Why the USAAF gave up on the A-36 in favour of the P-47.

[CJE]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

De Havilland only began working on B.18/38 (company designation DH98 Reconnaissance-Bomber) in Oct '38. Kind of hard to reject something before it has been put forward

According to Martin Bowman, the project was rejected by the Air Ministry in October 1938.
I don't think de Havilland had cut the first metal (well... wood) at that time.

[Kutscha]

What was rejected was the design for B.13/36 which was NOT the Mosquito. (via Micheal JF Bowyer)

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

De Havilland only began working on B.18/38 (company designation DH98 Reconnaissance-Bomber) in Oct '38. Kind of hard to reject something before it has been put forward.

Crystal balls, 20/20 hindsight and a fairy godmother who waves her magic wand and poof, 100s of fully tested a/c with fully trained crew suddenly appear is so wonderful.

1. Wikipedia quotes Bowman page 11 as the source for the following; " During the Munich Crisis in September 1938, the de Havilland company presented their brand new design which was manned by two crew and powered by two Merlins without any defensive armament. Speed, de Havilland vowed, would be its defence. .....The wood design would also shave a year off the time it would take to build a metal prototype", and it was rejected.
Are you saying this is untrue?
If so, then when would you say the RAF was presented with a Mosquito design concept.

2. Your reference to crystal balls and hindsight fails to engage with, and certainly does not dismiss, my simple assertion that there were contemporary alternatives to area bombing at night.
The RAF is correctly praised for its 20/20 foresight and acuity in selecting Hurricane/Spitfire/Chain Home, but you say any comment on its blindness and prejudice in rejecting the Mosquito dive-bomber/A-36 and using them against power stations is 20/20 hindsight. Double standard?

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Tony
to test the theory of vulnerability of Germany’s electrical generation to 500lb bombs I suggest that you try to find out what effects the 12 Aug 41 attack on the power stations Knapsack, output 600,000 kilowatts, it had the largest steam generators in Europe, and Quadrath, 200,000 Kw, had. After all of the attacking force of 54 Blenheims 50 bombed, each dropping two 500lb GP bombs during this low level attack. The crews claimed accurate bombing, 2/3 bombed Knapsack and 1/3 Quadrath. One lost before bombing had flown to high-tension cables, so it also had damaged Germany’s electricity grid. So 100 500lb bombs onto two very important powerstations producing power for Ruhr area.

Juha

The only source for an answer would be the Strategic Planning Survey and German damage reports.

Does anyone know if RWE records are available?

The RAF crew reports can be dismissed out of hand in terms of damage, even though they were flying by day (supposedly impossible according to Kutscha?) and photographed the right target.

I am away for a couple of weeks, so cannot comment further on this interesting question, but assume the Strategic Bombing Survey had the facts when drawing their conclusion that the system was highly vulnerable to small bomb tonnages.

Tony

[Juha]

Hello Tony
Quote:” The RAF crew reports can be dismissed out of hand in terms of damage, even though they were flying by day (supposedly impossible according to Kutscha?) and photographed the right target.”

IMHO one has to take crew reports with appropriate criticism but not dismiss them out of hand. After all this was a chimney height attack and there is much pictorial evidence on this attack because it was designed to serve 3 purposes, hit German war economy hard, by hitting where it really hurt Germany to force them to recall fighters from Eastern Front and to be a moral booster, a big daylight attack into rather deep in Germany.

And because 10 out of 53 (one early return) Blenheims and both Blenheim which acted as navigation leaders to 6 Spit sqns which were to meet the returning Blenheims over Dutch/Belgian coast, were lost, the lost rate was so high, even if there was some surprise element, that it was unbearable for longer campaign.

Mosquito development history was rather complicated, beginning as it was from twin Merlin engined bomber development of DH 91 Albatross 4 engined wooden airliner and gradually developing to what in to end became Mossie. And after all, even if Freeman was trice in 1940 told by Beaverbrook to stop DH. 98 project, he didn’t do that because he never got a written order to do that. So if RAF was first cool to the idea it also kept it alive.

IMHO Mossie as a very aerodynamically clean twin doesn’t seem to be easily to be modified as an dive bomber. There was later on one fighter Mossie prototype modified with angular airbrake around fuselage but that run into difficulties because of buffeting problems. Has anyone info on that dive-bomber Mossie.

And IMHO its unrealistic to think that RAF could have ordered A-36 before NA had some concrete design studies on it and definitely it could not have been in service before Mustang Mk I.

Juha

[Kutscha]

Don't take anything Wiki says at face value. It is a good starting point but always double check with other sources.

dH put forward many design proposals for unarmed wooden bombers but as I stated in post #52, the design rejected was for B.13/36 which was NOT the Mossie which was Spec B.18/38.

Yes Juha, that was the Youngman frill dive brake.

[CJE]

Quoting Bowman verbatim (Crowood): "That December another new bomber specification B.18/38 was issued, but it was of no interest to de Havillands, who persevered well into 1939 with the idea of a fast unarmed bomber".
As a matter of fact, the DH.98 was ordered against specification B.1/40, that was tailor-made for the Mosquito.

[Juha]

Hello Kutscha
I looked some info on A-36, even if deployed in NA it missed Tunisia campaign, it flew its first oper. sorties on 6 Jun 43 against Pantelleria.

Also one must to notice, that during the German evacuation from Sicily Germans noted that contrary their expectations evacuation during daytime across the Strait of Messina was more easier, in spite of day bombers, fighter bombers AND two full groups of A-36s, than during the darkness because of difficulties to load and unload in the full darkness and because of night bombing attacks by RAF. That even if they could count for protection only on AA because they lacked any meaningful day-fighter protection.

Again have anybody any definite info on that dive-bomber Mossie? I didn't find anything on it even if I looked on a couple Mossie books.

Juha

[Kutscha]

CJE,

The DH98 was for Spec B.18/38 (Bowyer). Spec B.1/40 was written for the DH98. The DH98 could not be ordered before a Spec had been written for it.

[Kutscha]

Juha,

I have to make a correction thanks to your post. Another 2 months must be added to my 13 months. The 13 months was the time it took to arrive in theater.

I to have not come across any info on Mosquito dive bombers.

Interesting comment re. the evacuation of the Germans from Sicily.

Do you have any combat performance info on the Ju88 (much heavier than the Mossie) dive bomber and the Pe-2 (slightly lighter than the Mossie) dive bomber?