Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots

[Broncazonk]

I'm looking for information on how Allied fighter pilots viewed their IJN and IJA opponents, specifically, which of the two did they think was more formidable.

I'm trying to think of a campaign where both IJN and IJA fighter pilots were regularly engaged at the same time--I'm not that well versed.

Anyway, I'm hoping someone has something on this.

Thank you in advance!

Bronc

[Leo Etgen]

Hi Bronc

I am not the one to comment on this since my knowledge of the Pacific War is somewhat limited but from my reading on the subject I get the impression that most Allied pilots considered the IJNAF to be the more challenging opponent. However, it should be pointed out that much of this was based on considerable misunderstanding as in the early stages of the war it appears that there was considerable confusion among the Allies regarding which Japanese air force where they engaged with. For example, both the RAF and AVG over Malaysia, Burma and China often claimed that their opponents were naval types when in fact their opponents were almost exclusively IJAAF aircraft - the Nate, Oscar, Sally, Lily and Ann to name a few. It appears that responsibility for the South Pacific theater generally was left to the IJNAF, however, the IJAAF had a number of units stationed on New Guinea by spring 1943 although these were rapidly worn down by combat attrition and supply difficulties. It is my understanding that the IJAAF and IJNAF were engaged alongside each other in the Philippines campaign and the defense of the Home Islands in the later stages of the war. It should be pointed out that at the beginning of the war both air forces had accumulated considerable combat experience as a result of the actions against the Chinese and Russians so in truth its hard to tell if one was "better" than the other. Hopefully, others can add more to this interesting subject.

Horrido!

Leo

[Broncazonk]

It's a hard question to answer--probably impossible. However are these statements correct?

1) Allied fighter pilots in the Pacific didn't begin engaging IJAAF fighters pilots until late 1943, and maybe even 1944. Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz and the whole of the Solomons campaign was fought almost exclusively against the IJNAF.

2) The AVG/Flying Tigers never flew against the IJNAF.

3) The RAF in Malaysia/Burma never flew against the IJNAF.

4) By the time USN and USAAF began engaging IJAAF fighter pilots in any numbers, they were flying Hellcats, Corsairs and P-38's. (Planes that dramatically out-classed IJAAF aircraft.)

Thanks!!

Bronc

[Leo Etgen]

Hi Bronc

I will try to answer as to the best of my knowledge which is not the greatest since the Pacific War is not my forte but hopefully others can correct any errors.

1) I agree that the Americans generally fought against the IJNAF in the early campaigns in the southern Pacific. The IJAAF did participate in the conquest of the Philippines and as pointed out before had a number of units based on New Guinea in mid-1943 but for the first two years of the war the Americans mainly fought against the IJNAF.

2) That is my understanding.

3) What I have read of the RAF in the early period of the war is limited to the Buffalo squadrons stationed in Malaysia and Burma and in the defense of Singapore these did engage IJNAF units on at least two occasions that I am aware of. Generally, though, they were confronted by the IJAAF.

4) I honestly have no idea which were the principal American types used in the southern Pacific at that time but I believe you are correct. I am almost certain that some USAAF units were still equipped with the P-40 and others with the P-47 and likewise some USN units were still equipped with the Wildcat. It would be hard to say just how these types compared to their opponents such as the Oscar and Tony of the IJAAF and Zeke of the IJNAF; generally I believe that pilot training was the critical factor for success in aerial combat. I have read that based on fighter losses suffered by both sides the first six months of the Pacific War were a period marked by decided Japanese superiority. However, from the Guadalcanal campaign on through the end of 1943/beginning of 1944 fighter losses were quite balanced after which the Allied units began establishing a notable dominance.

I hope this is accurate and if not any corrections or additional comments would be greatly appreciated.

Horrido!

Leo

[bearoutwest]

Hello Bronc.
From early 1942 until late 1943, the Allied Air Forces fought a predominantly defensive air war over Northern Australia and New Guinea. This threw the USAAF, RAAF and Dutch NEI flying units in against both Japanese Army and land-based Navy squadrons. It was probably the longest continuous period of time when both the Japanese air arms operated “together” in the same campaign. (Though, “together” is a loose definition – more like benign tolerance of each other, rather than active co-operation.)
A quick rough-guide to Japanese operations would indicate (though not definitive in any way):
- raids against New Guinea targets initially IJNAF, then heavily augmented by IJAAF, then reinforced by IJNAF;
- raids against Darwin (and other Australian targets) predominantly by IJNAF units, with a number of autonomous raids by IJAAF units.

If you are looking for aircrew opinions on the relative merits of Japanese Army and Navy air units, then looking into the unit diaries or biographies of the following units might be useful:
- 49th Fighter Group USAAF (originally destined for Java, but remained in Australia defending Darwin in 1942, before moving to New Guinea and subsequently the Philippines);
- 75 Squadron RAAF (defending Port Moresby in 1942);
- 75 & 76 Squadrons RAAF (defending Milne Bay in New Guinea);
- the Spitfire Wing defending Darwin & Northern Australia in 1943.
I’m sure there are many other units which would provide an insight.

It is my “impression” that poor initial Allied intel on the potency of the Japanese aircraft and units, couple with the similarities in Japanese aircraft types (e.g. Army Ki-43 Oscars cf Navy A6M Zeros; Army Ki-27 Nates cf Navy A5M Claudes; Army Ki-21 Sallys cf Navy G3M Bettys) probably led to great confusion over what units were operating in-theatre. My reading of the last few years has concentrated on the Allied fighter operations. I don’t recall any specific mention of operational orders or aircrew opinions which favoured concern over one Japanese unit over another – e.g. unlike European theatre concerns voiced over the yellow nose Bf109s of the “Abbeville Kids” (JG26?). Mind you, when I was reading up on my interest in the subject, I wasn’t looking subjectively at Allied opinions regarding Japanese Army vs Navy capabilities, so more subtle references would have been lost on me.

Regards,
...geoff

[GuerraCivil]

The book of Nicholas Millman "Ki-27 ´Nate´Aces" may give some light.

Millman shows that IJAAF units flying near-obsolete but still surprisingly well-doing ´Nate´ made quite well against Allied pilots in 1941-1942.

Action over the Philippines saw two Ki-27 IJAAF units participating and were able to bring down some American P-40 E´s and alone P-35. It seems that IJAAF pilots did make well against American foes who had more advanced planes. American pilots learned that the "obsolete" Nate with its fixed landing gear was still a dangerous plane in the hands of skilled pilot.

IJAAF ´Nate´pilots took further part in the Malaya, The East Indies and Burma campaigns doing rather well against the Brewster Buffalos, Hurricanes and P-40´s of RAF/USAAF/AVG.

RAF ace Barry Sutton about his IJAAF opponents over Burma in 1942 and what the real combat situation made him to think about pre-war newspaper article claiming that Japanese pilots were unable to perform aerobatics: "Many times since I have thought I would have liked to cram the man who wrote that article into the cockpit of my Hurricane as I twisted and turned, trying to dogde the front end of those slippery little 97´s (Nate) as they clawed themselves around incredibly tight corners at a couple of hundred miles a hour"

[GuerraCivil]

I have read that the Japanese fighter most successfull in terms of downed enemy planes is Oscar (Ki-43) - and this could show something about the abilities of IJA fighter pilots! Of course there is a problem to figure out how many of the claims of Ki-43 pilots are legitimate (to be verified by Allied loss records). And the same problem goes also for the claims of Allied pilots vs. Ki-43.

When it comes to airwar, more interesting is my opinion the turning point in late 1942 or early 1943 than to analyze the rather onesided airwar of 1944-1945. At the late stage of war Allied had all the advantages: better planes, more tech and human resources, better average pilots etc. Only the very few remaining Japanese aces were still able to survive from combats and score occasionally.

Japanese as well as Germans were broken down by the war of attrition against superior enemy. One thing to add to Japanese misery was the prewar combat training program - in IJN case it was focused to produce small number of professional combat pilots but neglected the need to train decent reserve pilots for the long term war (the idea was that war would be a quick win so small number of elite pilots was enough). When this mistake was realised, it was already too late. When experienced pilot was lost, there were no decent replacement but only little trained novices available.

At the late point of Pacific War the average skill of IJA/IJN pilot was already so low that from the Japanese point of view it did not make much difference to send hastily trained novices to normal combat mission (in which they would be shot down in first air combat) or to kamikaze mission.

[bearoutwest]

Here’s a quick (“Reader’s Digest style) snap-shot summary of the pre-1941 air war over China.

In 1937, IJA operations centred round the North of China, crossing over from Manchuria towards Beijing in early July. IJN centred their operations around Shanghai in August 1937. The bulk of the better-trained pre-war Chinese aircrews were stationed in the south to defend the major centres (Shanghai, Guangzhou/Canton, and the then-capital Nanking). It was also Chinese government philosophy to fight the battle where western reporters could see the effect (and encourage more sympathy). Hence the major defence of Shanghai – especially directly across the river from the International Settlement. Almost all of the pre-war Chinese fighter strength was gathered around Shanghai. So, initially the Japanese army aircrews had a much “easier” time with more and more land-based (and floatplane) Japanese navy air units became involved in operations over Shanghai.

It was a stalemate for almost 2 months, with the Japanese Naval Infantry unable to break-out, and the Chinese divisions unable to remove them. It took further naval landings to outflank the defenders, and the subsequent inclusion of Japanese army troops (though I’m unsure of the exact timeline of their involvement) to push the Chinese defenders back along the Shanghai-Nanking-Wuhan axis. Almost all the Japanese involvement over this theatre of air operations was IJN, mainly land-based G3Ms and A5Ms, and some carrier-based A4N biplanes.

The next major air battles occurred in the defence of Wuhan Jan/Feb – October 1938. Initially some of the Chinese squadrons began re-equipping with Soviet-supplied fighters (Polikarpov 15s and 16s). Subsequently in mid-1938, two Soviet-manned fighter groups joined the fighting. At this stage the air operations in the south (around Wuhan) were still IJN based. The IJA units (starting to re-equip from the Ki-10 to the Ki-27) were based in the north, especially around the Manchurian-Soviet border, where incursions and skirmishes were taking place.

The main IJA air battles did not take place until the massive Nomonhan/Khalkhin-Gol air battles in late 1938 and early 1939 against Soviet fighters and bombers across a 100-mile front.

The impression I have from my reading (and this is from memory now), it that the pre-1940 Japanese army and navy air arms were relatively small. It would appear that in the course of operations between 1937-1939, the bulk of the pre-war IJN fighter force was rotated through the southern China theatre of operations. The 1937 to early-1938 air battles against pre-war Chinese fighter pilots (home-grown and American-Chinese volunteers, and predominantly German-trained) was a close-run thing until the IJN threw in large numbers of A5M fighters for escorts and fighter-sweeps. It became more evenly matched again when the Soviet “volunteers” arrived. It wasn’t until 1940, with the withdrawal of the Soviet aircrews and the arrival of the experimental A6M Zero squadron, that the IJN gained air dominancy in the south.

The IJA air units did not engage in significant air battles (mainly due to a lack of opposition) in their northern area of operations until the air battles against the Soviets over Nomonham. Almost the entire available force of Ki-27 fighters (supported by a few Ki-10 units) would be involved in the fighting. The Soviets would throw in larger numbers of reinforcements. Both air and ground fighting took place over a small patch of territory (the front was of the order of 100 miles). Both sides over-claimed dramatically in the air – again as a result of the very large numbers of aircraft involved over a small front. I don’t recall the exact numbers, but the leading Japanese ace claimed 93(?) kills. Total Soviet air losses were of the order of 100 aircraft. Both sides over-claimed in a big way, so I’m not just singling out the IJA crews.

From all that, I concluded with the opinion that by 1941, the IJN aircrews had a much longer period of air combat experience. The longer pre-war training process, which Leo indicated previously, meant the IJN land-based crews had as much flight experience as their IJA counterparts, and the IJN carrier capable aircrews were “a cut above” as with most naval aviation organisations…..and rightly entitled to swagger down the street (or is that just getting back on dry land again).

So all other things being taken into account, in December 1941, I would rate the average IJN aircrew being better than their IJA counterparts – better training, and more time to incorporate combat lessons learnt. The downside of being an IJN aviator, is that eventually you run up against similarly trained enemy (i.e. USN), and when your airfield (the floating one) is sunk, you stand less chance of surviving. At least an IJA aviator stuck on the ground and being bombed on his runway, can take shelter and live to fight another day.


...geoff

[Broncazonk]

This thread has been generating some great posts, (all but mine because I don't know anything) and to one and all, I say thank you.

There was racism, a lot of racist propaganda that was directed against the Japanese prior to, during and throughout the war--for home consumption. However, each of the Allied nations had a military attaché exchange program with the Japanese in the late 1930's, no? The actual abilities and capabilities of the Japanese army and navy air forces had to be known (should have been known) to someone in the British and US military pre-war, no? And if not, why not?? (The standard narrative is that the Japanese came as a big surprise to the British and Americans. The Zero certainly was. Were the Japanese THAT successful in hiding their abilities in the late 1930's?)

Bronc

[bearoutwest]

Hello Bronc,

In the context of the timeline, the Japanese capabilities were not really known. If you compare the pre-1930/40, French and British near-hysteria about the Luftwaffe super-fighter – the Bf110 (and subsequently the He113), information wasn’t really at a finger’s keyboard touch or book-search away. I mean how well do we really know about the JSF or the F-22 or Chinese J-20 and Russian Su-37(?) (Russian stealth-ski?)?

The Western powers had observers in the International Settlement in 1937 during the Battle of Shanghai. A Dutch Colonel (*) wrote a series of lengthy reports for his government (and I believe it was shared to some extent with other western governments), so Japanese naval infantry tactics were quite well known. Claire Chennault and his team of technical people were on the ground (and in the air) training and organising the Chinese Air Force, so there was a steady flow of information back to the US.

The Chinese ground effort in Shanghai was hampered by the lack of heavy weapons, and co-ordination between various divisions (lack of willingness to share the limited heavy artillery, lack of coordinated air force/army co-operation, etc). The Japanese naval infantry/ship/airpower coordination was superb – possibly more integrated than any other armed forces until the US Marines after Guadalcanal. Where the Japanese Naval Light Infantry didn’t have land heavy artillery, they had heavy cruisers and destroyers moored in the Whangpo River. I guess the Western army planners may well have decided that the Japanese only succeeded in Shanghai because of the lack of Chinese heavy weapons, and that a Western army with integrated infantry and artillery with tank support would hold out easily. Besides….everybody knows you can’t drive tanks in the Malayan or Burmese jungle (or the Ardennes Forest!). The Chinese air effort wasn’t noticeable over the city (except when their bombs overshot the Japanese cruiser and hit the International Settlement) – in much the same way the troops at Dunkirk didn’t notice the air battle 20-30 miles away.

Chennault’s insights would have been useful, but he was on the outer with US Army General Staff (considered a bit of a maverick because he thought a credible fighter force could actually intercept heavy bombers and cause significant casualties). Only at Presidential level was there an amount of support for him, but then Roosevelt would not have dealt with relatively minor combat evaluation reports on the Japanese Naval Air Arm.

The Soviets – through their “volunteers” in China and through their combat in Nomonhan – would have gathered a reasonable amount of intel, but considering the massive overclaiming at Nomonhan, and the state of the Soviet AF in 1939 (notable in the Russo-Finish War as well), I’m not sure how well they would have evaluated the info.

So although there was data out there in 1939-40, I don’t think Western military planners would have really recognised the significance of much of it. In the main part, they had their own fixed ideas about air operations – Douhet’s theory about the bomber always getting through, etc – and a small conflict in the exotic far east between a couple of non-Western countries wasn’t going to change any opinions….yet. The racist element – Japanese pilot’s are all myopic and can’t fly at night, and all their aircraft are just rip offs of the junk we sold them, i.e. Vought 143s, Seversky two-seater fighters, etc – was perhaps evident at the squadron level; but the planners sent Buffalos to the Far East because that’s all that was available at the time against a potential enemy. The top-line Spitfires and Hurricanes and P-40s were being used against an actual enemy.

By the way, the Dutch Colonel’s notes (*) have been compiled into a book “A Dutch Spy in China”. It makes for a good read. The book’s quite expensive to buy, so one for the inter-library request system perhaps.

...geoff