"only the best pilots..."?

[galgos]

p107 of "Lancaster at War" Vol.3 says:
"Well into the month of February 1945.....the shortage of fuel was so acute the only top line (German) pilots were allowed combat flying time.."
Is this true?

Max Williams
www.galgos.co.uk

[Nick Beale]

As far as night fighters are concerned, yes - up to a point, anyway. There are several deciphered signals from early 1945 which say that only the best crews must be assigned for a particular night's operations.

[galgos]

Thanks Nick!

Max Williams
www.galgos.co.uk

[Adriano Baumgartner]

Galgos,
Yes, I have read it also on the book about Schnaufer, on the book writen by Major Martin Drewes, on the book "Duel under the stars". Only those who had a lot of experience on IFR and with IMC ( Instrument Meteorological Conditions ) were permitted to take off. If I do well remember, on the book of Wilhelm Johnen he describes the loss of a very experienced Hauptmann during a take off through a CB. The Me 110 crashed seconds after take off probably by heavy snow accumulated on the wings...I do not remember the page correctly, but will try to put it later for you. So, I guess that to avoid further losses ( young crews with very few IFR hours ) they let only the "experten" fly. Contrary, with DAY fighters, they put everyone aboard the machines and let them face the much more experienced USAF boys...
Hope it helped....( I will post the passage for you later, ok? )
Adriano

[galgos]

Thank you Adriano for your very full and interesting answer. It would be a great help in my research if you could post the passage.
Thanks again
Regards
Max Williams
www.galgos.co.uk

[RodM]

Hi Max,

firstly, in December 1944 and January 1945, the Nachtjagd was not overtly successful in the Defence of the Reich, when compared to the period of late 1943/early 1944.

For example, in the whole of 1944, it took the Nachtjagd, on average, 12 sorties to shoot down an aircraft, and during that year the arm suffered an operational loss rate of 3.3%. During December 1944, it took 19 sorties to achieve a victory and the loss rate for the month was 6%. January 1945 was better with an average of 9.36 and a loss rate of 4.5%. (Source of Statistics: OKL Füst Ic documents and data tables reproduced in ADI(K) Report 351/45)

Of significant importance was the fact that some 50-60% of the victories claimed during December 44 and January 1945 were achieved by crews who already had 5 or more victories to their credit.

Thus, it was clear that the Nachtjagd was expending a lot of effort and fuel when the positive results were being achieved by only a small proportion of the available resources.

The new Soviet offensive in the East in January 1945 meant that the OKL began to give increasing priority of available fuel allocation to those units fighting to block the Soviet advance, at the expense of units in the West. This priority of fuel allocation appears to have continued until the end of the war, and is certainly mentioned throughout mid-February 1945 in the KTB of OKL Füst Ia.

Thus, it became inevitable that Nachtjagd operations would be reduced. The way this was done was by Nachtjagdgeschwader having to rate the crews into three categories, with the 'bottom of the heap' being crews who had achieved no successes. These orders are made clear in the KTB of Stab NJG6, which notes the following in late January 1945:


on 23 January: “With immediate effect, on the grounds of the serious fuel situation, only Spitzenbesatzungen (crews with Abschüsse to their credit) must be employed. Practice flights, GCI sorties and test flights are to be strictly limited”, and then on 24-25 January: “All crews are to be classified in Category 1 and Category 2 (Spitzenbesatzungen) and a Category of non-flying crews. Every Gruppe, on average, will be allocated 20 crews, in the Categories 1 and 2. All other crews must be re-employed in other duties such as ferrying and other flights. The aircraft of the latter category of crews can be struck off charge permanently.”


So "only top line" meant crews who had achieved at least one aerial victory (this is evidenced from recorded sorties in the flying logbooks of quite a number of German night fighter crew members). From what I can gather, the Category 1 crews flew the most, while the Category 2 crews joined the fray when tactical and weather conditions was very favourable. Later in the month, in order to save even more fuel, it was prohibited from taxiing aircraft before and after take off. Another order in early February 1945 stated that night fighters should only be used in situations that clearly promised success (source: both from ULTRA DEFE 3)

It should be pointed out, the number of sorties flown by the Nachtjagd in December 1944 - early February 1945 was hampered by the extremely bad weather over the winter (this even effected Bomber Command's ability to mount operations for a third of January 1945). Allied to this was the use of a third of some Nachtjagdgeschwaders for night ground attack operations in Dec 44/Jan 45.

How effective were these measures? The OKL statistics for February 1945 (ADI(K) 351/45) show that the Nachtjagd flew even less sorties than in December 44 or January 45, but achieved more aerial victories. During February 1945 it took only 4.27 sorties to achieve a victory, but the loss rate for the month had reached 7%.

The February statistics don't reveal one important factor and that is that in February-March 1945, the level of overclaiming by the Nachtjagd compared to, say, January 1945, was relatively high and when actual RAF losses (less non-combat losses and Flak claims) are considered, overall more aircraft were claimed shot down in air combat than were actually lost (source: my own detailed night-by-night study).


As from the Allied Crossing of the Rhine, the Nachtjagd remained mostly committed to night ground attack sorties until the end of the war, with a significantly reduced number of aircraft committed to face the night raids. Of course, at the end of March 1945, the Nachtjagd was considerably reduced in strength and large numbers of personnel (air and ground) were given up as the ground troops, with promising pilots sent to retrain on the Me262 for day ops.

Cheers

Rod

[galgos]

A wonderful insightful reply as usual Rod!! Thanks very much: may I quote you in my website where and when appropriate?
Regards
Max
www.galgos.co.uk

[RodM]

Hi Max,

no problem, I guess that you can source the information overall as coming from the forthcoming book, 'The Nachtjagd War Diaries' by Drs. Theo Boiten (Red Kite, due for release May 2008). The points above will be expanded upon in the relevant sections of the book in more detail than what I've summarised above.

Cheers

Rod Mackenzie

PS - regarding the loss of ME453, there will be a very detailed description of the Defence of the Reich phase on 3-4 March 1945 (i.e. Ladbergen/Kamen RAF raids) in the forthcoming book.

[Adriano Baumgartner]

Galgos,
Here are the passages from Duel under the Stars by Oblt Wilhelm Johnen ( RK, 34 kills ):

Pg.108 ( Chapter XI – In Defence of Berlin )
On the night of 27th January the met reported a cloud ceiling of 150 ft with solid cloud up to 13,000 feet. From 3,000 feet there was danger of icing. A fine snow fell, covering with a coat of ice the machines with started cold. There could be no lagging at the start and we had to be in the air within a minute or else the engine would probably fail….The OC, Hauptmann Bär….detailed the crews. Only ten out of 30 pilots would take off if there were an alert….
I was ( Wilhelm Johnen ) all set to take off but it was a point of honour that the OC should take off first….The OC took off. The engines roared and a dense rain of sparks swirled the slipstream behind him. He had hardly left the runway when I gave my machine full throttle and streaked after him…..Just as I was about to retract my landing flaps a terrible explosion shook my machine and a scarlet flame pierced the night….For a second I thought that my machine had crashed but nothing could have happened for the altimeter showed 90 feet and I was in level flight. Then the truth struck me in a flash. Hauptmann Bär had crashed.

Pg.117: After bad icing, Leutnant Peter Spoden baled out with his crew and landed successfully ( same mission ).

Pg. 116 says that Lt. Kamprath also baled out due to bad weather ( icing ) on the same mission of 27th January 1944.


BACK TO pg. 89

It was difficult to have complete confidence in these instruments and to refrain from looking outside to get one´s bearing from the cloud banks on the ground. Many a young pilot had done this, stalled his aircraft and crashed into the ground from a low height.

From what I do have read, ALL young pilots fresh from Fighter or Night-Fighter schools had a period of acclimatization in their own unit, which means: a lot of flights to make them FIT for fighting. Johnen recorded this period on the early part of his book too.

That´s the main problem by the end of 1944-early 45: lack of time to train, lack of fuel, lack of machines, lack of security for training flights ( just remember how many of those training machines were caught napping by 418 RCAF Squadron or other INTRUDERS ). Well, I did not have time now to check the book of Schnaufer or that of Drewes, but I will have a careful look for you later.
Cheers and hope that will help you
Adriano

[galgos]

Thanks Adriano, that certainly adds to my understanding of the difficulties faced not only by the bomber crews, but also the German defenders who obviously were finding this stage of the war tough in many ways.
Regards
Max Williams
www.galgos.co.uk