Luftwaffe aerial recon prior to D-Day

[cheesey]

Hello Brian.
Yes I do have a copy of the report but I didn't have the Luftwaffe pilots details so thanks for that! North of Guernsey aerodrome sounds about right.
Thanks, Steve.

Edit:Just looked up Bitterlich on the Volksbund graves site and an Oberleutnant Heinrich Bitterlich (b:27/12/1915) is noted for the date 7/3/44! He is the only Bitterlich which corresponds for that date.

[edwest]

Thank you all for the additional information. I have read two accounts from the German side regarding delays after the invasion had begun. Apparently, some German ground units did not receive orders for days after it all started. I recall at least one other account from the German side complaining that "traitors" were not allowing some aircraft to fly.

I find it hard it hard to believe that the Germans were unaware that so many Yanks were now on shore in England.



Regards,
Ed

[Bruce Dennis]

Ed,
Have you seen 'Hitler’s Spies' by David Kahn? There is a very useful section on Luftwaffe recce groups history/structure. Nothing specific about individual flights, but the message is clear that the high-level operations were nearly impossible by that time. Then in other sections of the book, concerning the intelligence reaching Germany from her agents in the UK (all turned and controlled by the British), he make sit plain that the agents were the only method remaining for the Germans to know what was going on in the UK: this reinforces the viewpoint that the Luftwaffe was not supplying any information. The book is impeccably researched, with many interviews from participating German intelligence personnel, and I haven’t found a slip-up yet.

The files I have seen at The National Archives and those quoted in ‘British Intelligence in the Second World War vol3 pt1 & 2’ show that the Allies knew of many overflights which were potentially PRU (mainly Fw190), but the distracting possibility also existed that there were high-altitude flights of which they were unaware. Prof. RV Jones said some years after the war that he almost laughed when he found out that the elaborate deception operations carried out in the south of England were wasted because there was so little German PRU in 1944: he said there was 'effectively none' carried out, so he stops short of saying 'totally none'. (He was not prone to overstating his case, and he met many of his German counterparts after the war to tidy up loose ends, so I believe he was quoting 'direct from the horse’s mouth).

Still nothing specific I am afraid, but a body of evidence that there was little or no German recce over England that threatened to expose the true disposition of troops and armour.

Bruce

[Graham Boak]

It is worth pointing out that the elaborate deceptions (Patton's ghost army) were not only visual but electronic and propaganda based. Their overall success can be seen in the delay before repositioning the German divisions in the north east.

[odybvig]

According to Feindnachrichtensblatt 5/44 AOK Norwegen following are known to the germans

The movement of troops has more or less stopped, since they probably are in their positions before an attack (over the channel)
They are concentrated in south england and middle england.
Several messages are given to prepare for attack
Several messages (orders) of big exercises
Movement of HQ to assembly areas
High radio traffic between english and american units
production of a big moveable harbour

Forces
50 Inf Div
8 Airborne div
14 pz Brig
15 pz Div

Air rec was not flown in the first half of april so accurate position of units are not known (end of april)
Big concentration of landing boats in south england ( Poole - Portsmouth and Harwich - Great Yarmouth) Possible also in english channels (fjords).
American armor landing boats are mounted in english harbours.
Allied air forces show signs of preparing for invasion shortly

Troops:
South england: about 750.000
Middle england: about 650.000

In a report from the Kriegsmarine, the invasion are expected in june - july in france

Best from Norway
Olve

[edwest]

Thank you, gentlemen, for the additional information. The following is from Hitler's Secret Commandos by Helmut Blocksdorf, originally published in German.

"Initially it had been Hitler himself who suspected Normandy as a possible destination for invasion. In May 1944 radio specialists of 15 Army (Generaloberst von Salmuth) and, independently, a Luftwffe signals company stationed in Guernsey, predicted that beyond a doubt the invasion would be at Normandy. Both passed their reports to Rommel's Army group Staff. 15 Army raised the alarm, but 7 Army (General Dollmann) and other coastal units which lay directly in the path of the invasion remained stood down. After the Allied landings began, battleworthy divisions such as 21 Pz. Div. and 12 SS-Pz. Div. Hitler Jugend received no orders for days. ... Many military specialists agree that a single battleworthy German division would have decided the invasion in Germany's favour provided the division could have, or was permitted to, become involved in events immediately as they unfolded. If all this muddle was due solely to operational mismanagement or the failures of the OKH is open to question."


The following is from On Special Missions by Smith, Creek and Petrick.


"The Allied invasion was running full tilt. I assumed that Kommando Goetz was moving west and reported our two jets [Ar 234s] ready for action. I also had a Ju 352 as a transport aircraft. Nothing happened! The traitors in the highest leadership positions did not want the invasion to be interfered with. On 17 July, we finally received permision (not orders) to fly to Juvincourt on the Invasion Front."



Best,
Ed

[Graham Boak]

Hmm...I think even more military specialists would disagree. Quite how any German division could move a significant amount on the day in the teeth of Allied air power is totally unclear - look at the reported delays of those which tried.

[Larry deZeng]

In my 50+ years of intensely studying this subject both in the English and German literature, the first paragraph you provided above is right on the money. I would only add that the troops on the coast were also "Alert Happy". "Wolf" had been cried so many times by the higher commands in the West during the 6 to 8 months preceding D-Day that the lower commands at Armee, Korps and Division level were sick of the constant alerts and had protested repeatedly up the chain of command. So, along comes May 1944 with some good intelligence finally in hand, only to find Oberbefehlshaber West and Luftflotte 3 reluctant to call yet another alert. The "cry wolf" theory worked!

The second paragraph above is hearsay and not consistent with the historical record. It sounds like a quote taken from one of the postwar S.I.R. reports (secret listening devices planted in the rooms housing captured high and higher ranking Luftwaffe officers who had been taken to the U.K. after the war for interrogation - most of the taped conversations were conspiratorial in nature in which alleged July 20th "traitors" were blamed for everything). Anyone who has read some of the transcripts of these conversations will agree with me. Some of the things said are - in hindsight - a real hoot!

Larry

[Bruce Dennis]

Ed: after my earlier post on this subject, I was nagged by a half-remembered passage from British Intelligence. I found it in vol 3, part 1, Chapter 38, page 326 ‘The German Air Offensive against the UK’

“After increasing during February despite the withdrawal of two of Peltz's bomber Gruppen for operations against Anzio - a movement that was disclosed by the Enigma at the end of January - the scale and tempo of the offensive declined from the beginning of March. At the same time, the GAF diverted some of its effort away from London to Bristol and Hull in the belief that they harboured invasion shipping. * And after the night of 18-19 April, when piloted aircraft carried out their last raid of the war against London, it devoted almost all its remaining effort to ineffective attacks against the ports where shipping was collecting for Overlord. On 25-26 April all Peltz's available bombers were thrown into two attacks on Portsmouth. Four further raids on Portsmouth followed before the end of the month. On 29-30 April 100 bombers, twelve of them carrying the FX bomb, attacked a concentration of ships, including the battleship King George V, at Plymouth. In all these attacks bombing was widely scattered and did little damage. In May, despite a change in the GAF's Pathfinding techniques, two large raids - against Bristol on 14-15 May and against Portsmouth on the following night - failed-to reach the target, and smaller raids against other south coast ports did little damage in return for heavy losses. In June - following the Normandy landings - the GAF confined its operations over the United Kingdom to intruder raids against East Anglian airfields. Except that it briefly returned to such attacks in March 1945, an intruder raid on the night of 27-28 June was the last major attack of the war on the United Kingdom by piloted aircraft. The Enigma, which had given warning of the imminence of the offensive and accurate information about the size of the forces the GAF planned to devote to it, provided little intelligence about the offensive once it had begun. It occasionally confirmed that the GAF's radio aids had been rendered ineffective by jamming. Before the FX raid of 29-30 April it disclosed that FX bombs had been brought into Bordeaux and that the GAF had knowledge of the battleships in Plymouth.

* A GAF Enigma signal decrypted on 23 February reported the receipt of information to the effect that Bristol was full of important invasion shipping.”

Refs are quoted if you want to follow up.

Hope this helps,
Bruce

[edwest]

Thank you, Bruce, for your time and effort. This information is very helpful. I have not spent decades, as some here, tracking down everything relevant but I'm continuing to check new sources. One is a book titled German Penetration of SOE, which I do not have yet. I am also looking into what the Germans may have known about the departure of large numbers of troop ships from the American east coast, as well as vessels carrying ammunition and vehicles.



Regards,
Ed