The momentous cost of Bomber Command.

[Sid Guttridge]

My first thought is that the cost of Bomber Command cannot be viewed in isolation from the impact of Bomber Command on Germany in damage and expenditure.

My second thought is that, if there was no Bomber Command, one has to find a viable alternative that would have caused the Germans equivalent damage, expenditure, lost production and redirected military assets.

43,000 Churchill tanks is a nonsensical alternative. Firstly, they could have addressed not a single one of the targets Bomber Command did; secondly, Churchill tanks did not use either the same materials or industrial plant and so were not a direct production equivalent; and thirdly, unlike the Lancaster, they were poor at what they did.

The article seems to assume that the number of duds and misses by Bomber Command bombs were a unique problem. However, only the smallest proportion of bullets or shells hit a significant target either. Less bombs does not automatically mean more of more accurate missiles.

Despite its unrealistically narrow focus, the article was an interesting read.
Nor does Bomber Command seem prohibitively costly, given that it absorbed at most 15% of defence expenditure.

Certainly winning the war cost Britain a fortune. However, the alternative of losing it doesn't seem particularly financially attractive either!