A ?? RE: Allied flak coverage in Tunisia...

[NickM]

Guys:

Just had a SILLY thought, generated by my latest Re-reading of the FWs in North Africa book by Andrew & Morten & that has to do with the Allies flak protection from the LW's ground attack missions in Tunisia;
It seems that every attack against a convoy in Tunisia by III/SKG 10 & other units was met by lotsa ground fire(OF COURSE!!) but I wondered how the Flak was deployed: Was it 'deployed' along the route of march in 'overwatch fashion, did they have mobile flak units that could fire while on the move or were they just traveling with the convoys & when planes appeared they 'unlimbered' & brought into action as fast as was humanly possible?

Hope this question isn't TOO goofy!

nickm

[Graham Boak]

A quick response would be that there would be no "unlimbering". Many vehicles in the US Army carried their own AA, usually a 0.5in Browning. These can be seen in "pulpit" mountings on M3 half tracks or soft-top cabs, and as a circular mounting on hard-top cabs. Multiple gun carriage (Maxon turrets) were carried on White (or similar) half-tracks, which would travel with the convoys.

I admit not knowing the planned "order of travel" for US Army convoys, presumably some kind of dedicated spacing was involved. The precise dates of introduction of the AA half-tracks may be relevant for Tunisian operations.

[NickM]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

A quick response would be that there would be no "unlimbering". Many vehicles in the US Army carried their own AA, usually a 0.5in Browning. These can be seen in "pulpit" mountings on M3 half tracks or soft-top cabs, and as a circular mounting on hard-top cabs. Multiple gun carriage (Maxon turrets) were carried on White (or similar) half-tracks, which would travel with the convoys.

I admit not knowing the planned "order of travel" for US Army convoys, presumably some kind of dedicated spacing was involved. The precise dates of introduction of the AA half-tracks may be relevant for Tunisian operations.

Dang, forgot about those .50 cals on the trucks...thanks;

nickm

[Mark R.]

Agree with Graham. However, I have not seen US AAA units spread throughout miscellaneous units whilst they were on the move. With more requests for support than available assets, the bulk of the US anti-aircraft units were allotted to the protection of artillery units. I think most of the other units relied on their organic weapons (seems like almost every vehicle mounted something in those days) and immediate action drills (quickly moving off road on either side to avoid a densely clustered target) served to limit amount of damage by Jabos. The worst US loss to strafing German fighters (that I have found so far) occurred in early February 1943 when all of the howitzers and prime movers of C Battery, 33d FA were destroyed by strafing Bf-109s. I believe there were early M-15s (water cooled .50 cals x 2 and 1x 37mm cannon combined mount) involved in the Tunisian campaign. No quad 50s yet.

[Mark R.]

Agreed with Graham. Most vehicles relied on their organic .50 caliber machineguns for self defense. Trucks, halftracks, and tanks all carried them. The dedicated AA battalions (still considered part of coast artillery then) did have self-propelled halftracks (M-15 type) with a rotating partially open turret mounting 1 x 37mm and x2 .50 caliber watercooled machineguns. Not sure if they shot on the move a lot though, as it makes it doubly harder to hit a plane when the vehicle and aircraft are both moving (well, one is moving and one is bouncing up and down). The AA vehicles probably moved off the road a short ways and halted to fire. I think commanders tended to deploy their AAA near artillery units to ensure their indirect fire capability could not be disrupted by Stukas and Jabos.

[James A Pratt III]

Some twin 50 AAA half tracks were used in N Africa Sicily and Italy and were later upgraded to quad 50s.

[NickM]

Originally Posted by Mark R.

. The worst US loss to strafing German fighters (that I have found so far) occurred in early February 1943 when all of the howitzers and prime movers of C Battery, 33d FA were destroyed by strafing Bf-109s. I believe there were early M-15s (water cooled .50 cals x 2 and 1x 37mm cannon combined mount) involved in the Tunisian campaign. No quad 50s yet.

Interesting; this gives rise to a couple of questions for me:

first of all what exactly were the losses; and any idea as to what JG or SKG or SchG unit was the attacker?

thx

NM

[Mark R.]

It was four howitzers (105mm towed) and four 2-1/2 ton trucks. I will dig out the unit AAR. This battaion was deployed at Kasserine and made mention of the fact they were missing an entire battery because the guns and prime movers had been destroyed by strafing. As for who did it, that might be discernable to someone once I track down the exact date. Will dig in my records tomorrow.

[John Beaman]

Some thoughts: This is from a friend who is very well versed is US Army tactics' history:

1. The USA rarely deployed AAA units with moving columns. We might place AAA batteries at sites such as crossroads, defiles. bridges, etc. Choke points or congested areas.
2. Most American vehicles armored or other wise were usually equipped with an AAA machine gun not to mention small arms such as M-1's, carbines, sub machine guns and the like. Unless a column was surprised or caught where it couldn't maneuver it should be able to scatter and minimize the damage.
3. Early war doctrine seemed to emphasize taking cover, spreading out and laying down as much fire as possible. An example might be an early war tank company (Shermans). With three platoons that makes 15 fifty cal machine guns for AAA plus the light platoon of M-5 Stuart's another 5 Fifty cals. Plus 2 for the Headquarters tanks and throw in 2 Jeeps a half track (ring mounted fifty) and 18 trucks (at least half with ring mounted fifties) and a tank retriever you can have roughly 30 AAA heavy barrel fifties for defense. This was assumed to offer adequate protection against strafing. And remember early war doctrine was formulated against slower and less powerful aircraft than we faced later in the war.