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| Luftwaffe and Axis Air Forces Please use this forum to discuss the German Luftwaffe and the Air Forces of its Allies. |
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"Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Dear All,
I received this report from Manfred Boehme, who I believe obtained it from Morten Jessen. I'm not sure of the last name of the report writer, but it could be Dru, Major Robert B. Dru, A.C., to be specific. The report consists of detailed Luftwaffe operational records that were provided by the Japanese. Here is an excerpt as pertains to the Me 262: "The G.A.F. did, as a matter of fact, have I K.G.51 ready by October 1st, although it could not provide full strength of aircraft until November 1st. It did have II K.G.51 ready by December 1st and the recce. Staffel as well. III J.G.6 did go into operation early in October. The R.T.U. of K.G.51 was set up in October and was at full strength by December 1st. III R/T J.G.2 was at full strength by November 1st. Nothing came, however, of the plans for K.G.54. "This programme looks much better on paper than it actually is. I K.G.51 and IV (the R.T.U.) have been fully operational at full strength. The recce. Staffel has operated regularly but not at full strength. II K.G.51 although ready by December 1st has never operated as a Gruppe. III J.G.6 after a short period of experimental operations became non-operational. Through December and January the strength and effectiveness of K.G.51 steadily declined and the overall strength of the Me.262 declined as well. "There are several reasons for this situation: (a) airfield and weather conditions; (b) changes of decision in the employment of the Me.262; (c) fuel." Just how much of the above is Japanese sourced and how much of it is editorial comment, I can't tell. I have 2 specific questions: 1. Just why would the Japanese have had such detailed information regarding the employment of the Me 262? It certainly defies "need to know." 2. Why would the Japanese relate this information to the Allies? Now, it might be that the information was transmitted in code to Japan and the Allies had broken the code. Here's where you code breaking experts come in. Manfred says he's reviewed the document and that the information presented is correct. There's similar operational information on the Me 163 and Ar 234, simply far too detailed for "need to know." Regards, Richard |
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Re: "Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Nothing to do with "need to know"?
Far from it, in my view. If Japanese Forces were to build and operate fleet of Jet fighters and/or Bombers, any Historical info - namely experiance gained - last six months by March 45 - whould be of much importance in taking such decision as to build them "full scale" (as the Germans did) but I think the Japanese did not make such decision. But I am only amateur in these matters, and only been reader of WW2 history for last 40 years (or a little longer, one tends to forget exact details or perspective changes with more info, whatever...) My two cents be that these are possibly "findings" (notes) of Japanese Military Attache (or similar) delegation obtained within Germany, but quite possibly intercepted in code or in manuscript enroute - but the Japanese at the same time were getting blueprints and actual aircraft transported by submarine. Probably the "Recce staffel" beeing the "Stab." rather than referance to a NAGr (The "Stab" had recce ~ "leading the flock" function back in Cavalry days). Regards Ed Last edited by edNorth; 7th January 2013 at 23:55. Reason: typo |
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Re: "Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Richard
Interesting post. I don't have an easy answer for you. A Record Group at the PRO I hope to have a look at later this year is HW35 Government Code and Cypher School: Military Section: Reports of Japanese Military Attachees Decrypts 1942 - 1945 I have absolutely no idea what it does contain but I'm hoping that there might be material of this nature in there. I'll let you know either way. Steve |
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Re: "Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Dear Ed and Steve,
Thank you for your comments. Ed, the Germans vacillated on whether or not to provide the Japanese with plans of the Me 262. That the Germans became concerned about the security around what they told the Japanese is shown by an interview Manfred mentioned to me: "Fw. Heiner Geisthövel, a pilot of 11./JG 7, which was stationed at Brandenburg-Briest, had told me once, that at the end of February 1945, a Japanese military delegation paid a visit to B.B. They were to be shown the daily operation of a field unit equipped with jet-propelled aircraft. But at the briefing of the members of 11./JG 7 held prior to the arrival of the delegation, it was impressed upon them, that under no circumstances were they to mention, or even explain, the EZ 42, of which several had already been installed in the Me 262's of 11./JG.7. To me this indicates, that German intelligence services had at least an inkling, that some Japanese were leaking military secrets to the enemy." Perhaps they got smart rather late in the game. In regard to your points, Ed, I think of interest to the Japanese would be an example of typical operations, any useful tactics, and the success rate achieved. Obviously, to build Me 262's in Japan, they would need plans. But, the need to know what unit was equipped at any particular point in time to me wouldn't have had value to the Japanese and thus my question regarding "need to know". As for the possibility of plans and an actual example having been shipped by submarine, it looks like it may have been plans only, contrary to other reporting. Steve, I appreciate your putting this on your docket. I hope that Nick Beale also joins in the discussion. Regards, Richard |
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Re: "Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Quote:
Ultra (HW5 files) offers a very detailed picture of the introduction of jets, if you have enough time/patience to piece the fragments together. Something was known of EKdo. 262 at Lechfeld. It is highly detailed on KG 51 (examples on my website), useful but patchy on III./JG 6, pretty good on 1./NAG 1 and 2./NAG 6 but there is not that much on JG 7 or KG(J) 54. There seems to be a fair bit of material on III./EJG 2 but I haven't really tried to see what it adds up to. As for the Ar 234, there is a wealth of material on Kdo. Götz, Kdo. Hecht and 1.(F)/123 through to about early March 1945. 1.(F)/100 is well-covered, as is Kdo. Sommer until it reaches Italy. There are occasional items about the He 162, which (barring one or two late discoveries) Robert Forsyth and Eddie Creek had for the Classic Publications volume on the type. |
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Re: "Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Dear Richard,
Thank you for providing this information. The Germans and Japanese had a submarine trade system called Yanagi. They did build a version of the Me-262, Me-163 and aircraft that resembled the V-1. Unfortunately, recent books have usually downplayed German-Japanese cooperation during the war, and the manufacturing capabilities of the Japanese. Best regards, Ed |
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Re: "Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Dear Nick,
Did the Japanese Military Attaché use Enigma or the Japanese own code to transmit to Japan? I thought Ultra was strictly for translating German transmissions, not Japanese. Please enlighten me. Regards, Richard |
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#8
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Re: "Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Dear All,
I guess the underlying question is how did the Japanese get access to such minutia on testing and operational activities, followed by why did they report on them? Regards, Richard |
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#9
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Re: "Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Richard,
I don't know what the attaché, Hiroshi Oshima, used to send his messages but the Japanese diplomatic ciphers have to be the strong contender, I'd think. Whatever he used, the material was deciphered and appears in Bletchley Park's reports which (as per The National Archives' indexes) comprise material from "high grade machine ciphers." The content indicates that, as the representative of their principal ally, he was being thoroughly briefed by the Germans. |
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#10
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Re: "Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass
Dear Nick,
The "content", as well as the whole scenario, is what has bothered me. It just has a rotten fish smell and I was hoping that someone here would be able to give it a confirmation or denial. Regards, Richard |
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