Hooton's Luftwaffe Loss Totals - request for clarification

[Paul Thompson]

Hello,

I am very glad to have become a forum member!

I've been interested in Luftwaffe loss figures for a long time, and I've become ever more confused as to their precise meaning. My specific question concerns Ed Hooton's 2010 book - http://www.ianallanpublishing.com/the-luftwaffe.htm

On page 143 of this book, Mr. Hooton provides a summary table of Luftwaffe Losses in the Western Mediterranean

To give an example, for Q4 1942 he gives figures of 432 aircraft lost to EA (enemy action) and 489 to accidents

The sources he gives are as follows:
BA MA RL 2 III/875-881 and Mr Nick Beale (A member of this forum!)
Note: Figures exclude seaplane and transport units


My question is:
Are these total losses (100%), or do the totals include aircraft damaged beyond repair (60% and above), or all aircraft sustaining any damage (5% and above?)

Why were more aircraft lost to accidents than enemy action? Does this indicate that the figures include even minor damage, presumably sustained in many take-off and landing knocks?

Paul Thompson

[Nick Beale]

I don't know which of my things Ted Hooton was citing, so it's difficult to comment on how he did his maths.

Taking one of the files you mention, RL2 III/881, this offers detailed breakdowns of aircraft on strength and lost in units during August 1944. It categorises these losses under: enemy action, not by enemy action, given up to other units, and sent to industry (for major repair/overhaul). Aircraft received are divided into new production, from other units, and repaired.

I don't know if anyone has ever worked out the ratio of aircraft sent to industry vs. the reconditioned machines that units received. Presumably many written off aircraft would have yielded useable parts so that (in theory) you'd get a whole machine from every so many wrecks.

[Maxim1]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

I don't know if anyone has ever worked out the ratio of aircraft sent to industry vs. the reconditioned machines that units received.

I did that for some types (Ju 87, Ju 88, He 111) using Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen from Michael Holm's site. The final numbers are close enough.

[Graham Boak]

In RAF practice, the main fuselage carried the identification, so it would not be possible to generate a totally new airframe as it would still carry the identity of the fuselage. Everything else would just be spares. I suspect a similar situation existed in the Luftwaffe; the likeliest contender for such an item being the centre fuselage/wing centre section on most types.

[Paul Thompson]

Nick and Graham, thank you for your ideas!

Nick, your description of RL2 III/881 closely matches the layout of the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen available on Michael Holm's website. Are they indeed the same or similar?

The gist of what both of you are saying seems to be that Ted Hooton's totals are most likely those for aircraft lost or damaged beyond repair, minus any which were eventually extensively reassembled. I've looked at my notes again and I've found that on page 213 of the same book Mr. Hooton describes a similar set of figures for the Eastern Front as relating to aircraft destroyed or severely damaged. I am guessing that this should mean aircraft sustaining 60% damage or greater according to the Luftwaffe classification and so you are right.

However, all of the above raises a couple of "global" questions. Did the Luftwaffe really lose such a large proportion of aircraft to non-combat causes? Is this an exception or the rule among the air forces of World War Two? I find myself at a loss to answer those.

I've reproduced the Mediterranean table below to show the magnitude of the non-combat losses. Nick, I hope it might also give you some idea of how the calculations were done, by giving more data to compare with any totals that you may have.

Table below:

Quarter Year EA Accident Ratio of EA to Accident
Q4 1942 423 489 0.87
Q1 1943 448 471 0.95
Q2 1943 677 461 1.47
Q3 1943 1114 578 1.93
Q4 1943 261 129 2.02
Q1 1944 458 162 2.83
Q2 1944 421 162 2.60

[Don Pearson]

For comparison, Wikipedia provided this data for the USAAF;

"88,119 airmen died in service. 52,173 were battle casualty deaths: 45,520 KIA, 1,140 died of wounds, 3,603 were MIA and declared dead, and 1,910 were nonhostile battle deaths... 35,946 non-battle deaths included 25,844 in aircraft accidents, more than half of which occurred within the Continental United States."

Don

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

Nick and Graham, thank you for your ideas!

Nick, your description of RL2 III/881 closely matches the layout of the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen available on Michael Holm's website. Are they indeed the same or similar?

Did the Luftwaffe really lose such a large proportion of aircraft to non-combat causes?

I've reproduced the Mediterranean table below to show the magnitude of the non-combat losses. Nick, I hope it might also give you some idea of how the calculations were done, by giving more data to compare with any totals that you may have.

1) Yes.

2) Maybe but I've not tried to compile the stats. Lots of people died in accidents in all air forces but I don't have comparative data. Flying in the 1940s was far more hazardous than now and in wartime aircraft were often overloaded, operated from less than ideal fields etc. Runway and hazard lighting was kept to a minimum in the general blackout. Loading bombs and fuel could result in fire and explosions. Luftwaffe pilot quality deteriorated as training was curtailed. Delivery flights to North Africa were over water, those to Italy over mountains. Aircraft construction suffered from materials shortfalls, bombardment, dispersed production in sheds, tunnels forests. Germany was using slaves to produce aircraft. All of this is likely to have affected the quality of the final product.

3) I've never made any attempt to calculate total losses in the MTO or elsewhere, only for given units at particular times or for individual actions, so I can't really help. At a tactical level, an aircraft is lost when the user requires a replacement for it; where that replacement comes from is not too important (provided refurbished machines really are "good as new" and not obsolete marks, of course). At a strategic level however, the more severely damaged planes you can put back into action alongside new production, the better.

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

1) Yes.

2) Maybe but I've not tried to compile the stats. Lots of people died in accidents in all air forces but I don't have comparative data. Flying in the 1940s was far more hazardous than now and in wartime aircraft were often overloaded, operated from less than ideal fields etc. Runway and hazard lighting was kept to a minimum in the general blackout. Loading bombs and fuel could result in fire and explosions. Luftwaffe pilot quality deteriorated as training was curtailed. Delivery flights to North Africa were over water, those to Italy over mountains. Aircraft construction suffered from materials shortfalls, bombardment, dispersed production in sheds, tunnels forests. Germany was using slaves to produce aircraft. All of this is likely to have affected the quality of the final product.

3) I've never made any attempt to calculate total losses in the MTO or elsewhere, only for given units at particular times or for individual actions, so I can't really help. At a tactical level, an aircraft is lost when the user requires a replacement for it; where that replacement comes from is not too important (provided refurbished machines really are "good as new" and not obsolete marks, of course). At a strategic level however, the more severely damaged planes you can put back into action alongside new production, the better.

Nick, thank you again for your thoughts. Point 1 makes me think that Ted Hooton's figure may well be a very rough reflection of reality, since it's quite difficult to know which of the Bestandliste (correct term?) to include in any calculation.

In point 2 you suggest a few reasons for why the Luftwaffe in particular may have been badly affected by non-combat losses. I think its possible, particularly in view of the many comments made by men at the time and later historians, that the Luftwaffe maintenance and repair organisation was particularly bad in comparison to the RAF, for example. That would potentially mean that during crisis periods, such as the withdrawals late 1942, the Luftwaffe would be largely incapacitated by its own technical problems, rather than Allied air supremacy. Do you get that sense from your study of the Mediterranean air war? I have the impression that in Tunisia especially, the Luftwaffe had significant technical means and the men to use them, but failed to achieve much because of awful maintenance problems.

I understand that you haven't been collating total losses, but do Ted Hooton's figures seem qualitatively correct? By that I mean do the loss figures match the relative intensity of combat across the time periods in question? I was surprised that the beginning of 1944 was as quiet as the beginning of 1943, in spite of the air battles around Anzio.

Do you think that the Germans had much harder a time getting badly damaged aircraft repaired than the RAF or USAAF?

[AndreasB]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

Nick and Graham, thank you for your ideas!

Nick, your description of RL2 III/881 closely matches the layout of the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen available on Michael Holm's website. Are they indeed the same or similar?

The gist of what both of you are saying seems to be that Ted Hooton's totals are most likely those for aircraft lost or damaged beyond repair, minus any which were eventually extensively reassembled. I've looked at my notes again and I've found that on page 213 of the same book Mr. Hooton describes a similar set of figures for the Eastern Front as relating to aircraft destroyed or severely damaged. I am guessing that this should mean aircraft sustaining 60% damage or greater according to the Luftwaffe classification and so you are right.

However, all of the above raises a couple of "global" questions. Did the Luftwaffe really lose such a large proportion of aircraft to non-combat causes? Is this an exception or the rule among the air forces of World War Two? I find myself at a loss to answer those.

I've reproduced the Mediterranean table below to show the magnitude of the non-combat losses. Nick, I hope it might also give you some idea of how the calculations were done, by giving more data to compare with any totals that you may have.

Table below:

Quarter Year EA Accident Ratio of EA to Accident
Q4 1942 423 489 0.87
Q1 1943 448 471 0.95
Q2 1943 677 461 1.47
Q3 1943 1114 578 1.93
Q4 1943 261 129 2.02
Q1 1944 458 162 2.83
Q2 1944 421 162 2.60

Off topic, but could you do this table for Q4/41 and Q1/42?

All the best

Andreas

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by AndreasB

Off topic, but could you do this table for Q4/41 and Q1/42?

Andreas, I can not do that, because the data is from Mr. Hooton's book and his tables do not cover the periods in question.

Originally Posted by AndreasB

On Kew and Duxford/IWM:

My understanding is that any file originating with the British forces is held in Kew. Captured enemy documents are held by the IWM and can be read in Duxford (on appointment), or in London (on appointment, they would be shipped from Duxford). The files in Duxford are the same (as far as I can tell) as the ones held in NARA (they are photostat copies of the NARA files, mostly in poor condition, with the exception of some originals. I do not believe they hold a lot of GAF stuff. You are allowed to use a camera at Duxford, but will likely struggle to do this in the IWM Reading Room in London.

Nick, the tip on the AHB files is supremely helpful - I was wondering where these were held.

I hope this helps.

All the best

Andreas

Thank you for that information, it matches quite closely what my friend, who has contacted the IWM and will be going there soon, has been told. However, there is a discrepancy insofar as the IWM curator has indicated that the Duxford files are duplicates of files in Kew. These may since have been culled from Kew, although that is a guess on my part. My friend and I, if I have some free time, will investigate this further.

Could you look at the private message I sent you?

Regards,

Paul Thompson