New Shores, et al, book comments

[John Beaman]

I hate to rain on the parade of accolades about the new Chris Shores, et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, Vol. I: North Africa, June 1940-January 1942, but I have some concerns about the Luftwaffe dimension that is of special interest to me and others.

The original Fighters Over The Desert (1969) and its follow-up Fighters Over Tunisia (1975) were ground-breaking in their approach to air war history and content. Both have deservedly received many plaudits over their 40+ year existence. I and others thought A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945 would take the earlier works into and beyond the twenty-first century by making comprehensive revisions and by incorporating all the new material, sources, and research work done by many in the last four decades. I have, however, concerns as to what the new work actually draws upon.

There is nothing wrong about the diary approach or what is written and the daily summaries of claims and losses. My concern is what may, or may not, have been incorporated into the narrative. Specifically, what sources were used in writing this dairy?

Since 1970 there has been a veritable torrent of research and publication on the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean Theatre. This includes high-quality unit histories of LG 1 and KG 54 as well as most, if not all, of the Luftwaffe fighter units deployed to Greece, North Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy. We also now have important publications focusing on the Luftwaffe in Greece and in Sardinia.

Additionally, vast primary sources have become available, discovered, or declassified in the last four decades. Yet, Mediterranean Air War’s bibliography begins on p.524 and is but three pages long. It comprises almost exclusively English-language literature. Nowhere listed are the Luftwaffe’s Namentliche Verluste Meldungen (NVLM), the LwGQM 6. Abt. daily materiel loss reports, or the service’s official claims lists from 1939 on (microfilm, BA-MA). It would appear that at least some of these have been used in the daily summaries, but why are these sources not cited? Next, and most importantly, there is no entry for vital British/Allied ULTRA materiel or for routine air-ground and ground-air radio intelligence. In addition to Luftwaffe personnel and materiel loss reports and to DEFE 3 and HW 5 in the PRO, the BA-MA and the PRO have a plethora of archival materials on North Africa. Not least is a big document by Fl.Fhr. Afrika on its role in North Africa (this seems mostly if not wholly statistical rather than detailing individual losses). Then there are the SALU reports; a wadge of different Allied air tech intelligence report series; and the CSDIC series (over 500 reports total) reporting mostly on POWs taken in the MTO (admittedly CSDIC didn't get fired up until Apr. 1943). Now all these sources were sometimes slow and intermittent to be sure, but clearly the RAF was getting significant intelligence from early 1941 on. Where are the citations?

Was this intelligence significant to both sides and thus to conduct of the war? Yes, maybe not always in a direct, tactical, or strategic way, but it was useful and it was acted upon—the Malta air attacks on Italian-German convoys to Africa are but one example.

So were these sources studied? If so, why not list them? It would not have taken more than a quarter of a page or so to enhance the bibliography, were it merely a matter of doing so. Just asking ….. . . .