Opinions please (impact Allied fighter bombers on D-day)

[Rich47]

I'd like opinions on the impact of the Allied fighter bombers in the battle for France, D-day on, in 1944.

Thank you

[drgondog]

I'll take a position on this subject... the combination of RAF, 8th AF and 9 AF fighter bombers in the Normandy campaign were crucial in several categories.
1. They denied rail and road traffic mobility to both resupply forward positions and/or enable orderly retreat as the German army was pushed back..
2. They put heavy pressure on entrenched forward positions, destroying troops, tanks and armored vehicles. Many Panzer IV's were destroyed for example.
3. They denied any hope of Luftwaffe tactical air from becoming even a presence, much less effective. For example the Luftwaffe sent 15 Ju 87's to the beach on June 6 and the 355th FG wiped out the group completely
4. They were a bitter psychological reminder to the troops on the ground that they would not enjoy such air support and that they were left strictly to the inventory (ammo/food/armor) that they started with on June 6.
5. They put so much pressure on France based Luftwaffe airfields that they became ineffective against the strategic air campaign directed toward German targets.

I'm sure other will have a better opinion, but hopefully is a start.

Regards,
Bill Marshall

[Jon]

I have read one account of German tank crew POWS in British hands being moved back from the front actually soiling their trousers when a flight of RAF Typhoons flew over. The Brits said they were terrified beyond belief, just at the sound as they flew past.

Drgonag is correct with all his points, in particular the RAF Typhoon was greatly feared by the Panzer crews, but all the RAF and USAF fighter bombers or just fighters on patrol reduced massivley the movement of troops and supplies towards the front.

It was not uncommon for a single soldier to attract the attention of a straffing attack and again i remember reading a Spitfire pilots account of diving on a single German soldier on a bike in Northern France, as the pilot opened fire the German in a futile but natural act raised his arm to ward of the 20mm canon shells, the pilot said that is the one act he wishes he never did and obviously still haunted him when he wrote the story down.

I feel that without the allied Fighter Bomber D Day would have failed, certainly without the Allied Fighter bomber D Day would not have happened.

[Franek Grabowski]

Actually, assesment was done at the end of Normandy Campaign and it was found that damage inflicted was not very impressive. This is also conclusion of Zetterling's book covering the German side. Nonetheless psychological as well as reconnaissance role cannot be underestimated.

[Jon]

Hi Franek.
Yes you are correct regards the losses to armour these were actually very small against the claims of the Allied pilots.
However the knowledge that at any time you could come under direct attack from the air, aiming at you, rather than just bombing the area from a great height had a massive effect of the German forces.

The "Battle of the Bulge" was only started when cloud cover was low enough to hamper the allied fighter bombers. For a major attack such as this to hinge on the weather for this reason, shows exactly to what extent the German high command feared the Typhoons and Thunderbolts.

[drgondog]

I have had the opportunity to discuss the effect of free-ranging fighters behind German lines with more than a few knowledgable gentlemen on the other side.

Without going to the trouble of extracting General Galland's exact quotes which are in my book, paraphrased they go like this:
1. The effect of particularly the Mustang from March 1944 in dropping to the deck on the way home, strafing airfields, trains, barges and road traffic was devastating to the Luftwaffe - often preventing orderly take off and assembly to meet daylight bomber attacks and often wreaking havoc on tired pilots attempting to land often damaged a/c. Galland was very strong on this factor preventing him from getting large concentrations of fighters often enough in a localized space where he would have significant superiority and be able to do great damage.

2. The shooting up of trains and road and barge traffic had a more sinister effect to Germany's successful de-centralizing industry, particularly aircraft. The achilles heel was bringing sub assemblies by surface traffic which often came under attack somewhat offset the difficulties the Heavy bombers had in dealing with much de-centralization by not being able to destroy several large concentrations. In addition many repairable and repaired fighters returning from maintenance facilities via flatbed trucks were once again damaged or destroyed in such attacks

The above comments were made specifically to my question "How did the very large tactical "Footprint" of the Mustang cause difficulties to the Luftwaffe after Doolittle encouraged 8th AF Fighter Command to go on the offensive".

Remember, these attacks were ranging from Munich to Berlin months before the invasion.

Independent on whether the low level strafing attacks did as much damage as claimed, the order of magnitude of 5,000 German a/c destroyed on the ground matched the number destroyed in the air by the Mustang - and we haven't even touched on the terrible damage inflicted by the Typhoons and Thunderbolts in close proximity to the front lines in the true Fighter Bomber role.

The Falaise Pocket certainly illustrated the terrible effect of such low level attacks by the 'Jabo's'.... and the psychological effects of having to plan logistics and movement of critical supplies only at night reduced much of the German Army's effectiveness at the point of attack.

[malladyne]

It is fatuous to dismiss the claim that the Typhoon's rockets were significantly less effective than the broadside of a cruiser ( a comparison frequently made ). This is because although the full salvo of rockets may not have entirely equalled the cruiser's broadside in terms of numbers of projectiles or weight of same, there is so little difference between the two as to be of no account whatsoever. Moreover, the cost of a WW2 Typhoon was significantly less that £10 k. whereas a cruiser would have cost very much more than that. I won't even begin to factor in issues like the running costs of both, since the rocket equipped aircraft be it Typhoon or Thunderbolt, Lightning or Mustang could roam at will over a battlefield and it is that very mobility that makes rocket equipped planes the superlative tank killers/pillbox smashers/bridge busters that they were.
Afetr all, what was it that killed the german tank ace Michael Wittman, a superlative killer of Allied tanks ?...........yeah, youv'e got it.......a Hawker Typhoon.
Also, somewhere else in this thread a claim is made that the Allied fighters were insufficiently gunned for the Normandy campaign !!!! Is not a snootfull of m.g.'s and cannon in the nose of a lightning not enough guns for you ? let alone the 4 20.MM quick firing cannon of the Tempest and Typhoon and Spitfire variants !!!
Malladyne

[George Hopp]

Afetr all, what was it that killed the german tank ace Michael Wittman, a superlative killer of Allied tanks ?...........yeah, youv'e got it.......a Hawker Typhoon.

In "Panzers in Normandy then and now" and in a lengthy "After the Battle" article it was stated pretty categorically that Wittmann was popped by some Sherman Fireflies (Shermans regunned with the 17pdr. anti-tank gun).

[Josh Osborne]

There are a number of operational research reports available which attempt to avaluate the actual effects of jabo attacks. One report in particular evaluates the damage inflicted in the battles around Mortain and Falaise. Another similar study was performed after the battle of the Ardennes. All reports showed similar results, namely:
1) Strafing, rocket, and bomb attacks were very effective against unarmored and lightly armored transport.
2) Bomb and rocket attacks were notably ineffective against heavy AFVs. (Note: Tony Williams website has excellent information regarding 40's era anti-tank aircraft weapons)

The vulnerability of motor and horse-drawn transport had several consequences:
1) Movement was restricted during the day
2) Time and effort had to be expended hiding and camoflaging vehicles
3) Traffic that had to move during daylight would see losses, especially ammunition and fuel transport that were particularly vulnerable
4) Destroyed vehicles caused traffic pile-ups, which made the remaining vehicles that much more vulnerable to air and artillery attack

In addition to the effectiveness against soft-skinned transport, jabos were also effective against command and control centers and bridges.

My references for the above information: "To Win the Winter Sky" by Danny S Parker, Ian Gooderson's 'Air Power at the Battlefront'.

To say that jabos were ineffective to the overall war effort because they cannot destroy tanks is a ridiculous statement. Was the M-1 rifle a useless weapon because it could not destroy tanks? If you can damage or delay the train that carries the tank, then the tank gets to the battle too late. If there is no gas or ammo for the tank, it is a useless pile of metal.

[Juha]

Hello Tony.
I’m not too sure on that the 6” shells usually buried themselves deep before exploding. The main purpose of British naval 6” HE shell was that of shore bombardment, CPBC was the shell normally used in naval engagements. It would surprise me if the RN was incapable to design fuse-shell combination for shore bombardment which allowed the shell burst before it buried itself too deep because all armies I’m aware of succeeded doing that.

Regards
Juha