Christer Bergstrom BOB book

[Fanair]

Please what do you think of the new book of Christer Bergström about the Battle of Britain ?

Thank you

Alain

[Chris Goss]

Not new but a translation into English from his original Swedish text if I am not much mistaken

[mars]

Have somebody read this book in the Swedish version? What is the review?

[FalkeEins]

There is one 5-star review on amazon.co.uk for the English edition. AFAIK Christer is presenting his book at the Battle of Britain museum Hawkinge on September 15.

[mars]

Originally Posted by FalkeEins

There is one 5-star review on amazon.co.uk for the English edition. AFAIK Christer is presenting his book at the Battle of Britain museum Hawkinge on September 15.

I did remember it rose some controversial that Christer suggest RAF was in the verge of collapse only be saved by Hilter's order to switch target to London

[taitbb]

Interesting, I thought this was a common thesis, nothing new to my knowledge.

I have seen different authors give the shift to London different weight on the effect in the grand scheme of the battle, but I think there is little doubt that the squadrons on the main front benefited from the reprieve from being the concentration of daily attacks.

Originally Posted by mars

I did remember it rose some controversial that Christer suggest RAF was in the verge of collapse only be saved by Hilter's order to switch target to London

[mars]

Originally Posted by taitbb

Interesting, I thought this was a common thesis, nothing new to my knowledge.
.

No, it is not

[Peter Cornwell]

Indeed it is & has been a well-documented & widely-held view for decades - far from being anything new, radical, nor even controversial. The change in focus for German attacks in late August & early September brought 'intense relief' to DOWDING - greater than he could express at the time. 'I could hardly believe that the Germans would have made such a mistake.' PARK was equally relieved, writing within days of the switch in German tactics, 'Had the enemy continued his heavy attacks against Biggin Hill and the adjacent sectors ... the fighter defences of London would have been in a perilous state ...'. The Luftwaffe effectively achieved its goal of air superiority over southern England by the end of August and had it maintained its attacks on Fighter Command airfields for just one more week the outcome might well have been disastrous for Britain. This has all been very well documented over the years & all one needs do is consult the required reading.

[mars]

Peter, no one deny that RAF fighter command was under very heavy pressure then, and the target changes of Luftwaffe did give RAF a breath space, but did that mean RAF was at verge of defeat at that time? Many people, me include, do not agree that, there was no noticeable changes of the number of serviceable Spitfire and Hurricane between August and September, and RAF had not exhausted their reserve either, did Group 10 and 12 suffered far less than Keith's group 11?

[Peter Cornwell]

Nobody can suggest that there was ever a problem with the number of fighters available to Fighter Command - BEAVERBROOK had that well under control. But there were growing concerns over the wastage rate of fighter pilots and the inexperience and/or continuing endurance of those remaining on strength. DOWDING's policy of rotating squadrons between Groups also resulted in a similar diminishing quality (though to a lesser extent) within his reserve pilot pool. Pilot attrition within RAF Fighter Command was on a knife-edge. But the continuing availability of serviceable airfields in southern England was the other major factor which brought us so close to imminent defeat in early September 1940.