Opinions please (impact Allied fighter bombers on D-day)

[George Hopp]

Afetr all, what was it that killed the german tank ace Michael Wittman, a superlative killer of Allied tanks ?...........yeah, youv'e got it.......a Hawker Typhoon.

In "Panzers in Normandy then and now" and in a lengthy "After the Battle" article it was stated pretty categorically that Wittmann was popped by some Sherman Fireflies (Shermans regunned with the 17pdr. anti-tank gun).

[Juha]

Hello
Malladyne, have you any firsthand knowledge on explosives? Nearest equivalent to 6” naval shell on which I have experience is SC50, 110lb HE bomb, and nearest equivalent to 60lb rocket warhead is 22lb AT mine, 21lb TNT and 1lb glass fibre casing. The effects of explosion of those to nearby trees were different, believe me.
That rocket firing a/c is more economical, that’s entire true, but I think that Marines, Royal or not, still value high naval gunfire support.

On Wittmann, if IIRC there was only one Firefly which knocked out Wittmann’s and the other 2 Tigers. There were also a couple ordinary Shermans which also fired on those Tigers to distract them. The Firefly was in a position from where it could get flank shots to those Tigers.

Juha

[Tony Williams]

Originally Posted by malladyne

It is fatuous to dismiss the claim that the Typhoon's rockets were significantly less effective than the broadside of a cruiser ( a comparison frequently made ).

In terms of HE delivered, they were quite close. The 60 lb warhead of a 3 inch RP contained 14 lb of HE, which was more-or-less the same as a 6 inch HE shell. So a full load of eight RPs delivered much the same quantity of HE as one broadside from a typical 1930s RN 8-gun cruiser (of course, many RN 6 inch gun cruisers had 12 guns, and USN ones up to 15...).

However, it isn't as simple as that, of course. The much heavier naval shells would have produced a much greater quantity of high-velocity steel fragments when they detonated - but the downside is that they often didn't detonate until they had buried themselves in the ground, as naval shells were generally fuzed to detonate after they had penetrated a ship.

More generally, naval gunfire support is instantly available regardless of day, night or bad weather, and can keep up a relentless pounding - but only within gun range, and they rely on others to spot their targets for them. Each (planes and gunfire) has its place and can deliver effects which the other can't.

...rocket equipped aircraft be it Typhoon or Thunderbolt, Lightning or Mustang could roam at will over a battlefield and it is that very mobility that makes rocket equipped planes the superlative tank killers/pillbox smashers/bridge busters that they were.

RPs weren't superlative tank killers because they were too inaccurate. The average miss distance in 1944 was about 60 yards, with the hit probability of a single RP against a tank being around 5% in ideal training conditions and more like 0.5% (official British estimate) in combat. That meant they had to fire 200 RPs for every tank kill.

Also, somewhere else in this thread a claim is made that the Allied fighters were insufficiently gunned for the Normandy campaign !!!! Is not a snootfull of m.g.'s and cannon in the nose of a lightning not enough guns for you ? let alone the 4 20.MM quick firing cannon of the Tempest and Typhoon and Spitfire variants !!!

They were more than adequate against soft-skinned or lightly-armoured targets, as has been said, but were incapable of damaging tanks, except occasionally by chance. Large-calibre high-velocity cannon were needed for that, and neither the RAF nor the USAAF had planes in Europe equipped with these.

To sum up, the fighter-bombers were very effective in disrupting German operations due their ability to knock out the supply trains (on rail and road) on which the Panzer Divisions depended, and they also scared the daylights out of tank crews (especially inexperienced ones) but they didn't kill many tanks.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

[Josh Osborne]

There are a number of operational research reports available which attempt to avaluate the actual effects of jabo attacks. One report in particular evaluates the damage inflicted in the battles around Mortain and Falaise. Another similar study was performed after the battle of the Ardennes. All reports showed similar results, namely:
1) Strafing, rocket, and bomb attacks were very effective against unarmored and lightly armored transport.
2) Bomb and rocket attacks were notably ineffective against heavy AFVs. (Note: Tony Williams website has excellent information regarding 40's era anti-tank aircraft weapons)

The vulnerability of motor and horse-drawn transport had several consequences:
1) Movement was restricted during the day
2) Time and effort had to be expended hiding and camoflaging vehicles
3) Traffic that had to move during daylight would see losses, especially ammunition and fuel transport that were particularly vulnerable
4) Destroyed vehicles caused traffic pile-ups, which made the remaining vehicles that much more vulnerable to air and artillery attack

In addition to the effectiveness against soft-skinned transport, jabos were also effective against command and control centers and bridges.

My references for the above information: "To Win the Winter Sky" by Danny S Parker, Ian Gooderson's 'Air Power at the Battlefront'.

To say that jabos were ineffective to the overall war effort because they cannot destroy tanks is a ridiculous statement. Was the M-1 rifle a useless weapon because it could not destroy tanks? If you can damage or delay the train that carries the tank, then the tank gets to the battle too late. If there is no gas or ammo for the tank, it is a useless pile of metal.

[Juha]

Hello Tony.
I’m not too sure on that the 6” shells usually buried themselves deep before exploding. The main purpose of British naval 6” HE shell was that of shore bombardment, CPBC was the shell normally used in naval engagements. It would surprise me if the RN was incapable to design fuse-shell combination for shore bombardment which allowed the shell burst before it buried itself too deep because all armies I’m aware of succeeded doing that.

Regards
Juha

[Tony Williams]

Originally Posted by Juha

I’m not too sure on that the 6” shells usually buried themselves deep before exploding. The main purpose of British naval 6” HE shell was that of shore bombardment, CPBC was the shell normally used in naval engagements. It would surprise me if the RN was incapable to design fuse-shell combination for shore bombardment which allowed the shell burst before it buried itself too deep because all armies I’m aware of succeeded doing that.

You may well be right, Juha, but even with a superquick fuze the much higher terminal velocity of a shell seems likely to ensure that it would be at least partially buried by the time the fragments started to fly.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by Josh Osborne

To say that jabos were ineffective to the overall war effort because they cannot destroy tanks is a ridiculous statement. Was the M-1 rifle a useless weapon because it could not destroy tanks? If you can damage or delay the train that carries the tank, then the tank gets to the battle too late. If there is no gas or ammo for the tank, it is a useless pile of metal.

Discuss with the man.
http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/norm.../airpower.html

[Josh Osborne]

Originally Posted by Franek Grabowski

Discuss with the man.
http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/norm.../airpower.html

Franek, I have seen this little article floating around is message boards. It uses a lot of selective sourcing and questionable logic. It more of a high school level history paper than a serious source, why do you think it is relevant to this discussion? Can you point to a real published work with original research that makes the point that air power in general and jabos in particular were useless in WWII? Give me break.

[drgondog]

Franek - I have to agree with Josh on this presentation.

I like that he presented facts and tables but think that he was very selective and questioned too many assumptions regarding validity of either high ranking officers who stated that airpaower was devastating or failed to get a body of field/company grade officers to support his own conclusions?

Nor was his research and facts exhaustive enough to look to inventory available of fuel, food ammo to move to Normandy versus what actually reached the forward lines.

This IS a topic that needs more serious work but doubt that the status of German records would yield real metrics.. even the armor and vehicle figures in your referenced report are unclear as to 'beginning inventory-at front and say, as far away as Paris before the invasion, how many were shipped, and how many were damaged and destroyed - that one could believe and research oneself?

Having said that I would begin there and dig into his references (at least he has some) to see if there is a complete picture available just for the beginning inventory available at Normandy and all the regional combat units available for movement... and be very suprised if they existed... and only then could one truly make 'estimates' as to cause of loss for each category for all circumstances.

I've got combat film from my father of six trains that completely blew up during the Normandy Campaign (I doubt that he hit anything with bombs other than frags) from strafing and wonder how that factors in a conclusion of the effect of fighters on the supply chain to the front?

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by Josh Osborne

Franek, I have seen this little article floating around is message boards. It uses a lot of selective sourcing and questionable logic. It more of a high school level history paper than a serious source, why do you think it is relevant to this discussion? Can you point to a real published work with original research that makes the point that air power in general and jabos in particular were useless in WWII? Give me break.

You're correct that the Web site article is not very original, and also selective. That essay was obviously inspired by the work of other authors, such as Ian Gooderson in his Air Power at the Battlefront. Although not the first to do so, Gooderson closely examined a number of operational research (OR) reports filed by the British Army and the RAF with regard to air power vs. ground targets. He revealed many consistencies and tendencies, but also urged caution against making too many assumptions based on random samples.

Some years ago I read Montgomery's Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe, edited by Terry Copp. As I recall, it contained excerpts and summaries of some of those reports.