An article of interest

[John Beaman]

At the risk of starting a flame war which I hope the usually “professional” and mature members of this forum will avoid, I will post this link to a newspaper article that appeared yesterday, regarding the famous claim of the 332nd Fighter Group, the “Tuskegee Airmen”.

http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2006612100313

I do not know if many non-USA members on this site know of their claim: they never lost a USAAF bomber they were escorting. Of course, it is impossible to prove you did not lose one. This article documents attempts to do some serious research about the claim.

Many people, but especially other WWII fighter pilot veterans, are very resentful of this claim. A US Congressman, Charles Wrangle of New York, even sponsored a bill through Congress to strike and award a special gold medal to the pilots for this “accomplishment”. Unfortunately, in the current “PC” world of US politics there was no stopping it and it has been awarded. This makes other veterans even more angry, but if one says anything about this claim, one is branded as a “racist”.

Considering the segregationist climate they had to operate in at the time, the accomplishments of the Group were such that they did not need to make such a claim, but a few zealots have.

It is truly sad.

[drgondog]

John - good article and a lightning rod.

I consider myself a fact driven person and have learned a lot over the last 20+ years of serious archive study - and learned to reach out to other sources than microfilm histories. Having said that, the mission summaries kept by serious squadron/group historians are always a good reference and this source appears to be the root of the controversy.

At the risk of being bombarded I have never believed it possible that any single Fighter Group could ever achieve the distinction against the Luftwaffe over an 18 month plus span in the ETO... escorting Heavies to attack oil and airframe targets - which both the 12th and 15th AF did.

The route and escort assignments have too many variables with respect to execution to conceive that a.) the 332nd was always where they were assigned, b.) their assigned herd was on time and in good formation, c.) that a sharp Luftwaffe Controller didn't pick up a scenario where local Luftwaffe superiority could be exploited... and d.) that the definition of 'no loss' could be narrowed to only the bombers they were actually covering instead of the ones they were assigned to cover.

What I have always been prepared to believe is that the discipline of 'sticking to the bombers' was so compelling because of the political focus of race, that the squadrons just didn't break formation and go after large gaggles in the fear that another German force would attack the vacated position. In my opinion, this is why the 332nd did not have a single fighter pilot that a.) claimed 5 destroyed in the air or b.) was awarded credt for 5.

I could find reference after reference for 4thFG, 56th FG, 352nd FG, 355th FG, 357FG, etc that clearly showed aggressive mistakes were made in chasing german fighters or that all particular groups were overwhelmed because they were locally inferior in strength and covering too many bombers to prevent them from being shot down.

Inconceivable that the 332nd never experienced this type of misfortune.

Regards,

Bill Marshall

[Franek Grabowski]

Well, were not they the worsest FG of 15th AF in term of credited victories? Perhaps PC was a reason to look for a claim that would prove Redtails superiority in some regard.
Anyway, it seems it is a typical case. People in their 80s or 90s are rather less than open minded, and it is hard to discuss events from their past, especially when they feel this leads to belittlening of their achievements. On the other hand, there is plenty of plenty of publicists or researchers, who would make sensation of anything just to promote theirselves, and not caring, that it may hurt third parties.

[Graham Boak]

From what I have read, it is fair to say that the 332nd were under intense scrutiny. Had they ever gone free-hunting and left the bombers exposed to enemy fighters, they would have received more severe criticism than any other fighter group in a similar position.

However, this does raise a tactical point that has niggled at me for some time. There is no doubt that Doolittle's tactic of ending fighters ahead of the bomber stream did result in more Luftwaffe fighter losses. However, it is rarely pointed out that this was made possible by the steadily increasing numbers of escort fighters available. Although fighter groups were freed to roam a-hunting, others remained in close contact with the bomber stream. It was less a switch of tactics than an addition. Whenever the bomber force was left unprotected by fighters, the Luftwaffe seized their opportunities and bombers were lost.

Parallels can be drawn with the use of hunter-killer groups in the Atlantic war. When excort numbers were limited, forming hunter-killer groups weakened the convoys and left them vulnerable. As escort numbers rose, it was possible to form these groups and, more importantly, breaking the enemy codes meant they were not searching blindly but could go to the right areas for the U-boats. Can this parallel be extended to the use of the Scouting aircraft of the 8th, going out ahead of the main force to pass information back, not just to the bombers but to the fighter escorts too? I'm aware of the existence of these scouts, but have read little of their operational significance and precise roles.

[aeroeng]

Interesting article. Thanks for posting.

[drgondog]

Graham - the original concept of the Scouts was Colonel Budd Peaslee, at that time CO of 384BG.

The problem to be solved was first and foremost "what is the weather like over the target", secondly "if the weather is bad, but target conditions good, what route can the strike force take that is safest", third "is there a better alternative target and route" - last "what is the German Fighter situation."

The 8th AF started the Scouts at Steeple Morden under the support of the 355th FG in July 1944. The Experimental Scouts operated until mid September, was deemed a success and formed one Scout org per Bomb Division. The 1st followed peaslee to 364th/Hononton, the 2nd went to John Brooks at 355th/Steeple Morden and the 3rd went with Vince Masters to 20th/Wormingford

The 2nd SF had a spectacular success in the interceptor role when they helped a badly outnumbered 355th FG and 491st BG over Hannover/Gardlingen 26 November, 1944 -shooting down 5 with two probables to break up an attack by JG301 with enormous tactical superiority.

The 355th had exactly the classic challenge when their 'sheep' were strung out over a 40 mile path, because one bomb group failed in their navigation, with only the 339th and 355th anywhere near them.

The 355th had a very good reputation for sticking with the bomber, frequently chasing the 109's and 190's away - then coming back to escort (or never leaving) - but despite the discipline, had some days when the bomber losses were high nevertheless.

The 2nd also had the only Scout air ace, Bill Whalen who got three on this particular day.

Great org.

Regards,

Bill