Battle Experience V's Sound Tactics

[Jim Oxley]

Much has been made in history books of the experience gained by the Luftwaffe in Spain as a major contributing factor to it's early successes at the start of WWII. Along the lines of a cadre of battle experienced flyers leading a highly skilled peace-time trained air force. And is often used by historians to account for it's amazing success over many air forces in the early stages of the War.

Yet there were a number of countries who possessed an equal amount of battle experience. Italy's Regia Aeronautica fought in Spain for a similar period to that of the Luftwaffe and in Abbasynia. Japan, fought several air wars, in China and against the Russians in the Khalkin-Gol regin of Mongolia. Yet Italy's performance at the start of WWII was quite mediocre; and Japan, although gaining several resounding successes early on, drew many wrong conclusions on air fighting and suffered for it later in the War.

Now Russia had the most air fighting experience of any country - Allied or Axis - bar none. It fought an air war during the Russian revolution and it's aftermath (The Red and the White) up to 1920. It was heavily involved in the Spaniah Civil War for it's duration (sending many VVS frontline Squadron personnel into combat); the VVS provided equipment and personel to China in it's fight against Japan; in late 1937 it had it's first direct border war with Japan along the Amur River; another in July (to September) 1938 near Lake Khasan, 80 miles south west of Vladivostok; and the very serious confrontation in the Khalkin-Gol battles in 1939 (May to October). And shortly after that the VVS was heavily involved in the border war with Finland from November 1939 to March 1940.

So what was it about the Germans that allowed them to draw the correct conclusions to their experience in Spain; whereas Italy, Japan and Russia fail (who all had equal battle experience) failed to do so?

[Christer Bergström]

Soviet airmen drew correct conclusions, but some of those were blocked by conservative thinking in the upper echelons of the Soviet military.

They were not alone. Just look at RAF Fighter Command's "Fighter Area Tactics"... Similar to the question of the V formation for fighters, converging guns to 400 yards in RAF Fighter Command, the inability within the RAF and the USAAF to accept the need for fighter escort for bombers (before it was too late), etc: Conservatism blocked new ideas. Own battle experience benefits the pilots, but tactical conclusions must be drawn also by studying all conflicts, including those where you are not involved yourself.

On the other hand, the Soviets understood the need for close-support (assault) aircraft better than most other air forces by that time. And the Italians and Japanese (and the Soviets!) realised the need for torpedo planes earlier than most others (including the Germans).

Still, the Luftwaffe can not be regarded as the standard. Under Göring's and Milch's influence, the Luftwaffe was more adaptive to new ideas than probably any other air force by that time - with the possible exception of the Finnish Air Force.

[Juha]

I think RAF was mixture of innovativeness and conservativeness

“…the inability within the RAF and the USAAF to accept the need for fighter escort for bombers (before it was too late)…”

Strange, I thought that they won the war. I’d say that they abandoned the idea of unescorted daytime bomber formations much too slowly but not too late. OK, too late for many of the bomber crews.

“And the Italians and Japanese (and the Soviets!) realised the need for torpedo planes earlier than most others (including the Germans).”

British had had torpedo bombers from WWI onwards; IIRC they had begun experiments with torpedo carrying a/c even before WWI. USN had torpedo bombers at least from 20s onwards. French probably were also early on this field but I cannot recall when they began. Luftwaffe was a late comer for sure, but it was an exception..

“Under Göring's and Milch's influence, the Luftwaffe was more adaptive to new ideas than probably any other air force by that time…”

I’m not so sure on that. Germany had very update offensive systems, RAF had integrated air defence system. IMHO it was a question of how to allocate limited resources. LW put most of its to offensive “tools” RAF to defensive. That said I admit that LW was very effective in that it was designed to do, especially its fighter tactics were revolutionary. British archaic fighter tactics were based on assumption that Germans were unable to launch escorted (by single engine fighters) bomber raids against HomeIslands. The collapse of France was a big surprise to British.

Juha

[Ruy Horta]

Pre-war USN and IJNAF pilots were also a highly trained cadre of men, hardly inferior to anything the Luftwaffe could field.

[Juha]

Yes, USN fighter tactics were good, especially from 1942 onwards. O’Hare feat (3 Bettys destroyed and 2 badly damaged single-handed in 4 minutes) on 20 Feb 42 shows the merits to USN’s emphasis on shooting skills and good tactic chosen for attack against bombers. I’m not sure how exceptional Finnish AF was generally, except that the pilots and aircrews were ready to accept the fight against really great odds but I agree with Christer that FAF’s fighter arm was very good tactically and it also had emphasized shooting skills. Sarvanto’s feat on 6 Jan 40, 6 DB-3Ms downed out of formation of 7 bombers was really exceptional , especially because DB-3Ms were tougher targets than Bettys and Fokker D. XXIs had only 4 7,7mm mgs not 4 12.7mm as in F4F-3s.

JNAF was also very advanced, not maybe in fighter tactics but generally in carrier operations and tactics, also its torpedo and anti-shipping bombing tactics (incl. land-based medium bombers) were absolutely first rate as the British on Prince of Wales and on Repulse noticed in Dec. 41.

But of course LW was on the whole very good as a tactical airforce.

So, one can draw right conclusions from combat experiences but some, like USN and FAF could also draw right conclusions from theoretical analysis and from peacetime experiments. But in principle the first method (real battle experiences) was more reliable as IMHO usually practice is more reliable guide than theory but both can be misleading and good theory might allow a qualitative leap forward.


Juha

[Ruy Horta]

I've always regarded calling the Luftwaffe a tactical AF somewhat of a misnomer, certainly by 1939-41 standards.

[Juha]

Ruy
I’d say that it depends how one definite a strategic air force. To me a strategic air force is a force which can achieve strategic goals by its own actions. 1939 – 42/43 there was IMHO no truly strategic airforce anywhere. IMHO LW was never a good strategic AF. Early in the war it had first class navigational aids but lacked carrying power ie it could not carry enough bombs for truly decisive results. It also lacked good target intelligence. Which mean more than an ability to produce target maps. LW could sometimes made effective strategic attacks, for example the attack on Coventry and the attack on Bristol a/c factory at Filton by KG 55 in late Sept. 40 but it lacked ability or knowledge to strike repeatly and effectively to choosen targets to achieve decisive results. Generally IMHO LW’s strategic campaigns tended to be rather haphazard. So IMHO in 1939 – 42 LW was generally good in tactical operations but not so successful in pure strategic operations. Of course it was sometimes (in Norway and in Holland) effective terror weapon and if we think Douhet’s ideas that was one way to achieve a strategic goal. So one can say that in Holland LW achieved a strategic goal. In Norway the results were tactical. But if one thinks USAAF 9th AF in 44, IMHO LW was more like it than like the 8th in its destructive power and its reach.

Juha