Placing the Fairey Battle.

[Franek Grabowski]

This proves entirely nothing. They simply could consider radial engine simplier to maintenance. I never did mean P-47 was useless at all, I did mean it did not fit needs of long range escort duties as found on ETO. From this standpoint, Mustang is clearly superior at all views.

[Franek Grabowski]

This proves entirely nothing. They simply could consider radial engine simplier to maintenance. I never did mean P-47 was useless at all, I did mean it did not fit needs of long range escort duties as found on ETO. From this standpoint, Mustang is clearly superior at all views.
PS Gents, leave me some time to do reading. There was indeed some conflict in regard of army aviation.

[Jukka Juutinen]

Now you are saying the "overcomplicated" P-47 is easier to maintain than the P-51?

[Kutscha]

By the time the P-51s were flying escort to Berlin, in numbers, so was the P-47.

The P-47N gave excellent service escorting B-29s to Japan from the same bases P-51s were flying from.

[Jukka Juutinen]

Originally Posted by Franek Grabowski

Soviets claimed they have lost some 600,000 men in Poland in 1944/45 alone. US lost some 180,000 servicemen during the whole war, and you cannot say they were not fighting.

But do read what most German veteran memoirs say about the respective combat prowess of US and Soviet soldiers. E.g. Otto Carius makes some very interesting remarks. Overall, it can be said that Yanks (all possible insults intented) let the others do the bloodiest work. To put these "huge" losses of 180,000 KIA in perspective: it is only slightly over 2 times the KIA suffered by Finland and less than a third of the losses of the ACW. The US was the only major combatant whose existence was not in slightest jeopardy even after the direst military defeat (if FDR´s One World dreams are not counted as such).

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

The message I got from Hastings was that Bomber Command was relatively well-funded (with much of that had gone on high-quality ground facilities) but ill-prepared and largely ill-equipped. It's aircraft weren't exactly an all-star line-up although I'd guess the Wellington and Hampden more or less on a par with contemporaries such as the Do 17 and He 111 (he said without checking the figures). But as Hasting points out, no realistic practice for their planned strategic role and no "plan B" (no serious practice in night flying and navigation, no radio navaids, target markers, thought given to blind bombing etc.).

But Hastings is one who would say the Battle was obsolescent. So we have gone full circle, and are back at the beginning. The Battle was a newer design than the Bf109 for example.
BC was not 'ill-prepared' except in the sense that its tactics and philosophy of war were wrong. BC believed in a strategic air force when what was needed was all-arms.
BC was not 'largely ill-equipped' unless you think the Battle was obsolescent.
BC was ill-equipped only in the sense that it lacked the weapons to do what it wanted, which was to knock Germany out of the war through bombing. And that was pure and unadulterated crap.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

The Army did not lack CAS in Normandy: it was not a lack of CAS that prevented it taking Caen. In the first days excessive timidity perhaps paid a key part, in the reliance on experienced but over-used veterans who were inclined to take cover rather than risks after fighting through Africa and Italy.

Graham.

You are completely and slanderously wrong.
3rd British Infantry Division had not fought since Dunkirk, so how could it have been over-used and experienced after fighting through Africa and Italy?
Ditto the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division.
These were the two tasked with taking Caen on D-Day.
And there was no significant CAS on D-Day or for days afterwards.

You are probably thinking of the 7 Armoured Division, the Desert Rats, who were worn out and should never have been sent. But they had nothing to do with Caen.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Franek Grabowski

Jukka
Tony
OK, I thought you meant blood loss in combat, which actually was not that high, bulk of the losses being to extermination of population on occupied territories by both regimes. That said, I have to note that the real problem was not with armed forces but a political will. This must be seen with political corruption and treason on the highest levels of both American and British societies. Philby or Harriman were just needles in the haystock, and the real and current problem is that others were not pursued with all strength available.
Concerning books, it is a serious problem, but it must be had in mind that only in recent years Soviet archives were opened to some degree allowing for independent research. Results are astonishing and definetelly change the view of the war. That said, my comments on Il-2 are based on research in primary and period Soviet documents. Most significant find is definetelly that the aircraft was frequently used for ordinary level bombing and not ground attack missions! Simply, there were no other aircraft available in quantities. I have been interested on this particular aircraft and even have had written an article-summary of recent knowledge on the type.
I would not view British policy towards army aviation through this particular scope, and while talking about butcher, I would take some comparison of numbers. Soviets claimed they have lost some 600,000 men in Poland in 1944/45 alone. US lost some 180,000 servicemen during the whole war, and you cannot say they were not fighting.

Franek.

Is there any way of getting to see your article-summary in English?
If you ever publish anything on the IL-2 in English then please put me down for a copy.

The RAF lost 47,000 aircrew, some say 55,000. Compare that with the 30,000 killed in the U-Bootwaffe.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

But Hastings is one who would say the Battle was obsolescent. So we have gone full circle, and are back at the beginning. The Battle was a newer design than the Bf109 for example.
BC was not 'ill-prepared' except in the sense that its tactics and philosophy of war were wrong. BC believed in a strategic air force when what was needed was all-arms.
BC was not 'largely ill-equipped' unless you think the Battle was obsolescent.
BC was ill-equipped only in the sense that it lacked the weapons to do what it wanted, which was to knock Germany out of the war through bombing.

It is immaterial that the Battle's design was newer than the Bf 109, it was obsolete because by May 1940 it didn't have a prayer anywhere in daylight where there were Bf 109s above it or Flak concentrations below it. It was neither suitable for the environment it had to fight in nor did it have the development potential to make/keep it viable.

I say that Bomber Command was ill-prepared to conduct the war it had dreamed of fighting since, according to Hastings, it appears not to have tested the concept in any meaningful way and then taken steps to adapt to the lessons learned. It seems rather to have placed its faith in prophesies (Douhet, Mitchell, maybe even H.G. Wells for all I know). Being properly prepared to conduct strategic bombing still doesn't mean it'll work of course.

[Graham Boak]

Thanks for your correction: I was indeed thinking of unit(s) within the 7th Armoured. However, this does not change the fact that the landing plans called for the capture of Caen on the first evening, and that the capture of Caen and the surrounding plains was of great importance for the operation of 2TAF in support of the Army. Hence the diferences that arose within the Allied Commands.

Does your claim that no CAS was provided on June 6th have any actual backing in fact? Of all the sorties flown, not a single one was CAS? Or is it linked to your attitude that whatever was provided was wrong, inadequate, and therefore dismissable? Of course, not all aerial support given to the Armies was CAS, or are you suggesting that if it isn't in sight of a soldier, it is not happening, and of no value if it is?

Re Right of the Line: this is a book that gives full backing to the strategic bombing offensive that you castigate, and completely fails to cover operations outside the UK, with the all-important emphasis of tactical operations and the cooperation between ground and air developed under Tedder, Coningham and Montgomery. I don't believe that the author has grasped wider issues of air power, particularly in this key matter.

Re the long range fighter: I stated that the matter of a long range fighter was continually raised in the highest quarters, not that Portal was personally in favour. The RAF did order a long range fighter, the Merlin-engined P-51, but deliveries were thwarted by external events. Given that the RAF did not have long range bombers operating in daylight, it is easy to understand why the creation of a long range fighter escort force was not a priority, but neither was it totally ignored.