Operational Impacts of Ultra on the Air War?

[Boomerang]

Gentlemen:

I would like to ask a very broad question, which I concede may defy a simple answer i.e. how did the intelligence provided by Ultra actually effect the outcomes of the air war between the RAF, USAAF and the LW?

The value of Ultra as a historical resource is blindingly obvious, but Ultra's contemporary impact on aerial operations is another issue. As one example, Donald Caldwell's JG 26 War Diary describes how LW orders for the conduct of operations in the Normandy campaign were broken very quickly, presumably assisting Allied planners to disrupt such operations. However, if Ultra never existed at the time of this campaign, would the outcomes (total Allied air supremacy, thousands of Jabos swarming over the German lines, LW impotence) been any different?

I can see that there are many factors to consider, such as the significance of Ultra in gathering German operational plans, Order of Battle information, technical data, etc, so I doubt there is a simple answer.

Thanks

Don W