Me109D's converted to E's?

[Mr Schmitt]

Hi Guys,

This is a part of the main Radio Data plate from an Me109D/E. Was it common to convert a D to an E?
Even though the attached does not prove it, you can see that the D has been over stamped with an E.
The Dora from the Firewall back over, was almost identical in construction to the E.

Kind Regards

[Graham Boak]

However, the cooling system was completely different with the radiators mounted in the wings. I suggest that this could simply be the correction of a mistake: or the result of the number of radio data plates exceeding the number of D production airframes. It is possible of course that an excess of D rear fuselages was produced, and these were then absorbed into the E production line. Any one of these three suggestions appears at least as likely (to me) than the actual conversion of a finished D into an E: the effort appears to be so large as to be more trouble than it was worth.

[RT]

Lack of E plates ...

[GuerraCivil]

I think that there was not any need to convert Jumo-engined models into E once the production of E-model had started to roll. By the spring of 1940 there was well enough E-aircraft available for all single-engined dayfighter units at the frontline.

The B/C/D -model Bf 109 aircraft found good use as advanced trainer fighters and were used in that purpose up to 1943 (at least).

Some Bf 109 C/D could also be still used in combat units during the early WWII (up to spring/summer 1940). Although Bf 109 C/D might have appeared obsolete fighter model by late 1939, it was clearly superior compared to Polish PZL fighters and could take on Morane 406/Curtiss Hawk 75. (The famous air combat of 6.11.1939 when Bf 109 D -equipped unit was defeated effectively by French Curtiss fighters had more to do with faulty tactics and lack of coordination between German pilots than with the supposed inferiority of Bf 109 D vs. Hawk 75). The Bf 109 C/D was also the first German nightfighter to achieve some air victories during WW2.

[sidney]

Although not necessarily the exact subject of this thread, I will quote a line from Mike Spicks' book Luftwaffe Fighter Aces, page 37: "... The third reason is conjectural, but it seems probable, that Spanish experience notwithstanding, JGr 102 used the wrong tactics!..."

The first two reasons quoted were firstly, the alertness of the French pilot and secondly, the superior performance of the Curtiss Hawk 75 A.

In short, the wrong tactics employed by JGr 102 was merely the author's supposition, he could not prove it. Do you happen to have something more tangible on this combat - some other source that proved this "wrong tactics" beyond doubt?

Perhaps the opposite was true - the outnumbered French pilots of GC II/5 employed the right tactics (i.e., say, dive and zoom) against JGr 102's Bf 109 D-1s on this particular occasion, utilizing the superior performance of their Curtiss Hawk 75 A(-2, -3 or -4) aircraft?

[GuerraCivil]

Michael Ziefle in his small book Die Messerschmitt Bf 109 B/C/D in Ihrer Zeit (2011) gives following regarding the air battle of 6.11.1939:
- the Germans (JGr 102) enjoyed a numerical superiority of 3:1 against the French (GC II/5), one of their formations was also flying about 1000 m higher than the French, which should have been very favourable tactical situation - despite this they were effectively beaten which indicates that there must have been more than one tactical error by the German side.
- it seems that JGr 102 was not yet familiar with the "finger four" -tactics but flew still in old Ketten formations: flying in tactical pairs and swarms was still very new thing in Luftwaffe and not yet widely used in all German fighter units by late 1939.
- according to French pilots the Germans went for dogfight in tight turns, in which the nimble Hawk 75 had definitive advantage against the more stiff Bf 109. Lack of coordination between German pilots was apparent during the combat.
- the JGr 102 (earlier as I/ZG 2) had been very succesfull in Poland and this probably made them overconfident although the adversary was equipped this time with much better planes than in Poland. "Too easy" air victories may result as a attitude handicap in a combat when confronting an enemy that is not that easily defeated.
- and undoubtedly French pilots were well-trained and knew how to use the advantages of Hawk 75 against Bf 109: GC II/5 was credited with 47 air victories during the 1939-1940 campaign against Germans and they did shoot down at least 12 "Emils" (this number seems to be confirmed by German loss records) if not even more.

When it comes to technical notes, the Bf 109 D was about as fast as Hawk 75. The top speed with operational Hawk 75 varied between 430 - 480 km/h at the height of 1000 - 5000 meters which is clearly less than given often in English/American literature referring usually the very theoretical techical spesification of 500 km/h given by Curtiss-Wright company (see: https://forum.warthunder.com/index.p...-75-top-speed/). However Twin Wasp was a stronger engine with more horsepower output than Jumo 210 D. Hawk 75 was also more nimble and easier to fly than Bf 109 D.

Still I think that these advantages were not that great that they could be used as the main explanation of the result of the air combat of 6.11.1939 between JGr 102 and GC II/5. I think that this one air combat did give too negative impression about the combat capability of Bf 109 D against British/French in 1939/1940.

The "Dora" was still useful as interceptor against bombers/recce planes in 1939 and early 1940 and when flown effectively it could defend against slightly superior fighters - there is not much statistical basis to confirm that, but at least the "official kill/loss" -rate of Bf 109 D -equipped units vs. Hawk 75/Morane 406 was about 1:1. More about this: http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showth...rench+fighters