Placing the Fairey Battle.

[RodM]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The policy of 'Limited liability' meant that almost all the money went to the RAF throughout the 1930's rearmament. The RAF got what it wanted. That is the basis of the charge of incompetence. The RAF was not constrained. They wanted Fairey Battles and they got them; Blenheims, Hampdens, Wellingtons, Spitfires, Hurricanes - anything they wanted, and as many of them as they wanted.

The army got very little until the last moment. The RAF fought against all attempts by the army to get money, and they succeeded. The RAF claimed it could sink battleships, so the RN did not need money for new battleships. That was why Bismarck and Tirpitz were the largest battleships in the world when they were launched. Think of that. And how long did it take the RAF to sink the Tirpitz? You know the answer. Was it 5 years?

The RN was convicted of incompetence over the Channel Dash. But where were the bombers that the RAF promised could sink any battleship nearing Britain's shores? The money had been spent on bombers. Where were they?

The sinking of POW and Repulse was due to the weakness of the RAF in Malaysia. There were masses of RAF fighters whiling away the time on tarmac in Britain with nothing to do because their enemy was fighting the Russians. The RAF should have been in Malaya.

The RN lacked escorts in 1939-41 to sink U-boats. Churchill begged FDR for 50 rust bucket three-stackers from FDR. Why was the RN short of escorts? You guessed it. They had been denied the funds because the RAF had to have the money, and with it the RAF would destroy any threat up until the moment they were sked to deliver on their promises Then, oops, the excuses started, such as the excuse that the Fairey Battle was obsolescent.

As I have been saying all along; air was too important to be left to the RAF.

Hi Tony,

yes, yes, it is obvious where you think all ills with British arms lay, but no consideration as of the state of army/navy doctrines (strengths and weaknesses) and arms (strengths and weaknesses) at the start of the war has been presented to provide context.

The weakness with the Prince of Wales and Repulse did not lie with the RAF, but rather with inadequate anti-air capability within the RN, just as the same lack of capability was an early weakness of the army.

While the RAF wasn't successful during the Channel Dash, the RAF is not to blame for the lack of success of the navy.

Considering the increase in strength of the Luftwaffe in the late thirties, it is hardly surprising that an air arms race in terms of quality and quantity developed between Britain and Germany - yet you seem to be suggesting that Britain should have done nothing to counter the German air arm other than to concentrate on CAS aircraft. Thus, I don't believe some arguments have been presented in a full context.

If naval-history.net is to be believed, the British/Commonwealth had the largest navy in the world in September 1939; Britain did not have the largest air force. Again, what is the true context of the rapid increase in the RAF in the late thirites, and how well prepared was the 'largest navy in the world' to confront the operational requirements that it would be faced with?

"As I have been saying all along; air was too important to be left to the RAF"

While this is arguably true for army co-operation and the role played by the FAA, such a generalisation isn't worth further comment.

The Battle aircraft was a failure; it wasn't the first weapon to prove to be such at the start of the war and it wasn't the last - that is the nature of warfare - and to rag solely on the RAF for such a failure (ignoring the subsequent development of successful weapons and without the benefit of a major scientific study that looks at the percentage of operational failure of all arms produced in the UK during the war to provide a wider context), as part of an overall campaign to completely discredit the RAF, is hard to justify.


Well, at least these threads remain highly interesting.

Cheers

Rod