Tunisian losses

[Christer Bergström]

According to Mullins, no P-38s from 1st Fighter Group were involved in the more famous "Palm Sunday Massacre" of German air transports.

That is correct. The "Palm Sunday Massacre" on 18 April 1943 was carried out by a total of 46 Warhawks from all three squadrons of US 57th FG, plus an attached squadron from 324th FG, provided with a top cover by 11 Spitfires from 92 Sqn. The 65 Ju 52s which these attacked were escorted by 16 Bf 109s and MC 202s and three Bf 110s. Again, there were 19 Axis fighters against almost 60 Allied fighters - no wonder the Axis fighter pilots failed to protect the Ju 52 transport planes. The 15 Bf 109s claimed 7 P-40s shot down against a single own loss (in reality, the Americans lost six P-40s), so it must be concluded that if the numbers of fighters had only been even, the "Palm Sunday Massacre" could have had the opposite meaning - namely a massacre on American fighters. This only as an illustration of the significant importance of numerical inequality.

I guess Christer wants us to believe that USAAF Lightnings always roamed the North African skies in group-sized wolfpacks. Nothing could be further from the truth -- the P-38 squadrons were usually committed piecemeal at the whim of army commanders. That is one reason why the 14th Fighter Group was temporarily withdrawn from battle the previous January, they were badly mauled

Here is a row of examples of strengths of US P-38 Lightning formations in Tunisia, from "Fighters over Tunisia", each time with reference to the US reports in question:


10 March 1943: 36 P-38s from 1st FG escorted bombers and were involved in combat with 15 Bf 109s.

12 March 1943: 32 P-38s from 82nd FG escorted B-25s. A little later, 30 more P-38s escorted bombers to attack Sousse.

15 March 1943: 38 P-38s of 1st FG escorted B-26s.

20 March 1943: 29 P-38s of 82nd FG escorted B-25s.

22 March 1943: 23 P-38s of 82nd FG escorted B-26s, and they were engaged by two Bf 109s. Later during the mission, the same US formation of bombers and P-38s was attacked by six Bf 109s.

23 March 1943: 27 P-38s of 1st FG escorted B-17s to bomb Bizerta.

When I described the US success against Ju 52s on 5 April 1943, my point was to describe it as the result of an overwhelming US numerical superiority in fighters in that combat. There were 46 P-38s against 5 Bf 110s and Bf 109s, later reinforced by 8 Bf 109s, and although the German fighters shot down six P-38s, they could not prevent 14 Ju 52s from getting shot down. Of course the result would have been completely different if the figures would have been reversed - if there would have been 46 Bf 109s and Bf 110s and only 13 P-38s.

It is true that the Americans made several tactical errors, due to their inexperience, early in the Tunisian campaign. One of these mistakes was to not fully exploit their numerical.

In consequence, the inexperienced US fighter units also were badly mauled by the Luftwaffe veterans. Here are some examples:

On 26 December 1942, 1st FG escorted B-17s, but lost two P-38s to German fighters while the German units sustained no losses.

On 2 January 1943, 27th FS/1st FG despatched eight P-38s to escort B-17s, but these were bounced by 12 Bf 109s of ÍI./JG 51 and the C.O., Capt. Glenn, and Lt. H. K. Smith were both shot down - by Fw. Anton Hafner and Ofw. Otto Schulz - without German losses.

On 8 January 1943, eight P-38s of 49th FS/14th FG, along with some P-38s of 97th FS/82nd FG and P-40s of 58th FS/33rd FG clashed with II./JG 2. In their excellent "Fw 190 in North Africa" (pp. 71 - 72), Jessen & Arthy write: "In this slaughter, the 48th FS/14th FG suffered three aircraft destroyed and two damaged. 58th FS/33rd FG and 97th FS/82nd FG losses are unknown."

On 10 January 1943, 14th FG again despatched eight P-38s on a mission, but these were attacked by Ofw Otto Schulz (II./JG 51) and his wingman, and one P-38 was lost without German losses.

On 11 January 1943, ten P-38s of 1st FG escorting B-17s again came across II./JG 51 and lost two more P-38s (one of them to Ofw. Otto Schulz) without German losses.

On 15 January 1943, eight P-38s of 48th FS/14th FG escorted bombers, while eight more from the 49th FS escorted other bombers. Both formations were attacked by Luftwaffe fighters. Capt. Fulmer was seen to crash into the sea, while Lt. Auton and Lt. Lawrence failed to return. Shores et al describe a third Lightning mission that same day ("Fighters over Tunisia", p. 153) : "Other P-38s escorted 18 B-26s . . . 12 Bf 109s of II./JG 51 attacked . . . records confirm the loss of two P-38s during this mission, the unit involved is not specified."

On 21 January 1943, another two P-38s were shot down out of a formation of ten 82nd FG P-38s.

On 23 January 1943, 16 P-38s of 48th FS/14th FG clashed with Bf 109s of II./JG 51 of about the same strength as the Americans, and the P-38 pilots Lt. Schottlekorb, Lt. Mark Shipman, Lt. Stuteville, Lt. Harley, Lt. Yates, and Lt. Soliday - a total of six Lightnings - were shot down without any German losses. Again Ofw. Otto Schulz - the Eastern Front veteran who started to emerge as a first class "Lightning killer" - was among the successful German pilots.

Here we can clearly see that II./JG 51 was the main reason why the 14th Fighter Group was so badly mauled that it had to be temporarily withdrawn from battle, as Sixnifty points out: At least ten, maybe over a dozen, of this unit's P-38s were shot down in only three of those examples above, all by II./JG 51 - which apparently sustained no own loss to P-38s during those days.

On 4 February 1943, ten P-38s of 1st FG escorted B-17s, and four P-38s were lost in combat with Bf 109s.

But the Americans eventually learned to pull together their fighters into formations which outnumbered the enemy, and due to this quite rational tactic, their successes increased.

The mass formations of US fighters started to appear in the Tunisian skies from late February 1943 and onward. Thus, on 25 February 1943, 1st FG pulled together 34 P-38s from the 27th, 71st and 94th squadrons to escort B-17s (together with numerous Spitfires). From then onward, the ruling phenomenon was this - as expressed by many German fighter pilots whom I have met and interviewed:

"Die Amerikaner kamen immer in die Masse." - The Americans always came in masses.

The tactic of despatching concentrated masses of fighters to gain an overwhelming numerical superiority against the enemy had been used by the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain from August 1940, not without success.


The conclusion that "German pilots in Tunisia tried to avoid battle no matter what the odds" seems to be far fetched. Reading through "Fighters over Tunisia" rather gives the opposite impression, of very aggressive German fighter pilots actively seeking combat. On page 53 in "Fw 190 in North Africa", which Sixnifty quotes to prove his thesis, it is the Fw 190-equipped ground-attack unit III./SKG 10 which is dealt with. The task of a ground-attack unit is to deliver as many and as effective strikes as possible against ground targets, and for this reason, the ground-attack pilots are often forbidden to engage in air combat if they are not drawn into it. The ground-attack pilot has to drop his bombs, use his ammunition against ground targets, and then bring his own aircraft undamaged to base.

Also, Sixnifty left out the continuation of Spitfire pilot Peart's quote on p. 53 in "Fw 190 in North Africa":

"I think that all of the Luftwaffe pilots were good. I can't really comment on the pilots of the 190s because we had more fights against the 109s. The 190s weren't used in a straight out combat role. They were more attack, bomb and get out fast. They were fighter-bombers, and they wouldn't stick around for a dogfight." (End of quotation in the book.)

Regarding overclaims by II./JG 2, it should be noted that II./JG 2 fought much against the US aviation in northern Tunisia, and the US records for aircraft losses in Tunisia obviously are flawed by an unusually high degree of white spots. However, the comparison with Allied loss records in "Fighters over Tunisia" shows that the other German fighter units - mainly the former Eastern Front units II./JG 51, JG 53 and JG 77 - had a relatively good accuracy in their claiming. Not least if one compares with Allied or Italian claiming, which often was vastly exaggerated.