Placing the Fairey Battle.

[RodM]

Hi Graham,

"The RAF did order a long range fighter, the Merlin-engined P-51, but deliveries were thwarted by external events."

No. 11 Group was providing Mustang escorts for daylight Bomber Command raids from late 1944 onwards. Although I don't have figures immediately at hand, I can say that, as an example, the RAF raid on Hamburg on 31/3/45 was escorted by "12 squadrons" of RAF Mustangs.

Cheers

Rod

[Graham Boak]

Yes, but the orders were placed long before then. The RAF were supplied with limited numbers of P-51B/C fighters from 1943, but priority was given to the 8thAF. I feel that this was the correct priority for the overall Allied cause, but it gives a misleading impression of a lower RAF interest in long-range fighters than actually was the case. The numbers of aircraft supplied to the RAF rose after D-Day, permitting the conversion of more squadrons to the P-51: there is a suggestion that some of these were 8th AF veterans but I don't think that has been verified.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

I say that Bomber Command was ill-prepared to conduct the war it had dreamed of fighting since, according to Hastings, it appears not to have tested the concept in any meaningful way

You say 'ill-prepared'. The mot juste is 'incompetent'. The RAF had failed to test the software 'concept', but hadn't tested the hardware either. Example: the bombs with 11-second fuses dropped on the Admiral Scheer on September 4, 1939 at great cost by Blenheims failed to explode because they hadn't been tested. Example: the Wellingtons had no self-sealing petrol tanks and no waist gunners; etc.

But putting aside semantics, we have found agreement.

[Kutscha]

The first RAF base to receive Mustang IIIs was at Gravesend in Kent. The Mustang III initially equipped No. 65 Squadron in late December of 1943, followed by No. 19 Squadron in March of 1944. Later the Mk. III also equipped Nos 64, 65, 66, 93, 94, 112, 118, 122, 126, 129, 165, 234, 237, 241 249, 250, 260, 268, 306, 309, 315, 316, 345, 430, 441, 442, and 516 Squadrons and No. 541 Squadron of RAF Coastal Command.

The RAF Mustang IIIs began operations late in February 1944, escorting US heavy bombers as well as both US and RAF medium bombers.

[RodM]

Tony,

"You say 'ill-prepared'. The mot juste is 'incompetent'. "

Based on this 'measurement' it stands to reason that the army was incompetent for not being equipped and ready to effectively counter the Blitzkrieg, or incompetant in the defence of Greece, Crete and Singapore. Then again, the navy must have been incompetant for allowing the successful 'Channel Dash', losing the Repulse and Prince of Wales, and not being able to effectively deal with the U-Boat threat between 1939-41.

Cheers

Rod

[Kutscha]

The first P-39C (Ser No 40-2971) flew in January of 1941. The Army discovered almost immediately that the P-39C was not combat ready, since it lacked armor and self-sealing tanks.

Gee, your much toted P-39 did not have armor and self-sealing fuel tanks and flew some 17 months after WW2 had started. One would think that lessons would have been learned by then and been incorperated in the design from the start.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Does your claim that no CAS was provided on June 6th have any actual backing in fact? Of all the sorties flown, not a single one was CAS? Or is it linked to your attitude that whatever was provided was wrong, inadequate, and therefore dismissable? Of course, not all aerial support given to the Armies was CAS, or are you suggesting that if it isn't in sight of a soldier, it is not happening, and of no value if it is?

There was no CAS available to help the Suffolks take the Hillman concrete strongpoint that held up 3 Div throughout D-Day. Therefore Caen was not occupied and no airfield like Carpiquet became available for 2TAF.
There were lots of 2TAF RP Typhoons around on D-Day, but no forward air controller. There was a naval liaison officer with 3 Div but he was killed, so no 11-inch guns could be used. There was no Flak to worry Vengeances had they been released from target-towing duties in Devon. RP Typhoons were unavailable but were not the answer. Sherman tanks were available but likewise not the answer. Maybe bombs delivered by the Vengeances were also no answer, but they were the best bet after ships' guns.
The infantry should have had dive-bombers under command, as the Royal Artillery had Austers under command flown by gunners but supplied and serviced by the RAF. Gunner forward observation officers lived with the infantry battalions who felt they had their 'own' troop of three 25-pdrs. The FOO had only to call in an emergency and the troop would always drop what it was doing and come to the help of 'its' infantry battalion. If the threat was severe, the FOO could call on a battery, or a regiment, or higher. The FOO's decision was never questioned - unlike the case in the US Army which never trusted their FOO's with that discretion.
The Army tried to develop this kind of unit relationship between squadrons and brigades, and between sections and battalions. But the RAF always categorically refused. All they would allow was the permament allocation of a Group to an Army. So Typhoon pilots never met the infantry they supported, and never got their feedback.
The wrong aircraft with the wrong weapon in the wrong organisation gave the wrong result.

[Juha]

Tony
“The RAF lost 47,000 aircrew, some say 55,000. Compare that with the 30,000 killed in the U-Bootwaffe.”

What the h… is the meaning of that comparasion? One can compare the losses of RAF vs LW or vs. VVS or losses of U-Bootwaffe vs Submarine servises of RN, USN or Soviet Navy but are you next time comparing losses of LW to the losses of Submarine service of RN?

“And there was no significant CAS on D-Day or for days afterwards.”

Sometimes I seem to be able to agree with you by some extent!

IIRC 12. SSPzD sent a recon detachment to the coast while waiting Hitler’s permit to attack the Allied beachhead. These armoured cars and armoured half-tracks arrived without too much inference by Allied a/c and were able to give useful info to div HQ.

And when the CO of 21. PzD finally arrived and started act correctly, the div was able to disengage from the eastern bank of was that Orne, move back to Caen, drive through that town and attack against advancing Commonwealth forces without too much inference by Allied a/c. IIRC it lost some 8 tanks in Caen or just outside it, but the attack of the tank-heavy Kampfgruppe was stopped by Commonwealth anti-tank screen with a loss of IIRC some 30 PzIVs. The infantry-heavy KG got to beach between two Commonwealth invasion beaches but was withdrawn because a supply drop to the British Airborne Div was interpret as an airlanding against their LoC. Now IMHO is that the KG would not change the course of battle because at least naval artillery would have made their life miserable near beaches but anyway they would have been a potential threat to the troops on nearby beaches.

So it doesn’t seem that the CAS on June 6th, at least outside landing beaches, was very effective. And it’s ironic that the clearly most effective CAS a/c was the transport planes, probably Dakotas, on that day.


“There was no CAS available to help the Suffolks take the Hillman concrete strongpoint that held up 3 Div throughout D-Day. Therefore Caen was not occupied and no airfield like Carpiquet became available for 2TAF.”

IMHO you give too much importance to Hillman debacle. And Vengeances would not be able to help because to problem was lack of info. But you are right that the basic problem was the lack of RAF control team, what they were called, FAO?

Juha

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by RodM

Tony,

"You say 'ill-prepared'. The mot juste is 'incompetent'. "

Based on this 'measurement' it stands to reason that the army was incompetent for not being equipped and ready to effectively counter the Blitzkrieg, or incompetant in the defence of Greece, Crete and Singapore. Then again, the navy must have been incompetant for allowing the successful 'Channel Dash', losing the Repulse and Prince of Wales, and not being able to effectively deal with the U-Boat threat between 1939-41.

Cheers

Rod

The policy of 'Limited liability' meant that almost all the money went to the RAF throughout the 1930's rearmament. The RAF got what it wanted. That is the basis of the charge of incompetence. The RAF was not constrained. They wanted Fairey Battles and they got them; Blenheims, Hampdens, Wellingtons, Spitfires, Hurricanes - anything they wanted, and as many of them as they wanted.

The army got very little until the last moment. The RAF fought against all attempts by the army to get money, and they succeeded. The RAF claimed it could sink battleships, so the RN did not need money for new battleships. That was why Bismarck and Tirpitz were the largest battleships in the world when they were launched. Think of that. And how long did it take the RAF to sink the Tirpitz? You know the answer. Was it 5 years?

The RN was convicted of incompetence over the Channel Dash. But where were the bombers that the RAF promised could sink any battleship nearing Britain's shores? The money had been spent on bombers. Where were they?

The sinking of POW and Repulse was due to the weakness of the RAF in Malaysia. There were masses of RAF fighters whiling away the time on tarmac in Britain with nothing to do because their enemy was fighting the Russians. The RAF should have been in Malaya.

The RN lacked escorts in 1939-41 to sink U-boats. Churchill begged FDR for 50 rust bucket three-stackers from FDR. Why was the RN short of escorts? You guessed it. They had been denied the funds because the RAF had to have the money, and with it the RAF would destroy any threat up until the moment they were sked to deliver on their promises Then, oops, the excuses started, such as the excuse that the Fairey Battle was obsolescent.

As I have been saying all along; air was too important to be left to the RAF.

[Franek Grabowski]

Tony
If I recall, 30,000 German sailors were some 3/4 of the force. How about RAF losses?
Concerning Il-2 article, I would have to finish it, add some new and astonishing details, and then translate to English, but who would be interested in publishing it?
Concerning deliveries, no RAF did not get anything they wanted (and there were serious conflicts as what they wanted), and not in quantities. Several aircraft were simply failures, say eg. Battle, Defiant, Warwick, other not available in quantities. Nonetheless RAF should not be blamed for incompetence of Army and Navy in their orders.

Concerning escorts, Polish Mustang Wing was operational in April 1944 and flew escorts deep into Germany. During Normandy and following diver campaign they were in the other duties but reverted to escort in the Autumn 1944.