Cobras, Mustangs, Thunderbolts, Eastern vs Western front, Franek vs ...

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by drgondog

I had a detailed conversation with Galland in 1983 before publishing my book and he permitted me to reprint a letter about the impact of the Mustang on LW Operations. Essentially the Mustang interdicted formation assembly, killed many German pilots taking off and landing, shot up airfields and reduced 'effectives' at strategic points (munich/Berlin for example) for days - shot up rail and barge traffic when Speer decentralized plants and needed to move subassemblies from one factory to another.. and put up a fighter with equal performance (or greater at bomber altitudes) over HIS cities...
Regards,
Bill

Hi Bill,

I am also convinced that Mustang play very important role. But without other component of air force component they were not so successful.

I would be also careful with the statements of former responsible of wehrmacht generally and especially with Galland. He was responsible for fighter arm and he is also at least partly responsible for the disaster over Germany. After the war all former german generals try to give over own responsibility to other. And Galland was not an exception: he was the best, he understood all but Hitler, Göring, Joschenek etc were fault at the problems. And the last but not least: “Mustangs, what we can do?” But if I read his “The first and the last” and compare it with actual facts, I see many problem, where Galland was pesonally responsible.

Best regards,

[Franek Grabowski]

Replacing other escorts with Mustang all the goals would be achieved. Replacing Mustang with Thunderbolts they would be not.
PS There were plans to produce a long range Spitfire with similarly high range but they were abandoned after Mustang appeared.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

Hi Bill,

I am also convinced that Mustang play very important role. But without other component of air force component they were not so successful.

I would be also careful with the statements of former responsible of wehrmacht generally and especially with Galland. He was responsible for fighter arm and he is also at least partly responsible for the disaster over Germany. After the war all former german generals try to give over own responsibility to other. And Galland was not an exception: he was the best, he understood all but Hitler, Göring, Joschenek etc were fault at the problems. And the last but not least: “Mustangs, what we can do?” But if I read his “The first and the last” and compare it with actual facts, I see many problem, where Galland was pesonally responsible.

Best regards,

Igor - these were among many corroborating and supportive statements by Galland, Rall, Krupinski, Steinhoff and others at a Fighter Aces convention in Tuscon some 25 years ago.

In the context of the discussion, the Mustang was recognized as not necessarily the 'best', but was the most important Allied Fighter - in that it could do what the Spitfire and 109 and 190 could do in air to air combat, but had the range to do it everywhere.

It was of zero importance to RAF Heavy Bomber ops at night, or medium range bomber escort during the day (Spit, Tempest, P-47, P-38 could all perform this role) - but the daylight strategic raids would have been stopped and the Oil Campaign never started in time had it not been for the Merlin powered Mustang.

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Igor - these were among many corroborating and supportive statements by Galland, Rall, Krupinski, Steinhoff and others at a Fighter Aces convention in Tuscon some 25 years ago.

It was of zero importance to RAF Heavy Bomber ops at night, or medium range bomber escort during the day (Spit, Tempest, P-47, P-38 could all perform this role) - but the daylight strategic raids would have been stopped and the Oil Campaign never started in time had it not been for the Merlin powered Mustang.

As I already mention, I am very careful with the statements of former LW stars.
From the technical and tactical point of view I am agreed with you, but I am disagree with the consequences. Not a Mustang was a key issue, but a further splintering of the german forces. If not a landing in Normandy, if not an advance of soviet army into Romania( with cutting of 45% of german oil supply) and deep in German, all efforts of USAAF were without any result, as Beeg Week, bombing of ball-bearing industry etc.
The german would able to manage also the oil crisis, as they managed all other. The would reallocate the syntethic fuel production under ground. In june 45 Speer planed delivery of 30000 to fuel from underground facility

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

As I already mention, I am very careful with the statements of former LW stars.

Any statement should be verified.

From the technical and tactical point of view I am agreed with you, but I am disagree with the consequences. Not a Mustang was a key issue, but a further splintering of the german forces.

I do not understand what do you mean.

If not a landing in Normandy, if not an advance of soviet army into Romania( with cutting of 45% of german oil supply) and deep in German, all efforts of USAAF were without any result, as Beeg Week, bombing of ball-bearing industry etc.

By the time Red Army entered Rumania (August 1944!), Luftwaffe was already decimated. This was achieved both by the bomber offensive and Normandy. The Big Week was just a major step to the victory. Luftwaffe ceased to exist as a force well before the oil crisis.

The german would able to manage also the oil crisis, as they managed all other. The would reallocate the syntethic fuel production under ground. In june 45 Speer planed delivery of 30000 to fuel from underground facility

They were unable.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

As I already mention, I am very careful with the statements of former LW stars.
From the technical and tactical point of view I am agreed with you, but I am disagree with the consequences. Not a Mustang was a key issue, but a further splintering of the german forces. If not a landing in Normandy, if not an advance of soviet army into Romania( with cutting of 45% of german oil supply) and deep in German, all efforts of USAAF were without any result, as Beeg Week, bombing of ball-bearing industry etc.
The german would able to manage also the oil crisis, as they managed all other. The would reallocate the syntethic fuel production under ground. In june 45 Speer planed delivery of 30000 to fuel from underground facility

The most important target in Europe was Ploesti - which started without escort and continued until production was hovering around 10% when Red Army overran it. The first Major raid was the low level mission in August 1943.

The 'results' of the 8th and 15th AF missions to Rumania, Austria, Czechoslovaki and Germany had two major effects on Germany's ability to wage war. One, it killed the skilled core of the LW Day Fighter Command, including all the re-inforcements from Ost Front. Second it inflicted huge blows on rest of German petroleum/Chemical targets - all before D-Day. This was much more important than the Ball bearings, Transportation and aircraft factories.

What is absolutely true is that the Germans were tenacious about restoring limited production until USSR over ran the rest of the refineries from the East.. but there was never hope for the Germans to restore enough fuel to support flexibility in offense. The Battle of the Bulge was the final gamble and drew heavily upon reserves from Russian Front -

Speer was far more concerned about diverting feed stock supplies to Chemical plants to make enough fertilzer for Spring than he was in keeping Luftwaffe in air in March 1944.

The less critical but still important effect was that it forced LW into drawing on it's strategic reserves, and greatly reduced the flying time students had when assigned to combat - lessening the effectiveness of Luftwaffe even further, ditto for fuel to armor and motorized infantry units in defense.

Last these same daylight raids killed many NJG pilots and crews, and destroyed many specially equipped Me 110's, 410's and Ju 88s on the ground - helping the RAF reduce night losses.

The Mustangs were the principal 'messenger' over Germany during the critical months of January, 1944 through D-Day and grew in strength until all but one P-47 group was replaced with Mustangs by December 1944.

When the Invasion occurred much of LuftFlotte Reich was deployed westward in an attempt to wrest air superiority away from Allies and finally came into range of EVERY fighter based in England. Finally the RAF and USAAF TAC and rest of 8th AF P-47s were able to engage the LW once again in large numbers.

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by drgondog

The most important target in Europe was Ploesti - which started without escort and continued until production was hovering around 10% when Red Army overran it. The first Major raid was the low level mission in August 1943.

The 'results' of the 8th and 15th AF missions to Rumania, Austria, Czechoslovaki and Germany had two major effects on Germany's ability to wage war. One, it killed the skilled core of the LW Day Fighter Command, including all the re-inforcements from Ost Front. Second it inflicted huge blows on rest of German petroleum/Chemical targets - all before D-Day. This was much more important than the Ball bearings, Transportation and aircraft factories.

Bill, it was something different, what time line concern. Romania delivered 13 million barreal oil to germany during 1943 and in the first half 1944 again 7 million. IIRC the attack of Ploesti and mining of Danume did not affect seriosly the oil delivery to Germany until august. Only the attack in august caused strong damage of romanian oil industry. But from soviet point of view, these damages were not very helful. Oil reserves that could be used by soviets was already destroyed.
What the german oil industry concern, the before D-Day attack decreased the oil output some by 20% in may from the highest level of april(april 348tto, may 285tto). Therefore we could not speak about blows of oil/chemichals industry before D-Day. Only on 8th juni gen. Spaatz declare all oil related object as target number one. After that the 15th and 8th(from middle juni) air force started systematicaly distruction of oil objects. At that time the bulk of german fighter was already transferred to Normandy

[Franek Grabowski]

Igor, Luftwaffe was defeated well before Ploesti was overrun!!!

[drgondog]

Igor - the first official 8th AF attack on the German Oil Industry, as part of a concentrated campaign was on May 12, 1944 - to Brux and Zwickau among other targets.