Unresponsive VVS.

[Arsenal VG-33]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Richard Simpkin in "Deep Battle: the Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii", published in 1987, wrote on page 64;
"Despite its lavish army aviation resources, the Red/Soviet Army never seems to have come near to achieving the speed and intimacy of fixed-wing air support which the Wehrmacht possessed, and the Western Allies developed ..... The reasons for this shortcoming are twofold. One factor (which also affects artillery support) is that a request for additional support coming up from a subordinate commander was - and apparently and astonishingly still is - a one-way ticket to the nearest penal battalion. The second reason is organisational. Although the control organisation for tactical aviation is capable of putting out a tactical headquarters to army and tentacles to division, resources are concentrated in the air army under the control of front, and are not normally farmed out on an on-call basis".

Tony

Is he giving some concrete examples or just saying that with the same cleverness as "farting in water"?

I don't have the complete respunse but is seems from Perov & Restrennin books that delays for Sturmoviks intervention were reduced from some days to some hours in 41-43. So we cannot statue about VVS response (or unresponse) without considering where and when, in what conditions...

Moreover, in his book the famous anti-soviet dissident Viktor Nékrassov "In the tranches of Stalingrad" remembered that for his attack mission on german lines at night, he was (personnaly) helped by two Po-2 night bombers. Considering that his combat section (he was a second Leutenant) was reduced to 9 rifles (a combat group), and german lines were distant at about 20-30 yards, i don't see in what army the air support was that close or even closer and delegated as such low subordination order...(A 2d lieutenant leading a sergeant mission).

Of course, the mission was planned and not impovised, and no question about any radio connection. However...

Regards