SFTS 1940

[Brian]

Hi guys

How many SFTS were there in 1940? And where were they situated?

Early November 1940, a Flying Instructor from an SFTS shot down a Wellington. I have no other details.

Perhaps someone who has studied the various SFTS may have the answer. I hope so!

Cheers
Brian

[Observer1940]

Brian

I searched for a whole evening, the other night through my photocopies and photographs of two RAF files about incidents, regarding the Flying Training School incident, shooting down a Wellington.

I hope to get to Kew again in the next month, but already have a long list to go at, but also hope (time pemitting) to discover the date and identity of the incident.

Although, if someone has information about the Wellington shot down by an Instructor for you, all the better.

Training Groups
I am aware that there were at least two Groups which mainly covered the Service Flying Training Schools and these are No.23 and No.24 Group, which ought /may give more details about the incident and hopefully give the Unit date/involved, to check the Unit ORB.

No.23 Group
I have only seen the following Training Group ORBs for August 1940, but they are in AIR 25/521 No.23 Group, with the No.23 Appendices which are the Group Routine Orders and Charges in AIR 25/524.

August 1940 No.23 Group ORBs covered SFTS.

No.24 Group
AIR 25/537 No.24 Group ORB (WW2). The August 1940 No.24 Group ORB also had references to SFTS.

Also check Cat. Ref. and the Appendices for No.24 Group.

No.17 Group
Was a Coastal Command Training Group.

No.20 Group
Was, I am led to believe, the Coastal Command Training Group (Not Seen).

No.21 Group
Was also a Training Group (Not Seen).

Regarding the Enquiry
You may know this already, but bear in mind that if the AOC of the Group whose Unit held the Wellington on Charge was more Senior in Rank, than the Training Group AOC involved, then the Inquiry would usually be held by the other Group or Unit whose Unit held the Wellington on charge (Rules definitely applied to Bomber Command by the latter part of 1940 as I have seen it minuted).

No.10 OTU
I emailed 6th June 2010 titled "Friendly Fire 2" details from a Bomber Command letter dated 13th August about the shooting down of Whitley N1411 on 5th August 1940, to you. Do you still require the Flying Accident Card and Bomber Command's response to the Court of Inquiry, as Bomber Command challenged some of the Inquiry findings?

Billy Fiske
Regarding Fiske being down in the balloons 15th August, it appears he and fellow Pilots were chasing a German aircraft amongst the balloons around teatime, during a raid, as six RAF balloons got shot down during the raid.

Regards Mark

[Observer1940]

Two No. 4 Group Whitleys 14/15th August 1940

The friendly aircraft which attacked one of the two Whitleys (P5044 or P4982) before they both became victims to balloon cables, remains a mystery!

Although, I have now heard from four separate sources (Blackburn, Scotland, New Zealand and occupants of the adjacent house to the crash) that Whitley P5044 was actually shot down. The initial official Casualty Form for P5044 was changed from "FA" to "FB" ["Flying Accident" to "Flying Battle Casualty" - definition A.P. 1301 War Manual - 1939].

There was also (as you stated) firing in the Solent area during the night 14/15th August 1940.

Regarding Whitley P4982, I have discovered that P4982 was illuminated by searchlights, the Balloon Command Signal in the file reporting the crashes states "Searchlight played on it before crash".

Whitley P4982 definitely crashed at Larborne Farm, West Drayton per No. 11 Group Signal to HQFC Intelligence. I also noted in the The Battle of Britain Then and Now that an RAF Fighter was coincidentally also given as Larborne Farm on the 15th August 1940?

Searchlight homing, should have directed friendly aircraft away from Balloons and A. A.

Mark

[Alan Clark]

I think this extract from the No.11 SFTS ORB should answer your question. It was in under the 12th December 1940 but clearly refers to the incident being November.

11.12 Court of Inquiry into the Circumstances in which, on November 3rd 1940 an attack was made on Wellington
aircraft I.C. L.7817 of No.300 Sqdn by Hurricane Aircraft of No.11 SFTS piloted by S/Leader P.H. Maxwell, C.F.I.
and make recommendations as to the action to be taken. The Court was convened by order of A.O.C. No.21 Group
and was composed of W/Cdr E.W. Simpson, No.21 Group (President), S/Ldr F.V. Gauntlett, RAF Stn Cranage and
F/Lt P.G. Lamb of No.10 SFTS (Members). The following is a summary of the proceedings which are referred to in
11SFTS files as 941/59/P1. S/Ldr Maxwell states: “I am C.F.I. at No.11 SFTS. I was also in charge until the 20th
November of the Station Fighter Defence Flight…… On Sunday 3.11.40 about 1200 hrs I received a phone message
from the Observer Corps at Shrewsbury that a Wellington had entered our area from Wrexham area. Prior to the date
mentioned I had received reports of suspicious Wellington over Shawbury aerodrome, on one particular occasion the
25.10.40 Wellington F-QV had been challenged by a pilot of No.27 M.U. and had taken no notice. The 27 MU pilot
challenged it by firing across its bows. The fact was reported to W/Cdr Green our Security Officer and S. Eng. O. who
made efforts to ascertain particulars of this a/c – the reply from Bomber Command after an interval (29.10.40) was
negative. In consequence I consulted the Sec. Offr and it was decided that in the event of repetitions regarding
Wellingtons or Whitleys we should challenge them. Accordingly when I received the message on 3.11.40 I considered
it was advisable to take off in a Hurricane to intercept. I made no interception and returned. I contacted the Obs. Corps
who said it had turned east and circuited Ternhill and was proceeding towards Crewe and then coming once more in
our direction. It was at this moment I observed a Wellington approaching from the N.W. I subsequently intercepted
this Wellington at Sutton Coldfield at about 1220. It was then making gentle turns from left to right and appeared in
no great hurry – suddenly it took up a straight course and appeared to put on speed. This induced me to believe that
the pilot had noticed me which was directly from behind and 1500 ft above him. I was then flying at about 5,000ft. It
was some time before I caught up with him. My position was then approx 8 miles N.E. of Birmingham aerodrome at
Elmdon. I estimated his speed 240 mph (indicated). When I had caught up I lost height and flew level within 100 yds
[of] him. I now noticed there were no Squadron Markings. I then flew in front and above and dived past several times
expecting him either to slow down and drop his wheels or to fire the colour of the day. He took neither of these
precautions but just continued on course and speed. I then fired a burst across his nose. Having used one in five tracer
he could not possibly have failed to notice. I repeated the burst. He ignored it. I now decided to bring him down if
possible. I opened fire from the beam to starboard and then to port. He still continued. I then attacked from the rear
turning and attacking from ahead to beam. By this time my ammunition was expended and we entered thick weather
over Leicester, our height was then about 1500 ft. I lost him and returned to Shawbury and reported to my C.O. and
the Air Ministry. In afternoon I contacted Obs Corps who said the Wellington was last plotted over Lincolnshire.”
Questioned; “What other means of challenging the pilot are there other than firing across his nose?” Answer: “None, It
was up to him to comply with No.SD 158(i)para 6. Onus was on him to prove friendly character.” Question by P/O
Lewis (pilot of Wellington): “Did you notice my u/c was partially down after your first attack?” S/Ldr Maxwell:
“No!” He put no further questions to S/L Maxwell.
P/O W.E.J. Lewis No.9 S.F.P. Pool, Hawarden stated: “I am a ferry pilot attached to the HQs S.F.P. Pools RAF Stn
Kemble attached to Hawarden. On Nov 3rd 1940 I was detailed by F/Lt Bentley, M.C., A.F.C., commanding No.9
S.F.P.P. to collect from 48 M.U. at Hawarden Wellington No.L7817 and deliver to No.300 (Polish) Sqdn Swinderby,
Lincs. I took off at 1200 hrs and proceeded on an easterly course intending to cross the Pennines, but in the region of
Hulme-Walfield I encountered mist and further toward the hills I found cloud covering the hilltops. I then decided to
alter course and follow the railway via Leek to Uttoxeter and therefore go round via the lower ground. I was
temporarily lost circling around finally ‘pin pointing’ myself in the region of the hills to the West of Hanbury – I then
followed the river Trent eastwards. My height was approx 4,000 ft and I gradually lost height in order the [to] more
clearly to follow the river as the visibility was very poor with a ground fog – in the area of Donington Hall I was at
approx 1,000 ft and turned toward Newark-on-Trent. At this point I saw a Hurricane cross above me to the left and
appeared to sideslip across to the right and turn to the left behind me. I waved my map at him in the cabin as I have
often had aircraft formatting upon me when ferrying twin engined aircraft. I thought that he was just having a look at
me and would go away as often happens because he disappeared behind me and I dismissed the incident from my
mind and continued Map reading. Approx 30 seconds later I heard an unusual sound, and looking up I saw tracer
bullets passing over and to the left of the cabin which were being fired from my port quarter – I immediately put both
airscrews into fine pitch and lowered my u/c at the same time reducing height – a further attack was made from the
starboard quarter and a third from dead astern – By this time I was at 300 feet in the West Bridgeford area and in mil
forward visibility I turned 90o to the right and eventually found Nottingham aerodrome intending to make a landing. I
noticed my u/c indicator green lights were not on and observed that my u/c was only half down. I therefore tried the
emergency u/c operating lever and found that the wheels were coming down and the light go green. My flaps were not
working. I eventually landed at Swinderby at 1300 hrs and handed the Wellington over to the consignee. In landing
without flaps the tail wheel apparently snapped off and the rear turret was further damaged by dragging along
aerodrome surface. Questions by Court: “Are you familiar with instructions of Recognition of Aircraft as laid down in
SD 158(i)?” Answer; “I have not sent the publication mentioned but I am familiar with the ordinary means of
Recognition and identification – namely the immediate lowering of the u/s to establish friendly identity, flashing a
series of dots with an Aldis Lamp on the leading fighter – the firing of the colours of the day and signalling the reply
letter for the period on the upward or downward morse key.” Had you an Aldis Lamp in the aircraft? Answer: I had no
Aldis Lamp at hand for use. – Had you any means of firing the colours of the day? I knew the colours of the day but
the Verey pistol is fixed in the roof of the Wireless Operator’s cabin behind the pilot’s seat and I could not get at it. –
Could you signal the reply letter for the period? Yes, but I cannot remember it now – I got them from the Duty Pilot
before leaving Hawarden. – Why didn’t you land when first attacked? I could not land at the moment because I was
over a populated area, but I intended to land at Nottingham Aerodrome had I not noticed the attacker had gone. – Can
you fire a Verey Pistol from the Pilot’s seat? Yes, I could fire it from the sliding window at my left shoulder. –
Question by S/L Maxwell: Had you the cartridge of the day with you? As I did not have the Verey Pistol removed
from the Wireless Cabin I did not take cartridges with me. – Were you aware that I had flown with 100 yards both
parallel, above and below as well as diving across your nose from port to starboard and reverse before challenging you
with two subsequent challenges of tracer across? No, because I had no observer with me and the only time I saw you
was above and in front of me to the left – you sideslipped across in front of me to the right and sideslipped to the left
and behind me – I would like to point out that I was Map reading otherwise I have no doubt I would have seen you as
you state.”
FINDINGS: Having considered the evidence the Court make the following Findings:-
(I) We consider that S/L Maxwell was justified in taking the air in a Hurricane for the purpose of identifying the
aircraft.
(II) We are of the opinion that S/L Maxwell took every possible means of challenging the Wellington but we consider
that he should have made some further efforts to ascertain if the pilot was friendly either by following the a/c to find
out whether it was going to land in this country or waiting until it approached the coast before opening fire. S/L
Maxwell might have concluded that the a/c was being ferried either to an M.U. or a Sqdn as it had not Sqdn markings.
(III) We also think that P/O Lewis should have had a Verey Pistol with cartridges immediately available to enable him
to give the recognised colours of the day and that he was negligent in failing to provide himself with this equipment.
(IV) We are satisfied that P/O Lewis made an effort to give the recognised method of showing his friendly character
by dropping his u/c but that owing to partial failure of the mechanism the u/c was not fully lowered and consequently
not visible to the S/L.
RECOMMENDATION OF COURT:- (I) When aircraft are being tested by the manufacturers or M.U. or being ferried
from these to Sqdns they should have some distinguishing mark for identification purposes.
(II) That all Ferry Pilots are fully acquainted with the procedure laid down for recognition of identification of friendly
aircraft in SD 158(i) and supplied with the necessary means of complying with these regulations.
(III) That security flights at non-operational RAF Stns in area covered by Fighter Sqdns are no longer necessary.
(IV) It is observed that there is no recognised method for a Pilot to indicate to the pilot of another aircraft that the
letter is being challenged before opening fire, and it is recommended that some method should be adopted.”

[Peter Cornwell]

Originally Posted by Observer1940

Whitley P4982 definitely crashed at Larborne Farm, West Drayton per No. 11 Group Signal to HQFC Intelligence. I also noted in the The Battle of Britain Then and Now that an RAF Fighter was coincidentally also given as Larborne Farm on the 15th August 1940?

Can you please help me identify the RAF fighter referred to here ? I am having trouble finding it in my copy of BoBT&N. Thanks.

[Brian]

Mark & Alan

Many thanks indeed for your contributions.

Another additional entry to be included in Volume 2 of Blue on Blue.


Regarding Whitley N1411 shot down 5 August 1940, I have just received this:

From the Appendices to the Abingdon 10 OTU ORB Appendices for August 1940, AIR 29/640:

"On the 5th [August] a very serious mistake was made by a fighter Pilot (under training), from Silloth, who attacked, in a Hurricane, a Whitley V, piloted by Flying Officer Oettle, forcing it to land at Squires Gate Aerodrome, with a punctured petrol tank, and a damaged engine, luckily without injuring any member of the Crew, in spite of the fact that about 400 rounds entered the Whitley in question, which was seriously damaged. A court of enquiry was eventually held, suitable action being taken on their findings, which should preclude any possible repetition of such mistakes."

Now need to know identity of errant Hurricane pilot. From 1 OTU?

Cheers
Brian

[Brian]

Hi guys

Reading the CoI regarding the Wellington/Hurricane conflab, I noticed the reference to an earlier incident, thus:

"25.10.40 Wellington F-QV had been challenged by a pilot of No.27 M.U. and had taken no notice. The 27 MU pilot challenged it by firing across its bows. The fact was reported to W/Cdr Green our Security Officer and S. Eng. O. who made efforts to ascertain particulars of this a/c – the reply from Bomber Command after an interval (29.10.40) was negative."

Are we able to identify the aircraft/pilots involved?

Cheers
Brian

[Observer1940]

"Remarks by Group Commander"
[remarks in the numbered paragraphs, signed by Air Commodore T. E. B. Howe, Commanding No.17 Group, Royal Air Force]

Court of Inquiry President - Wing Commander G.H. Harrison, O.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.F. Station, Squires Gate.
Court of Inquiry Members - Squadron Leader B.S. Tomlin, D.F.C. No.10 O.T.U. Abingdon
Flight Lieutenant B.B. Jupp, R.A.F. Station, Abbotsinch.

1. I agree with para. 1 (a) and (b) of the Findings and consider that Sergeant PARROTT was also to blame in that he did not challenge Whitley N.1411 with the letter of day."

[Sgt J. C. W. Parrott 359233 on Page 2 of Evidence. Hurricane was R.4118 of No. 1 (C) O.T.U. Silloth on 5th August 1940 - Form 2 page 1].

"2. Reference para. 2 of the findings; I do not consider Flying Officer A. J. Gattle was to blame for not giving the recognition signal again in view of the fact that he had already given it once and the HURRICANE pilot did not challenge him with the letter of the day."

[Gattle should be Oettle.]

"3. I do not agree with the assumption made by Flying Officer GATTLE in his evidence that the HURRICANES were performng practice attacks in view of the terms of K.R.& A.C.I., para. 718 (1), which precludes any practice attacks between aircraft without prearrangement."

[Gattle should be Oettle.]

"4. I agree with para. 3 of the Findings that Flight Lieutenant CLEUGH-FAIR was indirectly to blame for not giving Sgt PARROTT more explicit orders."

[Cleugh-Fair initials were given as both A. D. and also A. D. C. Cleugh-Fair F/Lt. amongst the many pages of evidence].

"7. The use of fighters by Royal Air Force Station, SILLOTH, for local defence has since been stopped by Headquarters COASTAL COMMAND letter S.9400/9/Org., dated the 15th August, 1940."

Flight Information
Flying Officer A. J. Oettle stated he was an Instructor at No.10 O.T.U., Abingdon and was Captain of Whitley N.1411 and had been detailed "to go on a practice navigational flight along the route Abingdon - Worcester - Holyhead - Jurby - West Freugh - Silloth - Great Orme's Head - Shrewsbury - Abingdon, the excercise to include photographic bombing of Whitehaven, and also practice bombing on sea markers. I was carrying a crew of four, P/O. Stevens (trainee pilot), Sgt. Hoosan (W/T. Operator). Sgt. Hather (trainee navigator) and Sgt. Green (trainee W/T. Operator)."

"At about 1400 hours, between Silloth and Whitehaven, we were challenged by several Blenheim and Hurricane aircraft."

"We replied with the correct letter of the day, and then with the right two-star recognition cartridge."
...

"At 1425 hours we set course from St. Bees Head to Gt. Ormes Head, whereupon the fighter aircraft left me. At approximately 14.35 hours, at 6,000 ft. I noticed a Hurricane aircraft crossing our bows from starboard to port. After passing in front, he climbed to 1,000 ft. above and behind us, on the starboard side. I saw him no more."

"Sgd. A.J. Oettle, F/O."

"Page 9"

"About a minute or two afterwards, I felt a severe vibration through the aircraft, and heard a loud hammering noise, and also saw a number of holes appearing in both main planes. As it was apparent we had been shot up, I sent the Wireless Operator back to ascertain the damage. He reported punctured tanks, and other damage, and so I turned towards land, and made a landing at Squire's Gate, at about 1450 hours."

"Signature of Witness A.J. Oettle, F/O."

Parrott said he was instructed in the Watch Hut by F/Lt. Cleugh-Fair to take Hurricane R.4118 and intercept a Whitley aircraft reported over Maryport, and establish its identity and if he could not establish the identity of the Whitley, Parrott was to try and force it down.

This was in breach of Air Ministry Signal (exhibit at the Inquiry) issued to Coastal Command dated 25th July 1940, that despite the Air Ministry having evidence that the enemy were using British type aircraft, it was better for an occasional British type aircaft being flown by the enemy to escape destruction, to avoid shooting down one of our own.

Above information from AIR 14/390

Brian, I am going to go through my photos and photocopies to make a list of incidents with dates, as there are some more 1940 friendly fire incidents for you to include in your 1940 additional section, in a subsequent volume.

Regards Mark

[Observer1940]

Originally Posted by Peter Cornwell

Can you please help me identify the RAF fighter referred to here ? I am having trouble finding it in my copy of BoBT&N. Thanks.

Peter
see page 360 BoBT&N

257 Squadron, Northolt
Hurricane L1703.
Collided with balloon cable and crashed at Larbourne Farm, West Drayton.
The Hurricane was on fire so Pilot Officer C. G. Frizell baled out.
[The balloon collision incident, followed by a crash at Larborne Farm relates to a returning operational bomber aircraft Whitley P4982, just after 0400 hrs 15.8.1940]

Because Whitley P4982 had crashed at "Larborne Farm, West Drayton", I went to the RAF Museum to see the Flying Accident Card for P/O C. G. Frizell for myself.

The reverse of the A.M.1180 gives P/O Frizell. The front of the card matched to P/O Frizell on the film gives the aircraft as a Hurricane and what appears to read K1903 at 1315, patrolling a convoy. Regarding the aircraft serial a second letter appears to have been placed in front of K1903. The place is given "N of Hendon [looks like Hendon, but could also be possibly be Heston?] aerodrome and? Watford Way.

This leaves me wondering if two Hurricanes were involved in incidents in that area 15th August 1940?

The 257 Squadron ORB (AIR 27/1526) for 15th August 1940 says:-
At 0630 hours the Squadron left Northolt for North Weald where it carried out a number of operational patrols and convoy patrols.
"At 1200 hours when returning from convoy P.O. Frizell's aircraft caught fire. He baled out from a height of 2,000 feet and his aircraft crashed in a street of a garden city between Hendon and Northolt."

Regarding Whitley P4982 the aircraft log page of the flight was recovered and there is no reference to any firing on the op, nor any firing by other Whitleys in the 51 Squadron ORB.

The 51 Squadron ORB has no reference to any firing during the Op. However the 51 Squadron daily return for 15.8.1940 has the 1 wrecked [Whitley] aircraft and the numbers of the Officer and Airmen crew lost quantities and also states that 600 rounds were fired by "Active operations (i) in air".

Also the Balloon Unit ORB indicates that an identity disc of a Sgt Surridge, no number was removed by Police first and taken away, but despite making various inquiries the loss of Sgt Surridge does not seem to exist on 15.8.1940. Although they had crash times for Whitley P4982 and must have known the crash time, they only entered "am" for the time on the Accident Card (which they also gave "am" for P5044).

Mark

[Peter Cornwell]

Mark,

Thanks for the clarification. I believe that you must be consulting a Mark I edition of BoBT&N as the location of the crash of L1703 was amended to 'Watford Way, Edgware' on publication of the Mark II and all subsequent editions.