Operation Silver Fox June 1941

[Brian]

Hi guys

When the Germans launched Op Silver Fox directed at Murmansk in June 1941, what aerial operations ensued? I am aware that the Finnish Army was involved, but was the Finnish Air Force?

I can't seem to find the right information!

Cheers
In ignorance
Brian

[Geyerfalck]

Hi Brian,

As a clarification, the Murmansk offensive was given the code name RENNTIER (Reindeer), and the drive on Kandalaksha was dubbed Operation SILBERFUCHS (Silver Fox).
Three major units were set up to carry on the required operations in Finland :
- XIXth GebirgsKorps (Gen. d. Geb. DIETL) assigned to Operation Renntier
- XXXVIth Korps (Gen. d. Kav. FEIGE) assigned to Operation Silberfuchs
- Finnish IIIrd Corps (Gen. SIILASVUO) also assigned to Operation Silberfuchs.

The tactical staff of Luftflotte 5 (Luftwaffenkommando Kirkenes) controlled - for tactical purpose only - all of the air units committed against Russia in the Far North.
All other command authority over these LW units rested with Air Commander North (HQ at Stavanger) and with Fighter Command Norway.

The principal mission was to support all army and naval operations in the Finnish area.
This included :
- the establishment of German air superiority over all combat areas and coastal portions of Northern Norway ;
- operations against hostile land and sea forces;
- operations against Soviet supply routes, especially the Arctic Canal, Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Kandalaksha, and;
- the protection of German shipping against attacks by the Western Allies.

Because of the scope of German operations, the extent of the war theater and the paucity of German forces available, these operations could only be performed "as far as possible" under the existing conditions.

Since the Chief of Air Command Kirkenes also had to act as tactical air commander at an army HQ, close cooperation between LW and ground units was assured.

The following forces were assigned to Luftwaffenkommando Kirkenes on June 22nd 1941 :
- Recon units : 1.(H)/32 (Kemijärvi and Rovaniemi, 7 x Hs126 + 3 x Do17P), 1.(F)/124 (Kirkenes, 3 x Ju88), 1./KüFlGr 406 (Banak, He115 + Do18), Wekusta 5 (2 x He111 + 2 x Ju88D);
- Bomber units : 5./KG30 (Banak, 10 x Ju88);
- Stuka units : IV.(St)/LG1 (Kirkenes, 36 x Ju87).
- Fighter units : 13./JG77 (10 x Bf109) and reinforced Schwarm of Stab/ZG76 (6 x Bf110); both at Kirkenes.
- Transport units : Transportstaffel (attached to Luftwaffenkommando Kirkenes, 11 x Ju52).

First operation : destruction of 60-70 soviet aircraft at Varlamovo airfield.
2nd operation : destruction of communication lines and central power station at Murmansk.
3rd operation : severance of the Murmansk railroad line (devoted to KG30).
Other important targets in this area were the installations at Arkhangelsk, the Kandalaksha to Arkhangelsk railroad line, and the hydroelectric plant at Nivskiy, north of Kandalaksha, all of which were successfully attacked by the LW.

The IV.(St)/LG1 supported the operations of XIX Geb.Korps and performed certain secondary duties as requested, while units of KG30 attacked targets farther in the Soviet rear area.
The dive bombers were especially effective in reducing the batteries on the Rybachiy Peninsula.

Unfavorable weather during September prevented good exploitation of LW forces in the Far North, especially along the coastal areas.
Recon units were active insofar as conditions permitted.
They soon discovered that the Red Air Force was already receiving considerable amounts of equipment from the Western Allies.

A further task of Air Commander North was the maintenance of recon over sea areas east of a line from Spitzbergen to Barents Island to North Cape, and to attack hostile naval craft observed (+ Wekusta air missions as well).

There was no real operational collaboration between the LW and the Finnish Air Force, since their sectors of responsibility were hundreds of miles apart and their missions vastly different in character.
Liaison officers were regularly exchanged, however, so that a free flow of information was assured between Finnish and German leaders in widely separated combat sectors.
During the winter of 41-42, the FAF voluntarily placed the airfields at Kemi on the northern tip of of the Gulf of Bothnia and at Pori on the western coast of Finland, north of the Aland Islands at the disposal of GAF.
Kemi was foreseen as a tactical bomber base and Pori as the end terminal of the German air supply route in Finland.

Considering the strength of the Lw in this area, its operations were highly successful. Great efforts were made by all German personnel to accomplish their missions, despite material and personnel shortages.
Yet in the final analysis, the LW failed to attain its objectives in the Far North.

[Brian]

Hi Geyerfalck

Many thanks indeed for your responce - the info is great and certainly gives me a much clearer picture of events.

Cheers
Brian