Response to Glider and Juha.

[tcolvin]

Glider's question;

Tony
I still don't see how you can blame the 2 TAF for not attacking the bridges when they were not asked to attack them in the first place. According to the records I have seen (which are not conclusive I admit) the 2 TAF were never asked, tasked or ever planned to attack the bridges. It wasn't a case of the 2ATF passing the buck, they never had the buck to pass over in the first place.

Its a similar situation re the Hillmen strongpoint. How can you blame the 2TAF for not knocking it out when no one asked for it to be attacked? Had they been asked to so, then they would have attacked, flack or no flack.

I didn't know about Gen Horricks decision to ban mediums but I do know that 38 Brigade prepared a detailed report on the fighting and no problems with the air support were mentioned.
http://www.royaltankregiment.com/9_R...d%20Report.htm

No one would deny that the achilles heal of the Typhoon was its radiator, the same wen for the Tempest and P40, all of which performed well in the GA role. However I would still argue that its smaller size, higher speed and better maneouverability would balance the additional vulnerability. Typhoons were well armoured for a fighter and if he hadn't hit the radiator, the german would not have done much apart from knock a couple of holes in the plane.
As has been pointed out a large number of IL2's were shot down but the Finns who were on the receiving end of the IL2 noted that against pin point targets they were pretty ineffective due to a lack of accuracy.

As for why the Spitfire and Typhoon were chosen for GA I believe there are two different reasons.
Typhoon because it was fast, robust, well protected, exceptionally well armed and capable of carrying a heavy payload plus, by RAF standards it had a good range.
Spitfire, because we had planty of them, and as time went on the Mk IX could carry a respectable payload but not as much as the Typhoon or P47, whilst the XIV became the fighter to give top cover.

Finally can I ask where you get the information that the Typhoon and Spitfires were withdrawn from attacking defended targets?
I say this as on the last day of the war Spits and Typhoons were attacking ships and airfields both of which were amongst the most heavily defended targets you could find."




My responses:
1. On the Wesel bridges' question, 2TAF was asked to destroy the bridges.

In the planning of Veritable, 1 Canadian Army asked for the destruction of the Wesel bridges by air attack. All air support of 21 Army Group was the sole responsibility of 2TAF, and the only place 1Cdn Army could address its requests. If 2TAF wanted Heavies, then they put the request either to the BC LO at 2TAF, who passed it on to Harris, or to SHAEF who passed it on to VIIIUSAAF. If the answer was no, then 2TAF had to find another way from its own resources.


2. On the questions of Horrocks' banning all air support including Mediums, and the restrictions placed on CAS, I will quote from my draft book if you don't mind;



At this time (February 28) stresses long in the building came to a head. Their genesis can be traced to events earlier in the month. Horrocks was never happy with his decision to use heavies to 'take out Cleve', as Crerar described it. Horrocks wrote in 'Corps Commander' that he felt almost physically sick when he saw the bombers do another Caen. His rationalisation was that he was in a race to the Nutterden feature, and destroying Cleve might give him an advantage by slowing up the German reserves. This was the same argument used for the destruction of Caen and Winnekendonk. His overriding objective was to save British lives. He added that he was blessed with too much imagination and that it was fortunate for the British Army that he never rose above the level of Corps Commander. For years after the war Horrocks had nightmares about Cleve, and the destruction turned out to have been far worse than he had imagined because the RAF used HE instead of the incendiaries he had specifically requested. Even worse, the craters held up his advance and cost British as well as many German civilian lives.
The destruction of Cleve was on February 8. A fortnight later on February 21, 2 Group despatched a box of mediums comprising 35 Mitchells and Bostons to attack Weeze. Due to a mistake in navigation, thirty aircraft dropped 96 bombs on British troops in Goch and Üdem. Horrocks exploded, having,
'a sudden revulsion to all types of air support and requested the removal of all 84 Group assistance from his Corps front. This outburst of indignation upset the planning and consequently aircraft of 131, which were to have attacked strongly defended positions and troop concentration areas on the front of 51(H) Div, were diverted to alternative targets at Weeze and Sonsbeck'. Source: 84 Group ORB
Both Horrocks and Shores are silent about this in their books.
2 TAF was overstretched and its commanders were worried about losses. On March 1, 84 Group's Ops' Log reported a conference during that night with the Army, leading to a decision to impose a severe restriction on the,
'liberal use of aircraft in support rôles owing to the shortage of both Typhoon and Spitfire aircraft and the weariness of the pilots. The automatic use of aircraft in the counter-battery rôle, for instance, would be discontinued during static or semi-static periods, and indeed only accepted in special cases in an advance when our artillery could not take on the rôle, or if the menace of enemy guns was having a really serious effect. Moreover, the prolific use of Rocket Typhoons in cab rank under FCP control would have to be reduced and the scope of the FCP limited to a definite sector of front; for example a Div(isional) or B(riga)de front rather than as at present on an entire Corps front. A further check was to be kept on the acceptance by GCC of targets so that effort would not be wasted'.
Ironies abound in this assessment of chickens roosting noisily. The high speed of unarmoured Typhoons and Spitfires was now recognised as providing no defence against the powerful Flak defending German gun batteries, so 2 TAF simply abandoned that most important target without mentioning their previous refusal to consider aircraft armour. It was back to 1917. Furthermore, 2 TAF now mentioned the idea of supporting specific divisions or brigades when previously no formation smaller than a corps or army had been recognized. 2 TAF had been defeated and withdrew as surely as the U-Boats and the Flying Fortresses had been forced to do in 1943.


I would now add this;

A clue as to how the decision of the conference on March 1, 1945 was interpreted can be found in Ziegler's 'The Story of 609 Squadron', on pages 312/3. Squadron Leader Roberts checked with Group Captain Baldwin as to whether it was alright to attack, and was given permission because of the absence of FLAK.
“.....on 9th March, 609 had lost yet another CO on a supposedly 'easy' mission against barges ..... Johnny Baldwin, who had recently succeeded Desmond Scott as airfield commander, decided to 'go along for the trip', and here is part of the last entry in Eric Roberts' diary: “Because of the lowered cloud base I checked with Baldy as to whether to attack, and received the expected OK owing to the scarcity of FLAK. Turning west, I spotted the barges and led the boys down”.


Tony

[tcolvin]

Juha's questions;
Tony,
On Il-2 vs Typhoon. Typhoon was vulnerable to rifle calibre fire but much less vulnerable to Bf 109s and Fw 190s. Both were vulnerable to 20mm AAA. Il-2 was interesting solution to CAS problem but if you look the Soviet losses in men and material in 44-45 and compared those to losses of Western Allies in ETO in 44-45 you can see that it wasn’t a magic weapon. One could not fight a cheap war against an army like WM.On Hillman. I cannot follow your logic. If British had known how difficult object it was they could have softened it by heavy naval fire, for ex from HMS Rodney. 1 Suffolks had had easy job to reduce Morris shortly before (white flag went up before 1 Suffolk even had begun their attack on it). and it dawned to them that Hillman would be a totally different game only after their point platoon and parts of the second were inside Hillman. A bit late if one was not totally callous to the life of his own troops to deploy heavy support fire, dive bombers, BB main armament fire etc at that point.

Juha


1. On the Il-2, I would quote Walter Schwabedissen whose conclusions appear to differ from yours. I look forward in your comments;
"All German commanders describe the IL-2 as a highly useful airplane for ground-attack missions. Owing to its good armour plating, the plane could only be brought down by very well directed ground fire. It had a speed of 210 mph. General der Flakartillerie a.D Wolfgang Pickert adds that the IL-2 was impervious to light 20-mm armour-piercing or 37-mm shells. The same views are expressed by General der Infanterie von der Groben, who emphasises the nose armour and remarks that direct hits with 20-mm shells frequently had no effects on the plane. The experience of the 54th Fighter Wing also shows it was hardly possible to shoot down the IL-2 aircraft in an attack from the rear, because of its excellent armour protection." Source: Walter Schwabedissen: The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders.


2. On Hillman, IIRC there was an attack from the air planned which was delayed and ineffective. I seem to remember it was from Heavies. I will have to check and get back to you. I can't answer about naval support.


Tony

[Bill Walker]

Tony, you are again picking and choosing quotes that suit your purposes. Here is a quote I have picked about the Il-2:

"As revealed in Rastrenin's book, it took horrendous IL-2 losses before VVS Shturmovik units developed effective ground-attack tactics. The book is replete with countless missions where poorly-trained IL-2 crews, usually without fighter escort, hurled themselves at Axis forces only to be slaughtered by flak and Luftwaffe aircrews."

From a review of the book "Il-2 Shturmovik Guards Units of World War 2" by Oleg Rastrenin.

You are also again making broad over simplified statements without any support. For example, your quote from your upcoming book "..so 2 TAF simply abandoned that most important target without mentioning their previous refusal to consider aircraft armour. It was back to 1917." I hope you realize there was no 2 TAF in 1917. I hope you realise that the Typhoon did have some armour, as did most RAF combat aircraft. Like everything else crammed into a warplane, armour must be traded off against other equipment and structure to keep the thing flyable. We can second guess the designer's decisions from our arm chairs today, but just "adding armour" to any aircraft is quite a bit more complicated than you may understand.

The questions you pose are very complex, and deserve more than the simple quotes you or I can throw at them here. I hope your upcoming book uses a wide range of sources.

[glider1]

On the Wesel Bridges My probably incorrect understanding of the planning of the operation was that a joint meeting was held at which the Army USAAF and RAF were represented and the allocation of resources was made at that meeting. The air plan was put together before the battle atarted and the USAAF 8th air force had the target from the begining.

Your book looks interesting but ypur comments raise some questions. Some units of 2TAF (122 wing) were told to ease up for a short while around 1st March but in addition some Typhoon units were reequiping with Tempest which took them out of the action (485 and 349 squadron) others were transfering from rocket firing to bombing which needed re training, (183 squadron), some were disbanding (257 Squadron). Some Spitfire units were re equiping with Spit XVI (74 Squadron) plus the weather was very poor and after a period of intensive operations I would expect that the aircraft would need some TLC and the pilots a rest. As I pointed out and no doubt you are aware, operations did continue at a high intensity and on the last day included Airfields and shipping strikes. As you are well aware airfields and shipping strikes are arguably the most dangerous targets around.

To dismiss this as a defeat and withdrawal from combat is just wrong factually. If I am incorrect then please explain these attacks. The combat diary is interesting but when you remember that a low approach was the most dangerous and the low level of the cloud would dictate a low approach the amount of AA fire becomes a factor.

You seem to have a great belief with the Dive Bomber, its worth remembering that the Vengence was replaced in the Far East with a FB the P47.

Re the difficulty in shooting down the IL 2. If it was so impervious then why were approximately half of IL 2 losses caused by Flak?

Finally to call the Typhoon unarmoured is just wrong. It had the normal armoured seat, armour either side of the pilot and the engine in front of him. Some reports have mentioned an armoured floor but I have not been able to check up on that so will leave it open. Either way the pilot was very well protected. It may not have been proof against a 20mm but I suspect the Il 2 wasn't either, see above comment.

Going back to the Wesel bridge. How would the Russian forces have destroyed it. The IL didn't carry a big enough bomb and would have been shot to bits by AA fire. The Pe 2 didn't carry the right weapons so what are you left with?

[Juha]

Hello Tony
On Il-2 vs Flak, IIRC Raus in Panzer East noticed that at first Il-2 was a great shock because it seemed to be impervious to 20mm AAA fire but they then discovered than 50-50 mixture of 20mm Minen and AP ammo was effective against it. Same finding was made by Finns, a 50-50 mixture of AP and HE made 20mm AAA guns effective against Il-2s, it was called “Murha-sekoitus” (“Murder-Mixture”) by Finnish gunners according to Biaudet, a 20mm Breda(Italian gun) troop and later a battery CO during 44 and the writer of a good book on Finnish AA during the Continuation War (1941-44). In fact Finnish AAA batteries found a way to use their twin 7,62mm AA-mgs against Il-2s. While the main guns of light AA batteries (20mm and/or 40mm) fired on incoming Il-2s the AA-mgs opened fired on them as they overflew the batteries, their mission was to kill the rear gunners.

Il-2 vs fighters, now Il-2 was not a easy kill but many pilots made multiple claims on them, appr 8 claiming 50 or more, IIRC the top Il-2 killler was Otto Kittel with 94 Il-2 kills, he happened to be a JG 54 pilot. Finns thought that Il-2 was a difficult target to Bf 109G but fairly easy target to Bf 109G-6/R6 (ie 109G with two extra 20mm in underwing gondolas) so the success of Kittel who was a Fw 190A pilot (4 20mm) is not surprising.

Juha

[tcolvin]

Glider,

1. Armour on the aircraft types under discussion was as follows;

Typhoon 1B: 551 lbs, covering radiator, cockpit sides, cockpit floor and 8mm seat back.

Ju-87G-1: 1,540 lbs; 8mm ventral armour and armoured radiator; 4mm armoured pilot's seat with 4mm side and 8mm back armour. 75mm armoured windscreen; 8mm armoured rear bulkhead 5mm armoured floor for gunner.

Il-2m3: 2,092 lbs; nose and centre section pressed from 6mm rolled armour around the engine and crew; 8mm ventral armour around oil cooler ; 55-65mm armoured windscreen glass; 8mm armoured canopy roof; 13mm armoured bulkheads behind gunner and spinner.

Hs-129B: 2,370lbs; spot-welded nose and centre section of 6 - 12mm armour plate; 75mm armoured windscreen in 6mm armoured frame.

It is reasonable to call the Typhoon 1B unarmoured; the Ju-87G-1 armoured; and the Il-2m3 and Hs-129B heavily armoured.

2. I recommend you read any of Peter C Smith's books on dive bombers. His best summary, IMHO, is 'The History of Dive Bombing. A Comprehensive History from 1911 Onward', published in 2007. I can warrant it will change your views on dive bombing.

3. Re Hillman; there was in fact no air strike planned or made. Support was available from naval guns, but the Naval FOO was killed in the attack on Morris.
My point is that had there been an Army Air Force instead of 2TAF, then the Vengeances would have been on stand-by for just such an eventuality. Stukas, I believe, had an SD-500 HL (Hohl-Ladung or Hollow Charge) bomb which was reputed to penetrate 11½ ft of reinforced concrete, which was possibly good enough to neutralise Hillman. The Vengeance could lift 1 ton or two such bombs.
source: http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/t...rge-bombs.html

4. These bombs would also have done the trick if used on the Wesel bridges. Or the Vengeances could have used the American 1,600lb AP bomb, or any of the other bomb types, such as the 500 lb SAP, that were dropped on the Tirpitz in April 1944.

5. It may smack of hyperbole, but a reduction in operations forced by FLAK losses is reasonably termed a defeat.

6. I do not know, frankly, what to make of the IL-2 losses. We need someone to get a grip on the subject. I am, however, persuaded that the VVS operated to a different standard of army support compared with 2TAF, and their high losses reflect this. In other words, if 2TAF had attempted what the VVS achieved, they would have been forced early on to cease operations. The payoff for the Soviets from the VVS losses was that they took Berlin and achieved their war aims.

7. I think we have reached the stage where John Beaman thought we were at yesterday when he closed the thread. I'm not sure I have anything more to contribute, and the objective to get a handle on the VVS has not been, and seemingly cannot be, achieved.

Tony

[Juha]

Hello Tony
on Hillman, with the only FOO dead, no matter what support one had, dive bombers, heavy artillery or battleship on call, there would have been great difficulties to utilize it on a specific target. Ju 87s were rather ineffective against Maginot line forts with 500kg (1100lb) bombs in 1940. I cannot say if a 1600lb AP would have been adequate against Hillman, at least on Tirpitz it was incapable to penetrate her armour deck (some splinters of a bomb that exploded on the upper deck pierced the armour deck) or main turret roofs. Of course in Tirpitz attack Barracudas dropped their bombs from rather low altitude in order to secure hits but that was a usual dilemma in divebombing, lower release height, more hits, higher release height less hits but better penetration. 500lb SAP IMHO would have been too light. German bombs would not helped British, British had some special AP bombs but those I can recall were too heavy for Vengeances. IMHO the main reasons of Hillman debacle were the lateness of tanks (because of the congestion at the beaches) and too few FOOs around, on which Vengeances would not offer any help. BTW a british 16” AP shell weighted 2048lb and 15” 1938lb, entry speed and entry angle depended on range.

Smith’s book is good but IMHO has rather strong pro-dive-bomber POV,, I’d not base my opinion on dive-bombing solely on it.

Soviet tanks losses, as you see, Il-2s were not able to give free ride to Soviet AFVs, in fact losses were very heavy.
1944

Tanks: 16900

Heavy: 900 , Medium: 13800, Light: 2200

SP guns: 6800

Heavy: 900 , Medium: 1000, Light: 4900

1945

Tanks: 8700

Heavy: 900 , Medium: 7500, Light: 300

SP guns: 5000

Heavy: 900 , Medium: 1000, Light: 3100



Juha

PS Il-2 loss info

According to Yefim Gordon's Il-2 and Il-10 book, the Il-2 suffered the following losses:
Red Army: 10759 (24% to fighters, 43% to AAA, 32% failed to return, 1% on the ground)
Naval Forces:807


Here is the statistics of Il-2 losses, according to Hans Seidl:

Year - Total Losses - To Enemy Action - % of Strength at Hand
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1941* - 1100 - 600 - 73.3%
1942 - 2600 - 1800 - 34.2%
1943 - 7200 - 3900 - 45.0%
1944 - 8900 - 4100 - 46.6%
1945** - 3800 - 2000 - 27.3%
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total: 23600 12400 70.3%
* presumably from June 22
** until May 10

Therefore, over 50% of losses [not counting the 'worn out' category] was due to enemy.

[MW Giles]

Mr Colvin

Have you looked at the US Air Force studies series and in particular study

175 U) The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of the German Commanders, by Walter Schwabedissen, edited by Edward P. Kennedy (1960). 434 pages.

It is interesting to read German thoughts on the Russians as presented to an American audience, but might get you further with your question about the VVS. Too much for me to summarise in a thread like this

Downloading the PDFs is free

http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numb...ies151-200.asp

Regards

Martin

[glider1]

What a site.

Tony
Items 1 and 2 I will look into and thanks for the suggestion

Item 3 - If the GA attack aircraft were not put on standby then I don't see why Dive Bombers would have been

Item 4 - On this I believe you to be wrong. An AP or hollow charge bomb would simply punch a hole through the span and do little if any damage. Bridges of this type were notoriously difficult to destroy. If people wanted to get serious then the only more or less guaranteed way of destroying this type of bridge would be to use a Tallboy. You have chastised the 2 TAF for not destroying a target that they never attacked without saying how the Russian Airforce would attack them.

Item 5 - This is hyperbole and very wrong. You have assumed that the reduction was due to losses, without proof. The facts that squadrons were out of service for good reason and that aircraft need to be maintained, crews rested is very different to the reduction being due to losses.

Item 6 - Your approach is almost from the Napolionic Wars , when the scale of your Victory was measured by the size of your losses. The fact that the IL 2 had such severe losses seems to prove to you that this was because they were more effective and operated a higher standard of support to the Army. To me its quite possible that the huge losses were due to the IL 2 being getting shot down, the effectivness of the attack compared to the losses we don't know.

[tcolvin]

Glider you are right, but surely unreasonable, when you state I have 'assumed' reduction in 2TAF support was due to losses, without proof.
The ORB states the reduction was in the, "liberal use of aircraft in support rôles owing to the shortage of both Typhoon and Spitfire aircraft and the weariness of the pilots."
I cannot see how the shortage of aircraft could have been due to anything except heavy losses. Shortage of spares? servicing capacity? - I don't think so.
And surely a reading of the memoir literature explains that the "weariness" of the pilots was a euphemism for shattered morale due to FLAK.
Pilots reported being physically sick when being briefed for ops, and of inability to sleep, from fear of FLAK.
Incapacitating fear was the inevitable result of flying unarmoured aircraft vulnerable even to rifle fire, and the reason why pilots never went round again after missing the target - something the VVS, AFAIK, would not countenance.

Secondly I think you are wrong about the Wesel bridges. The RAF destroyed every one of the Seine bridges, and many many more all over Western Europe that were not strongly defended. They knew, as the VVS and GAF knew, how to destroy bridges - that was not the problem. The problem with the Wesel Bridges was that they were very, very strongly defended, like the Meuse bridges in 1940. For this reason 2TAF asked SHAEF for USAAF Heavies to undertake the task in daylight on their behalf, since Heavies could fly above the FLAK and plaster the site with Nordensight-accuracy, and they succeeded in bringing down one span. As far as the Heavies were concerned, the lack of GAF defence and the lack of very heavy immobile FLAK (like the twin 128mm FLAK equipment defending Hamburg, Berlin and Vienna) meant the Wesel Bridges were in effect undefended.

Tony