 - it is probably pertinent to now introduce the red herring! NG335 was lost without trace, so could have conceivably crashed anywhere, and could account for any one of a number of the unidentified sightings collated by the ORS - the Flak loss at Frankfurt, the fighter loss at Coburg, the fighter loss at Weimar or the Flak loss at Zeitz (this Flak loss was an aircraft reported as coned and shot down by Flak at 2206-2118, but most-likely relates to NE130 below)
582 Sqdn NE130 - this aircraft was hit by Flak while coned in S/Ls over the target at 2208 hrs (and is most likely the aircraft reported as shot down over the target) and then it was attacked and further damaged by a night fighter at 2216 hrs (reported position NW of Erfurt). The aircraft limped back behind Allied lines and was abandoned over France.
576 Sqdn PD309 - sustained Flak damage over target (port outer engine) after port inner engine had already become unserviceble for unknown reasons. Abandoned over Belgium.
100 Sqdn PA189 and 300 Sqdn PD257 - both crashed to the north of Erfurt, and the ORS could make no post-war assessment on the cause of loss. Sightings were made in the area of aircraft seen going down between 2220-2245. one of which was after air-to-air tracer was seen. The Interception Tactics report doesn't mention any specific losses in the area, although either of these two aircraft or NE130 could have been reported as the loss to a fighter near Weimar.
166 Sqdn ME296 and 12 Sqdn LM213 crashed near Bad Iburg and Ohne repectively, both brought down by night fighters. A Luftgau crash report for KM213 gives the time as 2230. These are the two fighter losses mentioned in the Interception Tactics report as being at "
Hengelo and Zwolle", while surviving Form Z data plots the losses as occurring between 2235-2300.
2. With reference to the raid report given in your link, the Brux claim was by a 630 Sqdn Lancaster at 2234 hrs near Brux. No claims were acknowledged by any of the Zeitz raiders. The 57 Sqdn combat report may be an initial claim or or may be no more than a sighting report of an enemy aircraft, I don't know.
3. Regarding Walter Borchers:
"And we have THREE Lancaster (confirmed by the OKL) shot down by the Kommodore of the Nightfighterunit 5 Obstlt.Walter Borchers he was based here switching around between the aerodromes of Erfurt, Altenburg
because Mosquitos are there every night and so you must hiding your presence day by day.
he took off and made his way to the west, the order give out, go into the stream at the Frankfurt area, we do not know if he came to this point, but he was on the southern formation of bombers up until 22.o2 hrs ! exact at this time the bombing of Zeitz has begun and the controllers give the new order all available Fighters with enough fuel has made for the Zeitz area
Borchers was one of those and he made his way to this point, again he was a little late go into combat with no results came from and hunt on found the tail of the homegoing bombers near Sangerhausen/ Nordhausen and shoot 22.3o hrs
two Lancasters in rapid succession down, than he turned away and landed nearby at Erfurt (fuel tanks must now been empty too).
So we could accounting for two of his three Lancasters.
BUT which identity has Claim three ? poss. the first one? Was it LM 472 ? I think so.
See the timeframe 22.o2 hrs, all were ordered to Zeitz, the attack on LM 472 was placed around 22.o4 hrs so it is possible and very likely, that he made this before he broke away and made for Zeitz..I think so.
He must hunt them down for a time, could not made an attack, because he was too late first he run westwards, than turned around, try to catch the stream again all this taking time, and he made no contact before 22.00 hrs and he must have seen the existence of the force see those two blewing up aircrafts at Pfaffhausen, so he flew on … when he found the Bombers, he was ordered to go to Zeitz."
This seems to be based on a lot of supposition, and it would be interesting to know if he really took off from Alenburg/Erfurt. His claims are specifically mentioned in the KTB of III./NJG5, so is there a possibility that he operated from Lübeck or Lüneburg on this night? Note that no accounting of the attack and damage to NE130 or the loss of NG335 is made in the statement above.
There are two main issues in trying to assess Nachtjagd claims on this night - (a) the total number of Nachtjagd claims made is not known, thus it is unclear if there are claims that were made for which no detail has been found, (b) at least half of the known claims are not supported by information on time or location of the claim.
IMHO, this situation means that exact details on many of the events of this night may never be known, and nothing should be assumed beyond what can be supported by surviving evidence.
For LM742 the evidence supports where it crashed and that it was hit by fire from another aircraft. If the still-classified Luftgau report ever gets released then a documented crash time will become available along with the German assessment on the cause of loss, which must be weighed against the British assessment of a cause of friendly fire. In both cases, it may not be possible to determine how the respective parties reached their conclusions. Sadly, with so much Nachtjagd claims data missing, I don't believe that we'll ever know who shot down LM742, if it was indeed shot down by a night fighter, unless new documentary evidence comes to light. In addition if a Loss of Bomber Aircraft questionnaire was completed by Knight and becomes declassifed, then this too may shed light on what happened. The statements he made to the RAAF were too vague (note that in those statements, he doesn't mention unseen fire or an unseen aircraft). It is not out of the realm of possibility that Knight reported the fire to have come from another Lancaster...
cheers
Rod
PS -
Dr. Theo Boiten has written in his book NACHTJAGD War Diaries Vol. 2 page 231 ff about the Fighter elements during this Airraid.
Actually, it was myself who researched and wrote that section of the book...
