Placing the Bell P39 Aircobra.

[Jukka Juutinen]

The Twin Wasp was never, NEVER as powerful as the contemporary Hercules. Not in 1940, not in 1943, not in any year. By the time the Twin wasp was rated at 1350 hp, the Hercules was already a 1700+ hp engine.

BTW, what was the max TO weight of Twin Wasp Wellington´s vs. Hercules Wellingtons?

[tcolvin]

Rod.


You said; "While I suspect that many would concede that CAS could have been better, it was just a component of the whole combined force."
No. It was not "just" a component. It was an "vital" part of all-arms which relied for success on integration of a) infantry b) artillery c) armour d) air and e) logistics, and a half decent performance by each one.
The British army had superb infantry, artillery and logistics in 1944/45. But armour and air were deficient, and for the same reasons. Neither would subordinate itself to the infantry/artillery, and both were wrongly equipped - with Typhoons/Spitfires/mediums, and cruiser tanks.
Refusal to cooperate was endemic.
Desmond Scott refused to cooperate with the infantry/artillery. In February 1944 he had an "introduction to the future interdependence of the tank and aircraft….. the essence of our combined operations". No mention of infantry or artillery.
Tedder said the same in 1943; "The Army having been drugged with bombs, it is going to be difficult to cure the drug addicts. The Air could not, and must not, be turned on glibly and vaguely in support of the Army, which would never move unless prepared to fight its way with its own weapons". There we have it: air was not an Army weapon in the opinion of Ike's deputy and the effective head of the RAF.
Some such as Harry Broadhurst saw how crippling was this RAF attitude, but he was overruled by Coningham and Tedder; "The way I looked at it was, the Army in this particular situation, had to occupy the ground. They had to supply us and we couldn't pretend to be the main arm of the thing. You could almost say they could go on without us. So we were definitely subordinate to the Army's planning. They had to have the major say in the whole thing. So it was no good someone like Coningham saying they had to be equally important. His job was to support the Army's plan, and influence it as much as he could to suit the air force's ability to do the best".
Irony piled upon irony. The two examples that particularly riled Coningham and Tedder were the retreat of 7 Armoured Division from Villers Bocage on June 14, and that of 11 Armoured Division from Hill 112 on June 29 - both examples of the armoured elite pursuing its own mythical mission of exploitation without cooperation with the infantry/artillery. And that was exactly the problem with 2TAF.
The conclusion has to be faced, that the British Army got to Luebeck in spite of the Air and the armoured divisions. They would have got there equally quickly without 2TAF and without the armoured divisions. They would have got there six months earlier if 2TAF and the armoured divisions had equipped themselves correctly and subordinated themselves to the Army. The way to achieve subordination was an Army Air Corps, and the conversion of all armoured divisions into tank brigades equipped with a Churchill tank immune to the 88-mm.
2. I have an article to finish, and have to get on with it. But I may in the months ahead revert to this subject by starting a thread titled "Was 2TAF a fraud?", and laying out the arguments.
Tony

[RodM]

Hi Tony,

my reference to "whole force" goes beyond just the ground war - the whole force brought to bear is political and economic, along with military.

The impression that I get (and I admit that I may have got this wrong) is that you have inferred that anything outside of the ground war and it's support is irrelevant.

For example, while the Russians did the bulk of the ground fighting by the Allies in Europe, they benefitted from the economic blockade of materials placed upon Germany and the effects of the strategic air campaign. the later beginning to tell from 1944 onwards (counter arguments about increased German production during this period are too simplistic because (a) it was only during this period that the Germans "pulled finger" on war production, (b) production is useless unless it can be used where it is needed, and (c) stocks of vital materials were becoming increasingly lower).

I will not neccesarily disagree with you about the quality of British CAS, (it was not, however, NOT better than nothing - that is simply an emotive statement of little validity), but I disagree about the overall quality of British infantry in 1944/45, especially the way in which it was lead. I completely disagree with your one-sided apportionment of blame, which lacks balance and seems to fly in the face of many well respected historians.

You have also failed to mention a key player in what transpired over the first few months from D-Day, and that is Lord Montgomery - or is it that you believe Montgomery was blameless over the lack of intitial progress and the souring of relations between himself, the Americans, and the RAF?

To provide a balance to the choice quotations that you have posted throughout:


Rommel to Keitel (12 June 1944):
"The enemy is strengthening himself visibily on land under cover of very strong aircraft formations...Our own operations are rendered extraordinarily difficult and in part impossible to carry out (owing to) the exceptionally strong and, in some respects overwhelming, superiority of the enemy air force."

Belchem (Monty's Head of Operations) on the British landings on D-Day:
"A more dynamic formation would not have dug in...This should not be taken as a criticism of the troops but rather a comment on the lack of training and battle experience of some of the officers."

Belchem (again) on initial close air support for the British forces:
"The division had made few calls on the air forces for direct support, which of course was a mistake..."

Panzer Lehr Division report on British (June-July 1944)
"The enemy is extraordinarily nervous of close combat. Whenever the enemy infantry is energetically engaged they mostly retreat or surrender."

Tedder (late 1944, in response to army calls for air support, and months after after Monty had used the heavy and medium bombers of both the RAF and USAAF for carpet bombing during CHARNWOOD and GOODWOOD, neither operation leading to the promised breakout):
"The army having been drugged with bombs, it is going to be difficult process to cure the drug addicts".

Reputably the reaction by Eisenhower (according to his official biographer) to the lack of success by Monty after CHARNWOOD/GOODWOOD:
"He (Ike) thundered that it had taken more than seven thousand tons of bombs to gain seven miles and that the Allies could hardly hope to go through France paying a price of a thousand tons per mile."

Zuckermann (architect of the pre-D-Day transportation plan) on 'Bomber' Harris:
"The amazing thing is that Harris, who was even more resistant than the Americans to the idea of AEAF domination, has in fact thrown himself whole-heartedly into the battle, has improved hisbombing performance enormously, and has contributed more to the dislocation of enemy communications...than any of the rest."

Source: Terraine, 'The right of the Line'

I would also be interested to know the American opinion on the CAS they received and how it may or may not have differed from British methods, and why they did not see the need to deploy a dive bomber in Western Europe...

Cheers

Rod

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by RodM

You have also failed to mention a key player in what transpired over the first few months from D-Day, and that is Lord Montgomery - or is it that you believe Montgomery was blameless over the lack of intitial progress and the souring of relations between himself, the Americans, and the RAF?
Rod

Rod.

I have to get on with urgent matters, but will revert to this question.

In answer to your direct question, Montgmery was a "little shit" and should never have had command of 21 Army Group. The best qualified was Slim. Montgomery was influenced by Liddell Hart and his theories that speed was more important than armour. Montgomery and Hart believed in cruiser tanks and fighter bombers and 2TAF. Montgomery criminally kept 6 Guards Tank brigade back from Normandy until Caumont because of a personal spat with WSC and because he saw no value in its Churchill tanks, which he tried to abolish completely.
Montgomery was a major part of the problem. But his dreadful relations with the RAF were mostly due to jealousy on the part of Coningham and Tedder, who claimed that any progress of 21 Army Group was made courtesy of 2 TAF and BC. That claim was fraudulent. The question for debate is what exactly remains after stripping away the fraudulent claims. I believe the quantity is almost certainly negative.

Tony

[RodM]

Hi Tony,

to me the main fault of the air forces in CAS was the direct inability to knock out tanks (with RPs and bombs; both RAF and USAAF), and in this, especially after being forewarned of the problems during trials and in not taking steps to remedy the situation after the deficiencies were scientifically proven, I am in complete agreement with you, but acknowledge that the RP was not totally useless (it did destroy tanks and did hit targets), rather it was a grossly uneconomic way to fight a war. But 2TAFs effort (and air power in general) went beyond just trying to kill tanks. I believe that the interdiction effort was successful in lowering the effectiveness of the German forces that confronted the Allied armies, and prevented the intervention of strong Luftwaffe CAS.

But at the end of the day, CAS and armor aside, I still ask the question as to why the British army struggled head-to-head against an enemy that fought with even less air support and with greater logistical and operational difficulties. Was it a question of leadership? The army was not without blame...

As to the dive bomber question, maybe they would have been a bit more accurate (against tanks, that remains to be seen and a pilot has to locate a target in order to hit it) but the cost may also have been considerably higher (I'd hate to think what a German flak trap would've done to a flight of slow-moving dive bombers)...so it is debateable as to whether it would have actually have been a worthwhile solution. Again, it would be interesting to know why the Americans didn't deploy this type in Europe.

Cheers

Rod

[smudger3]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Rod.

I have to get on with urgent matters, but will revert to this question.

In answer to your direct question, Montgmery was a "little shit" and should never have had command of 21 Army Group. The best qualified was Slim. Montgomery was influenced by Liddell Hart and his theories that speed was more important than armour. Montgomery and Hart believed in cruiser tanks and fighter bombers and 2TAF. Montgomery criminally kept 6 Guards Tank brigade back from Normandy until Caumont because of a personal spat with WSC and because he saw no value in its Churchill tanks, which he tried to abolish completely.
Montgomery was a major part of the problem. But his dreadful relations with the RAF were mostly due to jealousy on the part of Coningham and Tedder, who claimed that any progress of 21 Army Group was made courtesy of 2 TAF and BC. That claim was fraudulent. The question for debate is what exactly remains after stripping away the fraudulent claims. I believe the quantity is almost certainly negative.

Tony

I think you’re a self-opinionated argumentative armchair historian who has nothing better to do than instigate confrontational debates so you can just vent your obvious frustration.

I am all for honest constructive debate, however having read your posts with some amusement I may add all I find is a lot of “what ifs” and disparaging comments on a number of respected officers and men, both Army & Airforce.

You for one will not draw me into any debate or discussion as I feel you have a hidden agenda and are using this forum to that end.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by RodM

But at the end of the day, CAS and armor aside, I still ask the question as to why the British army struggled head-to-head against an enemy that fought with even less air support and with greater logistical and operational difficulties. Was it a question of leadership? The army was not without blame...

Rod.

I agree entirely, and have struggled to answer this question for 60 years - well, seriously for 35 years. It is, IMHO, a major question still unresolved. But I have written a book which hopefully will be published in a couple of years even if I have to do it privately, to address the matter. It describes hour by hour how 3 British Infantry Division fought three battles in four days against 8 Fallschirmjaegerdivision in the area Kervenheim-Winnekendonk between February 27 and March 2, 1945. You will then be able to see on an hourly basis - and can walk the ground if you wish - who was doing what and with which and to whom (including 609 Squadron with Typhoons and 197 Squadron with Bombphoons) in trying to make progress against, as you say, an army fighting on its own soil, almost devoid of transport, short of supplies, without CAS and worried sick by what BC and Russians were doing to their families, and by concerns for the future. The book is based on interviews with some of the main players who were still alive in the late 70s and early 80s when I did the research.

The answer to the question, my friend, was that the Wehrmacht was defending with good defensive equipment. The lack of LW CAS was not important in defending ground as it was for the Allies who had to seize it. The Allies could not attack effectively without a tank immune to the 88-mm and without accurate CAS for taking out mortars, which were the big killers, mg42, artillery and Paks, including the Stug, which would have been easy for a gun-firing CAS because Stugs stuck to roads having useless cross-country capability in a sodden countryside.

I don't blame the army leadership except Montgomery, and perhaps Horrocks who should have been invalided out. Montgomery was an arsehole who didn't know what he was doing. He thoughtlessly scuppered Brooke's campaign to establish an Army Air Corps, which I am sure would have rescued the Vengeances from target towing, and maybe built the IL-2 under license. Montgomery thought his armoured divisions could 'crack about' behind enemy lines, and this turned out to be another fraudulent claim like that of 2TAF. And Montgomery allowed Hobart, his brother-in-law, to take the Churchill VIIs for conversion to Crocodiles. Montgomery also failed to procure a tank immune to the 88-mm, and against the urgings of WSC. This blindness was akin to Portal's disbelief in a long-range fighter, and for the same reason. They feared that if you developed a long-range fighter or an immune tank that could take on the short-range fighter or the Pak, then the Germans would only up the ante and go one better. It was a race you could never win they said. But of course they ignored the German problem of having their fighters and Paks made obsolete. Simply, the Germans could not have replaced them.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by smudger3

I think you’re a self-opinionated argumentative armchair historian who has nothing better to do than instigate confrontational debates so you can just vent your obvious frustration.

I am all for honest constructive debate, however having read your posts with some amusement I may add all I find is a lot of “what ifs” and disparaging comments on a number of respected officers and men, both Army & Airforce.

You for one will not draw me into any debate or discussion as I feel you have a hidden agenda and are using this forum to that end.

Smudger.

My 'hidden agenda' is truth. It comes only, IMHO, from the conflict of ideas. I apologise if the conflict made you and others uncomfortable. But it's over now. I do have something better to do.

You should however know that "little shit" was a quote from Freddy de Guingand who knew Montgomery better than anyone. And you pay no respect to history if you think Coningham, Tedder, Sholto Douglas or Leigh Mallory deserve respect. Sholto Douglas did well to avoid being charged with theft. Dowding and Broadhurst and others, however, have well-earned reputations, and I said so.

Tony

[Kutscha]

So how many mortars did the Stuka take out?

You still have not explained how your super duper Vengeance would survive German flak while the FBs did not.

So what tank was immune to the 88s? How would this heavy tank go cross-country when you say the light STuG could not?

[Juha]

Hello
"My 'hidden agenda' is truth."
Is this a joke?
Very difficult to believe your statement when one thinks the number of false claims there have been in your messages.
And why still complains like this "Montgomery allowed Hobart, his brother-in-law, to take the Churchill VIIs for conversion to Crocodiles" because if you had studied Reichswald battle you should know that Crocodiles were used there to help infantry and it was probably more effective infantry support vehicle than standard Churchill Mk VII. And this is only one of a number of odd claims you have made even in your last few messages.

Juha