Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?

[tcolvin]

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the BofB, is there any dispute about the point made by Clive Ponting in his book '1940, Myth and Reality', that the BofB was won largely, but not entirely, in spite of the RAF's generalship.

1. Left to their own devices, the RAF would not have had an effective air defence system in 1940. Their preferred strategy was defence through attack with the bomber. The industrial capacity necessary to outproduce the LW in fighters was created by a decision of Cabinet in November 1938 that overruled the RAF. The RAF's Dowding System of air defence was made possible by political decision-making.
2. British fighter production, repair and storage systems were reorganised successfully by Beaverbrook's Ministry of Aircraft Production as a result of its separation from the Air Ministry in May 1940. The result was that British fighter availability increased from 644 at the beginning of July 1940 to 732 at end October, while German fighter availability declined over the same period from 725 to 275.
3. By contrast with the success of non-RAF management of aircraft supply, the supply of pilots was left in RAF hands with nearly disastrous results. The pilot training system was inefficient with 4,000 training aircraft producing 2,500 pilots in the 12 months preceding the summer of 1940, while Germany produced one pilot per training aircraft. Even so there was no real shortage of British pilots with 9,000 available to fly 5,000 aircraft. The RAF nevertheless managed to create a shortage by; over-allocating pilots to squadrons (26 pilots for 20 aircraft); allocating 70% of available pilots to non front-line positions (20% to vital instruction, 20% to continuing training of pilots after they had qualified, and 30% to office jobs because the RAF insisted on all staff jobs being filled by pilots).
4. The RAF starved the vital 11 Group of Spitfires, giving it a split of 70% Hurricanes/30% Spitfires while other less critical Groups had a 50/50 split.
5. 11 & 12 Group airfields had resident Blenheim night-fighter squadrons throughout the BofB when their space could have been utilised by Spitfire day-fighters. Coastal Command and FAA airfields in 11 & 12 Group areas were not switched over to day-fighters.
6. Squadrons when re-deployed took all of their fitters and spares with them which removed the squadron from combat for a week. Pilots who landed at a strange airfield had to return to base before being redeployed, instead of re-engaging from where they landed and returning to base later. The GAF later showed how fighters could be deployed across the length of Germany and be refuelled, rearmed and serviced by any airfield unit.
7. In summary, the RAF in general stubbornly adhered to tradition and hidebound procedures even at a time of national emergency. The BofB was decided by; Britain's ability to outproduce Germany in fighters; Dowding's System of air defence (the exception that proved the rule); LW mistakes in equipment and strategy; RN destruction of the German destroyer fleet in Norway; and geography.

Tony