Churchill and the BBSU.

[tcolvin]

The Editor of the BBSU published by Cass, Sebastian Cox, wrote this about Churchill's obstructionism; “...the Prime Minister who, for reasons which remain obscure, plainly had no desire to see any really detailed survey of the offensive undertaken, and was intent on placing every bureaucratic obstruction in its path” (page xx).

It is obscure why Cox in 1998 should be coy about speculating on Churchill's reasons. No one involved was then alive to object, and as Head of the Air Historical Branch he had the opportunity to ask around and find out, or at least list possible reasons.

Does anyone disagree that at least four elements must have weighed with Churchill;

1. Churchill knew that since “too often we enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought” (JFK), he was determined that his book, 'The Second World War', would be the opinion-former. Churchill said, "For my part, I consider that it will be found much better by all parties to leave the past to history, especially as I propose to write that history myself." He would therefore fear that an authorised BBSU would raise questions that he had no intention of answering.
2. His conscience told him area bombing was terror bombing. He said as much after Dresden, but withdrew the memo. Churchill knew a BBSU would make it difficult for him to create distance from his well-known Trenchardist bombing policies.
3. He knew the Americans implacably opposed a joint bombing survey with the British partly through distaste of Air Ministry bureaucracy and infighting. Churchill had been shocked by its manifestation in the dismissal of Dowding and Park, and was probably aware of a move to rubbish Harris. The BBSU would inevitably be used for settling scores, and would rouse dogs that Churchill preferred should be left to slumber. That is what he meant by saying the BBSU would be covering 'sterile' issues.
4. Churchill knew the Air Ministry would never settle for a survey team smaller than the American team of a thousand. Their cost was a real issue for a bankrupt Britain. It might even become an election issue. Hence his anger on April 18, 1945 when a thousand Lancasters overflew London during the night. “Why is it necessary to fly aircraft in such great numbers over London during the night? Has this any war value at all?”, he demanded of Portal. “It is a great nuisance”. He knew he would soon be at the polls. Cost was therefore a publicly safe reason to give for rejection.

Have any other possible reasons been missed here?
Tony

[SES]

Tony,
Let the dog slumber. You tried to stir up a discussion on a similar note, which was closed down by the moderators, please do not revive it from a different angle.
SES

[tcolvin]

Thanks, SES.

You're right about the effect here of discussing BC, which is often called "a most evocative and controversial subject" (Derek Wood, Editor of Bracknell Paper No. 4).

It is not a suitable subject for this board. Pity.

Tony